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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Community groups in the United States occasionally enter into negotiated agreements 
with local communities to alleviate negative environmental and public health impacts 
associated with polluting industries. These so-called Good Neighbor Agreements (GNAs) 
take a variety of forms, but typically commit the company to mitigate the offending 
practices in exchange for the community group’s commitment to stop legal and public 
relations challenges to business operations.  Many community activists believe that 
GNAs are a promising tool for community empowerment.  This premise is explored in 
the following review of 11 GNA case studies. 
 
The overall conclusion and recommendation emerging from this study is that GNAs are, 
in fact, a process worth pursuing in the right circumstances.  Those circumstances are 
varied, but at a minimum, require a company with the potential to address community 
concerns while maintaining economic viability, and a community group with sufficient 
leverage, resources and skill to move through the often long process.  Five specific 
findings are offered:  
 
(1) Environmental GNAs are Rare.  Although the “GNA approach” has been in existence 
for several years, it is still a fairly rare strategy used by community organizations to 
address environmental, public health, and nuisance concerns. 
 
(2) The GNAs Studied are Generally Quite Effective.  The case studies strongly suggest 
that when used in appropriate circumstances, the GNA approach can be (and often is) 
an effective and appropriate approach for a community group to address 
environmentally-oriented company/community conflicts.   
 
(3) The Northern Plains GNA is Atypical. The arrangement between Northern Plains and 
its partners with the Stillwater Mine is unusually sophisticated in terms of the scope 
and complexity of the agreement, and the community group resources committed to 
the GNAs successful implementation.   
 
(4) Formal—i.e., Written and Legally Binding—GNAs are Highly Desirable, but May 
Not Be Essential to Achieving Implementation Success.  Although there is not a direct 
correlation between the formality of the agreements and their degree of 
implementation success, having a written and binding agreement offers additional 
opportunities to ensure compliance should the signatory company become 
uncooperative.   
 
(5) GNAs Are Best Viewed as a (Long and Difficult) Process.  Successfully utilizing the 
“GNA approach” requires navigating three very different stages typically spanning 
several years: (Stage # 1) getting the company to the negotiation table, (Stage # 2) 
GNA negotiation/design, and (Stage # 3) implementation.   
 
GNAs are not needed everywhere.  But where the safety net of environmental law and 
regulation is inadequate, GNAs can be a valuable tool for community activists.   
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The body of this Good Neighbor Agreement (GNA) evaluation report is relatively brief, 
with most details and supporting material presented in a long series of appendices.  The 
report begins with this introductory section explaining what a GNA is and why and how 
we conducted the evaluation.  This is followed by an overview of the cases investigated 
for this report, and an assessment of their success.  Knowledge gained from these case 
studies is then summarized as key findings, followed by concluding remarks.  The 
appendices that follow the main report contain a wealth of information, primarily 
focusing on further describing the case studies (particularly the Northern Plains 
arrangement with Stillwater Mine) and the research methodology.  
 
 
WHAT ARE GOOD NEIGHBOR AGREEMENTS? 
 
In many locations throughout the United States, communities suffer negative 
environmental and social impacts from neighboring industries.  Conflicts are particularly 
common in areas dominated by industries such as petrochemicals, manufacturing, and 
mining.  A variety of federal, state, and local laws, and their associated permitting 
programs, provide some protections for local communities.  However, these protections 
are frequently viewed by communities as inadequate, often failing to recognize and 
address the full range of local concerns, and enforced by agencies with a limited set of 
remedies and, frequently, declining budgets and staffs.  Additionally, these protections 
can create regulatory costs and uncertainties detrimental to the companies and, in many 
cases, the communities as well.  Communities, companies, and governments often see a 
need for better solutions. 
 
Increasingly, community organizations—sometimes in conjunction with local 
governments—are choosing to address these conflicts through the use of agreements 
negotiated directly with the local companies.  These so-called Good Neighbor 
Agreements (GNAs) take a variety of forms, but typically are documents promising 
company concessions and behavioral changes designed to reduce (and more fully 
disclose) negative community impacts.  Despite the positive sentiments evoked by the 
“Good Neighbor” terminology, these concessions are typically the product of hard-fought 
negotiations, and then, are only offered in exchange for a community commitment to stop 
litigation, a permit challenge, or some other form of activism against the company.   
 
 
WHY EVALUATE GNAS? 
 
In the summer of 2001, the Northern Plains Resource Council (hereafter “Northern 
Plains” or NPRC) contracted with the Natural Resources Law Center and Anne 
Fitzgerald Associates to conduct a three-year study of environmental GNAs.  There were 
several motivations for this study.  First and foremost, Northern Plains is already a 
signatory and active participant in a GNA with the Stillwater Mine (Montana), one of the 
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world’s largest producers of platinum and palladium.1  While this is enough to make 
Northern Plains an expert on the design and implementation of GNAs, the organization’s 
experience with GNAs is nonetheless limited to this one example.  In order to potentially 
improve the functioning of this arrangement and to guide ongoing discussions about 
potential new GNAs in other substantive areas (e.g., coalbed methane development), 
Northern Plains felt that the organization could benefit from an outside perspective and 
from a comparison of the Northern Plains GNA experience with others nationally.  This 
evaluation and review was to have at least two additional benefits.  First, it would allow 
the organization to better respond to the dozens of inquiries flooding in from other 
community organizations considering the adoption of environmental GNAs, and 
similarly, to better share knowledge among other groups that, like Northern Plains, had 
some first-hand experience with GNAs.  And secondly, such a review would be helpful in 
guiding funders anxious to assist communities in the resolution of environmental 
problems.  Much like the community groups and companies that sign GNAs, the funding 
community is interesting in generating maximizing return on its investments.  An 
evaluation of GNA performance could greatly inform these decisions.  
 
These various motivations came together when the William and Flora Hewlett 
Foundation, a long-time supporter of Northern Plains and their GNA arrangement, 
offered to fund a three-year evaluation of GNAs, with the intention of generating 
information that could be of use to Northern Plains, other community organizations with 





This study is primarily based on a review of 11 case studies, with the majority of data 
collection being accomplished through a written survey, the review of written documents 
where available (including the GNA itself), oral interviews, and three workshops held in 
Montana (at the end of year 1, 2 and 3 of research).  This work was done collaboratively 
among the research team, with most survey work and the literature review being 
coordinated by the Natural Resources Law Center, most phone communications 
conducted by Anne Fitzgerald Associates, and the hosting of workshops by Northern 
Plains. The case study approach was seen as essential since there is not a rich GNA 
literature, and since our goal is to identify lessons and trends that relate to the use of 
GNAs in practice.   
 
In all of this work, our communications were with the community groups—and not the 
companies—involved in the GNAs.  This focus on community groups persists in the 
analysis of data and the formulation of conclusions.  A companion study from the 
perspective of the companies would undoubtedly be a worthwhile effort, but was 
considered beyond the scope and intended audience of this investigation. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Palladium is a primary component in catalytic converters used to reduce automobile emissions.  Only 3 
mines worldwide produce palladium. 
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The GNA Network 
 
A key source of information and insight in this study was the community leaders and 
their consultants directly involved in the negotiation and implementation of the GNAs 
studied.  This so-called “GNA network” was consulted frequently during the study, 
including in three workshops held in Montana.  Some of the key contributors are listed 
below in Table 1: 
 
Table 1.  Participants in the GNA Network 
 Richard Abraham, Texans United Education Fund 
 Rachael Belz, Ohio Citizen Action 
 Darlene Bos, Northern Plains Resource Council (Montana) 
 Arleen Boyd, Stillwater Protective Association (Montana) 
 Ruth Breech, Ohio Citizen Action 
 Aaron Browning, Northern Plains Resource Council (Montana) 
 Dawn Caldarelli, Seneca-Babcock Environmental Sub-Committee (New York) 
 Janet Callaghan, Shoreline Environmental Alliance (Rodeo/Crockett, California) 
 Iris Carter, Concerned Citizens of Norco (Louisiana) 
 Joan Chadez, Citizens of Owyhee County Organized Association (Idaho) 
 Henry Clark, West County Toxics Coalition (Richmond, California) 
 Ilene Dobbin, Citizens of Owyhee County Organized Association (Idaho) 
 Sarah Eeles, West County Toxics Coalition (Richmond, California) 
 Teresa Erickson, Northern Plains Resource Council (Montana) 
 Jack Heyneman, Stillwater Protective Association (Montana) 
 Jerry Iverson, Cottonwood Resource Council (Montana) 
 Kasha Kessler, Shoreline Environmental Alliance (Rodeo/Crockett, California) 
 Robyn Morrison, Western Slope Environmental Resource Council (Paonia, 
Colorado) 
 Denny Larson, Refinery Reform Campaign (San Francisco) 
 Bill Nowak, Buffalo Common Council (New York) 
 Jeremy Puckett, Western Slope Environmental Resource Council (Paonia, 
Colorado) 
 Michael Reisner, Northern Plains Resource Council (Montana) 
 Anne Rolfes, Louisiana Bucket Brigade 
 Jane Shellenberger, Boulder Residents for the Elimination of Air Toxics and 
Hazardous Emissions (Colorado) 
 Amy Singer, Northern Plains Resource Council (Montana) 
 Garland Smith, Citizens of Owyhee County Organized Association (Idaho) 
 Wilma Subra, Louisiana Bucket Brigade 
 Tara Thomas, Western Slope Environmental Resource Council (Paonia, 
Colorado)  
 Ed von Bleichert, Boulder Residents for the Elimination of Air Toxics and 
Hazardous Emissions (Colorado) 
 Bob Wendelgass, Clean Water Action (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) 





Very little documentation exists regarding our relatively small set of case studies, a 
reality that has influenced our selection of research methods.  Given our small sample 
size and our reliance on subjective opinions, we sought to provide some structure to our 
qualitative conclusions by subjecting each case to the same set of evaluation metrics.  
The selection of these metrics was not only driven by our data limitations and related 
methodological constraints, but was also influenced by the broad goals of this study.  Our 
desire is to accomplish more than a simple determination of success or failure, but to also 
develop a better understanding of why efforts succeed or fail, and what transferable 
lessons can be pulled from this collective experience.  Based on this set of reasons, we 
ultimately selected a research approach that relies primarily on 3 evaluation metrics, 
listed below in order of importance (most important listed first): 
 
1. Actual program activities versus promised activities.  To the extent that the GNA 
requires specific actions (or inactions) at predetermined times (or under specific 
circumstances), these standards provide a useful way to evaluate activities, outputs, 
and potentially, outcomes.   
 
2. Participant satisfaction and self-assessment.  Presumably, participants have a good 
idea of the suite of problem-solving options available to them, and of the costs and 
benefits of pursuing the GNA strategy.  Thus, their degree of satisfaction with the 
GNA is a useful metric of the strategy.   
 
3. GNA success versus other problem-solving opportunities.  Communities can use a 
variety of approaches to modify and/or control the activities of neighboring 
companies.  Ultimately, the efficacy of the GNA approach must be considered with 
respect to what is potentially achievable using other tools—including those of a 
regulatory, judicial, economic, and/or political nature. 
 
Two additional metrics were also utilized to complement and further refine the analysis 
of case study information: 
 
4. Self-assessment of keys to success and failure.  Success or failure can often hinge on 
the availability of a key resource or circumstance that is best understood by 
participants active in the negotiation and implementation of the GNA.  By 
understanding the keys to success and failure, informed judgments can be made about 
the potential merits, application and transferability of the GNA approach. 
 
5. Internal logic of the problem-solving strategy used in the GNA.  One way to explain 
the success or failure of a problem-solving strategy in a given situation is through an 
institutional analysis approach that evaluates how the GNA effort has changed rules 
influencing relationships, behaviors, and activities of key participants, and whether or 
not this happened as intended. 
 




SELECTION OF CASES 
 
The research approach used in this study is based on the analysis of case studies.  
Locating GNA case studies was a difficult process for many reasons.  For starters, the 
term “Good Neighbor Agreement” is poorly defined and is used inconsistently in a 
variety of contexts; thus, it is difficult to decide what types of arrangements should be 
included.  In this investigation, we’ve decided to primarily focus on arrangements with 
the following characteristics: 
 
1. Feature a written agreement (i.e., an actual GNA document)2; 
2. Located in the United States3; 
3. Concerned primarily with environmental pollution or natural resource impacts 
and/or the associated impacts on human populations4; and 
4. Prominently involve one or more non-profit community groups. 
 
These criteria reflect our need for cases offering parallels to the Northern Plains GNA 
with the Stillwater Mine.   
 
No central or comprehensive listing of GNAs currently exist.  Based on our review of the 
relevant—but exceedingly sparse and dispersed—literature (see Appendix A), and our 
investigation of numerous Internet-based leads, we identified about 15 cases that 
potentially fit our criteria.  These cases were narrowed from a body of roughly 50 self-
defined GNAs in the United States. 
 
Once this set of potential case studies was identified, we contacted key members of the 
relevant community organizations and, where appropriate, followed through with a 
general survey (see Appendix B).  The decision to use a survey was based on our need to 
develop a working knowledge of each case, to collect information in a standardized 
manner (to facilitate comparisons), and to cultivate relationships with community leaders 
that can contribute to, and ultimately use, this research.  The survey was also useful in 
fine-tuning our selection of case studies, since it is fruitless to pursue cases where we 
                                                 
2 Our thinking was two-fold: (1) that a written agreement would be necessary to locate and compile a case 
study, and (2) that only a formal agreement would offer the promise of solving the issue of concern.  This 
guideline was violated by our inclusion of the Rohm and Haas agreement with Ohio Citizen Action.  As 
discussed later (particularly in finding # 4), the inclusion of this case study provided to be very worthwhile, 
as the case illustrates a highly informal GNA model that can be very successful. 
3 We do not have a full picture of GNA activity overseas, with the exception of the effort being led by 
Friends of the Earth Scotland (see http://www.foe-scotland.org.uk/nation/gna_report.pdf). 
4 Note that the phrase “environmental GNAs” is defined herein to include agreements focused on human 
health impacts associated with air, land or water pollution.  This clarification is needed to distinguish these 
GNAs from those focused on topics such as collective bargaining and banking, areas where some GNA 
activity is believed to exist. 
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could not find an appropriate contact person, and thus, could not acquire a minimum level 
of documentation.   Based on this mix of technical and practical criteria, we ultimately 
chose to include 11 case studies. 5
 
 
OVERVIEW OF CASES 
 
The case studies featured in this study are briefly summarized below (listed here by name 
of participating company & primary community group(s)).  More detailed reviews can be 
found in Appendix D and, for the Stillwater/Northern Plains case, Appendix C.  The case 
studies (Appendix D) were primarily compiled from surveys (Appendix B) and from the 
limited documentation available, particularly the GNAs themselves.  In drafting the 
Stillwater/Northern Plains case study, Anne Fitzgerald Associates supplemented this 
information with a series of personal interviews.   
 
 Bowie Resources & Western Slope Environmental Resource Council (WSERC).  
(Paonia, Colorado.) The GNA is primarily designed to limit truck and rail traffic and 
noise associated with increased production at a coal mine.  The GNA, adopted in 
2000, was an outgrowth of a federal coal permit challenge which threatened to delay 
mine expansion for several years.  The GNA provided the community with a 
mechanism for addressing the traffic issues—which was not covered in the EIS—and 
allowed the company to move forward quickly with expansion.   
 
 Chevron Refinery & West County Toxics Coalition (WCTC), Communities for a 
Better Environment (CBE), and People Do!.  (Richmond, California.) The GNA was 
inspired by a variety of public health and nuisance concerns associated with pollution 
discharges and Clean Air Act violations from the Chevron refinery.  When the 
refinery sought a state air quality permit to (ironically) start manufacturing new 
“clean fuels,” a permit challenge was initiated, prompting GNA negotiations leading 
to adoption of an agreement in 1992 calling for reduced pollution, increased 
monitoring, and investments in the local economy. 
 
 Rhone-Poulenc & Texans United Education Fund (TUEF). (Manchester-Houston, 
Texas.)  The GNA addresses the community’s public health and nuisance (odors, 
noise, traffic) concerns associated with emissions from a chemical plant.  A major 
chemical spill and a pending permit mobilized the community to seek the GNA, 
which was adopted in 1992 as part of the permit issued by the Texas Water 
Commission. 
 
 Rohm and Haas & Ohio Citizen Action (OCA) and Environmental Community 
Organization.  (Cincinnati, Ohio.)  The agreement addresses air quality and noise 
issues associated with a chemical plant.  In response to public pressures resulting 
from an aggressive canvassing and media strategy, the company agreed in 1991 to an 
                                                 
5 The 11 cases actually cover 13 GNAs (since the 3 Seneca-Babcock industries are treated as one case).  
Additionally, some of our advisors and members of our GNA network have experience with multiple cases, 
which undoubtedly increases the value of their opinions and insights. 
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informal and non-binding agreement that addresses the public health and nuisance 
concerns through a Community Advisory Council. 
 
 Seneca-Babcock industries (PVS Chemicals, BOC Gases, and Natural 
Environmental, Inc.) & Buffalo Common Council and Seneca Babcock 
Environmental Subcommittee (SBESC).  (Buffalo, New York.)  The GNA is actually 
a series of three agreements addressing a variety of environmental, public health, and 
nuisance concerns associated with three chemical companies.  Bad publicity (in part 
due to spills) and governmental pressure prompted negotiations leading to agreements 
signed in 1995-1997 focusing on pollution prevention, community notification and 
involvement, and public health and safety.  
 
 Shell Oil & Concerned Citizens of Norco (CCN).  (Norco, Louisiana.)  The GNA is 
the culmination of a lengthy and bitter fight concerning public health and nuisance 
impacts experienced by families living adjacent to a refinery and a chemical plant.  
The agreement promises funds to relocate the most affected individuals. 
 
 Stillwater Mining Company & Northern Plains Resource Council (NPRC), Stillwater 
Protective Association, and Cottonwood Resource Council.  (Billings, Montana.)  The 
GNA addresses concerns relating to environmental protection and the community 
impacts of new workers being brought in to increase production at a palladium mine.  
Community groups used pending permits and threatened lawsuits together with a 
negative publicity campaign to force a negotiated agreement in 2000 that addresses 
key community concerns while allowing mine operations/expansion to proceed.  (See 
Appendix C for a detailed discussion.) 
 
 Sun Oil & Community/Labor Refinery Tracking Committee (C/LRTC) and the City 
of Philadelphia.  (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.) The GNA addresses public health and 
quality of life issues associated with sulfur dioxide emissions from a refinery.  
Negotiation and adoption of the GNA derived from a lawsuit inspired by Clean Air 
Act violations.  The GNA was enacted in 1997 as a consent decree to the lawsuit, 
which has since expired. 
 
 Syntex Chemicals & Boulder Residents for the Elimination of Air Toxics and 
Hazardous Emissions (BREATHE).  (Boulder, Colorado.) The GNA mitigates the 
public health and nuisance impacts of air emissions from a pharmaceutical company.  
The agreement, initiated by the company and adopted in 1995, was inspired by high 
emissions reported in the Toxic Release Inventory and by threats by citizens and local 
government to block needed building permits for a proposed expansion.   
 
 Unocal & Shoreline Environmental Alliance (SEA), Communities for a Better 
Environment, and the Crocket/Rodeo Coalition.  (Crockett/Rodeo, California.) The 
GNA addresses public health concerns associated with chemical releases from a 
refinery.  Several highly dangerous spills/releases prompted citizens to challenge the 




 Idaho Dairies & Citizens of Owyhee County Organized Association (COCOA).  
(Marsing, Idaho).  The GNA addresses the impacts on water and air quality 
associated with large-scale dairy operations, particularly the disposal of manure.  
Negotiations were prompted by a citizen challenge of a water permit needed by the 
dairy.  The GNA, signed in 1998, is included in the state water permit.  Originally the 
GNA applied to only one dairy but was later extended to a second dairy owned by the 
same operator.   
 
 
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
 
Overall, the cases offer enough similarities to ensure that comparisons are meaningful, 
while featuring sufficient variation to support useful contrasts.  Appendix E provides a 
statistical summary of the information gathered; the following paragraphs summarize 
some key highlights. 
 
Perhaps the strongest similarity among the cases is the history of how the GNA came into 
being.  With remarkably few exceptions, the following narrative appears to be an 
accurate summary of each of our case studies: 
 
A company (normally profitable) repeatedly ignores community 
complaints about pollution (nuisance, public health, and environmental 
concerns) and related impacts until a time at which it needs a new permit 
(often as part of its expansion plans) or it violates an existing permit (e.g., 
a sulfur dioxide spill).  This provides a focal point for community 
opposition, and can provide an opportunity for community groups, by now 
often organized into local coalitions, to threaten a lawsuit, a permit 
challenge, and/or other forms of and activism.  This tactic is generally 
augmented by a public relations campaign.  The intent of the community is 
rarely to close the company, but rather to force resolution of community 
concerns outside the scope of, or beyond the apparent interest or ability 
of, governmental regulators.  Fearing a lawsuit—where delays are as 
much a concern for the company as a potential negative verdict—or the 
rejection of permits, and wanting to turn bad publicity into good, 
companies accept (often begrudgingly) a community’s offer to negotiate.  
The resulting GNA outlines a plan for addressing community concerns, 
often employing creative remedies not usually available through 
regulatory or litigation mechanisms.  The breadth and strength of the 
resulting GNA is closely correlated to the amount of leverage held by the 
community group at the time of negotiation.6   
                                                 
6 The experience of the Stillwater Mine GNA, for example, follows this pattern.  The relationship between 
the mine and the local community became strained in 1997-1998, when the company sought the permits 
necessary to significantly expand production, to build a new impoundment, and to establish “man camps” 
for new workers.  These modifications threatened to produce a variety of environmental, public health, and 
nuisance problems.  Nonetheless, the permitting and EIS processes led by the U.S. Forest Service and the 
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The greatest point of difference among the case studies is arguably the size of the 
community groups involved.  Annual budgets of these groups range from $500 to $2.1 
million dollars; similarly, the number of paid staff positions range from 0 to 170.   There 
is also significant variation in the industries involved, ranging from dairies to mines to 
refineries.  However, in many respects, these industries are ultimately quite similar in that 
they each produce emissions (pollution) that are mobile and, thus, problematic to 
neighboring communities.  Addressing these transboundary impacts—what economists 
call externalities—is notoriously difficult, as polluting industries usually lack the 
economic incentives to change behavior since the benefits of this changed behavior are 
unlikely to show up as profits on the company’s balance sheet.  For this reason, 
environmental law imposes regulations on polluting industries, and tools such as citizen 
lawsuits and permit challenges empower communities to help ensure that regulations are 
enforced even when the relevant agencies fail to act.  Public relations pressure can also 
provide a source of leverage promoting changed company behavior.  A “good neighbor,” 
therefore, is one that has reached a point at which it becomes more profitable to cease the 
offending behavior than to continue and face community opposition.7   
 
 
THE IMPLEMENTATION RECORD 
 
The implementation record of the case studies is more similar than different, and is 
generally positive.  The degree to which GNA commitments have been honored reflects 
many factors, including not only the strength of the agreements, but also the attitudes of 
the companies involved, the vigilance of the community groups, the age (and stage) of 
the agreements, and the ease to which community concerns are readily resolved through 
technological fixes or other readily-identifiable strategies.8   
 
One of the most successful cases is the most informal of the GNAs investigated: the 
agreement between Rohm and Haas and Ohio Citizen Action.  In this case, 
chloromethane emissions have been reduced dramatically (almost entirely), while idling 
trucks have been removed from the neighborhood.  What this GNA lacks in legal 
formality it apparently compensates for in the strength of the community group (Ohio 
Citizen Action) and the cooperative spirit of the plant manager. 
 
Implementation of the two mining-related GNA cases also has gone well.  The contract 
between Bowie Resources and the Western Slope Environmental Resource Council 
                                                                                                                                                 
Montana Department of Environmental Quality approved the expansion plan, triggering a lawsuit by the 
Stillwater Protective Association.  Concerned about the costs, delays, uncertainties, negative publicity, and 
incomplete solutions often typical of litigation, the mine and community activists soon agreed to negotiate 
a GNA.  By 2000, a legally binding agreement was in place that provides land, water and community 
protections, and that gives locals access to the mine’s operations.  (A brief description of this case is found 
in Appendix D; a detailed discussion is found in Appendix C.) 
7 Despite the near uniform (and well-justified) frustration with regulatory agencies expressed by the 
community groups in this study, it is worth noting that the very fact that often small community groups 
have been able to entice companies to negotiate GNAs is evidence that the US system of environmental 
regulation has real strengths.   
8 Implementation histories are included as part of the case studies in Appendix D. 
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(WSERC), for example, has resulted in rerouting of truck traffic to a new load-out facility 
and the implementation of noise mitigation measures.  Some elements of the agreement 
did not survive the company’s recent bankruptcy proceedings, although this has not yet 
proved to be problematic.  The agreement between Stillwater Mine and Northern Plains 
(and others) also has been successful in many ways.  The establishment of the busing 
program for mine workers is among the most visible accomplishments, although for this 
and many other issues addressed by the GNA, implementation has required a large 
commitment of staff time and ongoing pressure on the mine—which has recently 
changed ownership.  If not for the GNA provision requiring the mine to fund some of 
Northern Plains’ oversight expenses, the level of progress achieved would likely be 
noticeably lessened.   
 
Two cases involving chemical companies also appear successful and largely complete, 
although in both cases a lack of data regarding implementation and the difficulty in 
identifying individuals still involved in the cases makes detailed assessments difficult.  
The oldest of the two agreements is the GNA between Rhone-Poulenc and Texans United 
Education Fund, which appears to have achieved the goal of involving the Citizens 
Advisory Committee (CAC) in many aspects of company planning and decision making 
regarding health and nuisance (odors, noise, traffic) concerns.  In the GNA between 
BREATHE and Syntex Chemicals (Boulder), the emissions reduction program is also 
believed to have been relatively successful, however, BREATHE has dissolved and very 
little monitoring data exists to track compliance with the terms negotiated. 
 
Another of the mature agreements is the GNA between the Community/Labor Refinery 
Tracking Committee and Sun Oil (Philadelphia) which expired with the federal consent 
decree in which it was enacted.  Most items, including installation of the sulfur recovery 
units, were implemented, but implementation required constant pressure from the 
community, and the local air quality has not noticeably improved. 
 
Somewhat similar implementation histories are associated with two refineries in 
California.  The GNA between Chevron and the West County Toxics Coalition (WCTC) 
(Richmond) has featured partial implementation success, as leakless valves were installed 
and a community health center was established.  Fenceline monitoring and long-term 
funding of the health center have not been achieved, however, as community attention 
has shifted to other issues.  The GNA between Unocal and Shoreline Environmental 
Alliance (SEA) (Crockett/Rodeo) has also produced some successes, but overall the 
implementation history has been disappointing as both the company and the community 
groups have gone through transitions.  Since the GNA was signed, SEA and CBE are no 
longer strong and vibrant organizations; similarly, the Unocal facility has been sold twice 
(and is now Conoco/Phillips).  Some health studies were completed, mitigation funds 
were awarded, and emergency warning equipment is now in place, but many other 
provisions are likely to remain unaddressed.  These cases illustrate the long-term 
challenge of GNA implementation. 
 
The most recent of our refinery cases involves Shell Oil and Concerned Citizens of 
Norco.  The deal negotiated is clearly a mixed bag, as most citizens covered by the 
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agreement have now been able to relocate (a few families have chosen to stay), but 
compensation for property and moving expenses has been low and difficult to obtain, and 
long-term health care issues remain unaddressed.  The GNA was clearly beneficial, but it 
was nonetheless a very partial and ultimately inadequate solution to the most horrific of 
the cases in this study. 
 
A mixed track record also characterizes the GNAs negotiated between the three Buffalo, 
New York companies (PVS Chemicals, BOC Gases, and Natural Environmental, Inc.) 
with the Seneca Babcock Environmental Subcommittee (SBESC) and Buffalo Common 
Council (BCC). The most successful of the three has been the agreement with National 
Environmental Inc., which has now addressed most community concerns relating to truck 
traffic and noise.  The implementation record with BOC Gases and PVS Chemicals has 
been spotty at best.  The problems with BOC Gases stem from the facility “going remote” 
(i.e., becoming largely computerized and mechanized).  The most notable success from 
the PVS Chemicals GNA has been the establishment of the CAN system, a computerized 
telephone system used to alert community residents of spills or other emergencies. 
 
The remaining case study is the GNA between Idaho Dairies and Citizens of Owyhee 
County Organized Association (COCOA).  Initial progress under this GNA is 
encouraging, particularly the voluntary extension of the GNA to a second dairy and the 
establishment of water monitoring programs.  However, the financial and staff demands 
on COCOA remain high, and the impact of the dairies on local water resources has not 





As stated earlier, three primary “metrics” are being employed to measure the degree to 
which the GNAs studied are considered successful: (1) actual program activities versus 
promised activities; (2) participant satisfaction and self-assessment; and (3) GNA success 
versus other problem-solving opportunities.  Each metric is difficult to apply in practice, 
and each tells only part of the story of how useful and appropriate the GNA approach has 
been.  Presumably, the first and, perhaps, the third metric can be applied by an 
independent observer with adequate data, whereas the second metric comes directly from 
the opinions of the community group participants.  However, as a practical matter, it is 
difficult to limit community group member opinions to just the second metric, as the 
study was highly reliant on basic data from community group participants.  Also 
problematic is the fact that the cases are in different stages of completion.  For these and 
other reasons, the evaluations offered by both the study authors and the community group 
participants are both highly subjective and inherently qualitative.  Fortunately, there are 
only a few areas of disagreement, and these are relatively minor. 
 
The opinions on GNA success provided by community group members (in survey data) 









Rating: 1 to 10  (10 is best)
Overall Success b
Rating: 1 to 10   
(10 is best) 
Would you do 
it (the GNA) 
again? 
TUEF 9.5 9.5 Yes 
WSERC 10 9 Yes 
WCTC 9, 10 [9.5] 8, 10 [9.0] Yes, Yes 
NPRC 9 9 Unsure 
OCA 9.5 9 Yes 
BREATHE 7-8, 8 [7.8] 8, 9 [8.5] Unsure, 
Most Likely 
C/LRTC 8 8 Unsure 
COCOA 8 8 Yes 
LABB 10 7 Unsure 
SBESC/BCC 5-6, 7 [6.3] 5, 6 Yes, Yes 
SEA 4 5 No 
AVERAGES 8.3 8.0  
 a = evaluation metric # 1; b = evaluation metric # 2. 
 WSERC = Western Slope Environmental Resource Council; WCTC = West County Toxics Coalition; 
TUEF = Texans United Education Fund; OCA = Ohio Citizen Action; SBESC = Seneca-Babcock 
Environmental Subcommittee; NPRC = Northern Plains Resource Council; C/LRTC = 
Community/Labor Refinery Tracking Committee; BREATHE = Boulder Residents for the Elimination 
of Air Toxics and Hazardous Emissions; SEA = Shoreline Environmental Alliance; LABB = Louisiana 
Bucket Brigade; COCOA = Citizens of Owyhee County Organized Association. 
 Multiple responses mean more than one individual completed a survey.  Multiple responses from a 
single group are averaged [shown in brackets] for purposes of calculating the overall averages. 




Based on the information available, these “self assessments” offered by the community 
group participants seem reasonable with very few exceptions.9  Specifically, the GNA 
ranking by the WCTC representatives now seem generous given the recent “backsliding” 
of the company (e.g., declining support of the health center), while the GNA ranking by 
the SEA representative appears somewhat pessimistic given that the initial failure to 
relocate the school and the ongoing problem with the distribution of mitigation fund 
money are not problems that can be described as a failure of the company to honor 
commitments.10  Also somewhat questionable is the description by the LABB 
representative that GNA commitments in the Norco case have been completely honored 
(10 out of 10).  This ranking does not reflect recent difficulties with relocation, but was 
likely a reasonable response at the time the survey was completed.11  Also, it is 
                                                 
9 These “independent evaluations” come exclusively from the lead author, Doug Kenney. 
10 Implementation histories are provided as part of the case studies in Appendix D, and summarized in 
implementation tables.  Due to data limitations, there is no implementation table for the BREATHE case. 
11 At the time the surveys were conducted, we did not have the cooperation of a member of CCN 
(Concerned Citizens of Norco), so we relied upon the judgment of technical consultants associated with 
LABB (Louisiana Bucket Brigade).  Over the course of the study, we recruited a CCN member to the GNA 
network and updated our knowledge of this case significantly. 
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worthwhile to note that the rankings offered by the SBESC/BCC respondents were an 
attempt to collectively summarize the response of three different GNAs, one of which has 
clearly been successful (with Natural Environmental, Inc.) while the other two have been 
only marginally beneficial (with BOC Gases and PVS Chemicals). 
 
The third of our primary evaluation metrics—a comparison of GNA success versus other 
problem-solving opportunities—is particularly difficult to apply, given that it requires a 
judgment regarding the outcomes potentially achievable using other problem-solving 
techniques.  Nonetheless, two observations are worth noting.  First, in every case, the 
GNA was not the first technique used to resolve the problem, nor was it used in isolation 
from other techniques and tools (such as lawsuits, permit challenges, public relations, and 
so on).  To the contrary, the GNA approach was used as a way to harness these other 
techniques and tools into a coordinated problem-solving effort finally capable of yielding 
results.  Secondly, this coordinated problem-solving effort (of which the GNA was the 
centerpiece) undoubtedly achieved a long list of outcomes likely impossible through 
other means.  The high flexibility of the GNA tool is apparent from even a cursory 
review of the type of concessions gained by communities: e.g. citizen/community 
involvement in company operations, outside reviews of facilities, relocation of families, 
worker busing programs, elimination of nuisances (e.g., idling buses), community 
investments (e.g., health centers, parks), information sharing, and so on.  The fact that 
only one survey respondent pledged not to use a GNA in future disputes (while a 
majority said they would) further illustrates the opinion that this tool can accomplish 





The information and analysis featured in this report support five major themes and 
conclusions regarding the current state of environmental GNAs: 
 
 
(1) ENVIRONMENTAL GNAS ARE RARE.  Although the “GNA approach” has been in 
existence for several years, it is still a fairly rare strategy used by community 
organizations to address environmental, public health, and nuisance concerns. 
 
Of course, the manner in which GNAs are defined shapes the number of identified case 
studies.  The range of GNA studies is larger if the defining criteria are relaxed, and if 
non-environmental GNAs are included.  For example, a variety of GNAs have been 
pursued (including many by Ohio Citizen Action) that we chose not to investigate 
because of their informality (“handshake GNAs”); similarly, we found evidence of GNAs 
in non-environmental fields such as collective bargaining and labor relations.  The lack of 
GNAs in the environmental field is reflective of the strong history of relying on 
regulation, litigation outcomes and permitting processes, and perhaps more importantly, a 
history of activists trying to eliminate “offending” industries completely.12  Authors of 
                                                 
12 Many of the industries featured in these case studies are frequently targeted by the so-called NIMBY 
movement (Not In My BackYard). 
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GNAs, in contrast, do not seek to drive industry out of the region, but rather seek to shape 
industry practices to better respect and protect community values.  It is this quality, more 
than any other, that is at the heart of the “good neighbor” terminology.   
 
 
(2) THE GNAS STUDIED ARE GENERALLY QUITE EFFECTIVE.  The case studies strongly 
suggest that when  used in appropriate circumstances, the GNA approach can be 
(and often is) an effective and appropriate approach for a community group to 
address environmentally-oriented company-community conflicts.   
 
Most of the members in our GNA network are happy with their arrangements, and for 
good reason.  If the SBESC case study is disaggregated into 3 cases, this study features 
13 GNAs of which 10 are likely to meet most definitions of success.  Even those that are 
problematic—i.e., the SBESC arrangements with BOC Gases and PVS Chemicals, and 
the SEA arrangement with Unocal (now Conoco/Phillips)—have been partially 
successful (although the future of BOC Gases is in question).  It is important to note, 
however, that this success has come at a significant price in terms of personnel and 
budget; as discussed below (particularly in findings # 3 and 5), achieving success through 
the GNA approach normally requires a significant amount of effort and resources.  
 
 
(3) THE NORTHERN PLAINS GNA IS ATYPICAL. The arrangement between Northern 
Plains and its partners with the Stillwater Mine is unusually sophisticated in 
terms of the scope and complexity of the agreement, and the community group 
resources committed to the GNA’s successful implementation.   
 
There is much that other groups could learn from the NPRC GNA with the Stillwater 
Mine, but perhaps most important is that the complexity of the GNA should not exceed 
the capacity of the community group to ensure monitoring and implementation.  While 
this GNA is clearly successful, it is not an appropriate model for groups without a 
comparable level of resources and longevity.  One source of implementation resources is 
funding from the mine for NPRC’s GNA monitoring and oversight expenses—a 
concession that most members of our GNA network found remarkable and desirable in 
future GNAs.13  As the apparent “Cadillac” of GNAs, this GNA undoubtedly offers some 
useful insights about what future GNAs should look like, but at the same time, it likely 
presents a model that is unrealistic for groups with lesser resources.   
 
It is important to note, however, that while we conclude that the vast organizational 
resources of NPRC are essential to the implementation of its GNA, and that 
organizational resources (i.e., budget and staffing) in general are an extremely valuable 
asset to groups considering GNAs, such resources are not always essential.  COCOA, 
BREATHE and SBESC, for example, have all produced notable successes using GNAs, 
                                                 
13 The argument has been made that accepting implementation money from the company can potentially 
lead to cooptation.  While this may be a concern in some cases, a more serious concern is community 
groups without sufficient resources to monitor and ensure implementation.   
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while operating on a collective annual budget of under $20,000 annually.14  Organizations 
lacking extensive resources are clearly at a disadvantage when using the GNA tool (and 
all other problem-solving tools for that matter), but it is a disadvantage that can often be 
overcome by a sound strategy and committed leadership (as described in finding # 5). 
 
 
(4) FORMAL—I.E., WRITTEN AND LEGALLY BINDING—GNAS ARE HIGHLY DESIRABLE, 
BUT MAY NOT BE ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVING IMPLEMENTATION SUCCESS.   
Although there is not a direct correlation between the formality of the agreements 
and their degree of implementation success, having a written and binding 
agreement offers additional opportunities to ensure compliance should the 
signatory company become uncooperative.   
 
This finding is largely influenced by the approach used by Ohio Citizen Action (OCA) 
which relies on canvassing and letter writing to pressure companies to agree to address 
problems, but does not require signed contracts or agreements.  This approach has been 
used with great success in the OCA case with Rohm and Haas (described herein), and in 
other contexts as well—including the ongoing campaign with AK Steel.15  This compares 
favorably with the most “legally bulletproof” of the agreements—the now-expired 
arrangement between C/LRTC and Sun Oil (Philadelphia) enacted in a federal consent 
decree—where the company’s implementation record was considered good but not 
exceptional (estimated by the community representative as 80 percent compliance), and 
was achieved only under constant community pressure.  It is likely that most community 
groups will conclude, wisely, that formal agreements provide a valuable source of 
ongoing leverage useful in ensuring GNA implementation.16  But the case studies 
reviewed in this study suggest that formal agreements are not always essential, and 




                                                 
14 Budget information for WCTC is not available, but is likely quite modest as well.  In contrast, NPRC has 
an annual budget of approximately $800,000. 
15 Already, the AK Steel campaign has turned over 30,000 letters from citizens into company commitments 
to spend $65 million on air pollution controls. 
16 Designing an agreement that companies cannot easily “dodge” or “escape from” is a common goal of 
groups pursing GNAs, and is a challenge where legal expertise can be extremely beneficial.  In negotiating 
with a company, it is good idea for the community group to have an understanding of contract law.  A brief 
primer on contract law is provided as Appendix H.  Enforcement of agreements is always an overriding 
concern.  One of the most promising approaches to ensure enforcement is to have a GNA enacted as part of 
a federal consent decree, which empowers the community group to return to the judge for enforcement (if 
necessary) during the life of the decree.  Another strategy is to have the terms of a GNA enacted as part of a 
permit.  No approach, however, is truly “bulletproof,” as changes in ownership and company bankruptcy, 
and other factors, can test even the most carefully constructed agreements.  Whether or not a GNA survives 
a change in ownership can vary from state to state as the rules differ.  If your state does not offer adequate 
protections, a group may be able to address the issue through the use of covenants, or by making 
acceptance of the GNA a condition of a permit (if the agency will agree).  Strategies to make a GNA 
survive a company bankruptcy are also multi-faceted, but can include the use of escrow accounts, 
performance bonds, or even obtaining a security interest in the property.  Regardless of the challenge faced, 
good (and creative) legal advice during agreement negotiation can be highly beneficial. 
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(5) GNAS ARE BEST VIEWED AS A (LONG AND DIFFICULT) PROCESS.  Successfully 
utilizing the “GNA approach” requires navigating three very different stages 
typically spanning several years: (Stage # 1) getting the company to the 
negotiation table, (Stage # 2) GNA negotiation/design, and (Stage # 3) 
implementation.   
 
Successfully addressing the problems of concern in a GNA requires completion of all 
three stages; the process can fail at any of these stages.  The key to negotiating this 
process is best defined in terms of leverage and resources.  Both of these variables can 
be—and typically need to be—augmented and maintained by the community group 
throughout the GNA process.  This requires planning and strategic thinking.  Leverage 
can come from many sources, from exploiting legal requirements (both substantive and 
procedural), to gaining access to company information (and technical knowledge), to 
applying traditional, grass-roots activism.  Also critical is the importance of a “focal 
point,” such as a permit application or an emergency discharge.  Large, well-established 
community groups—i.e., those with extensive staffing and funding resources—are best 
positioned to take advantage of these ingredients, but as suggested earlier, several 
strategies exist that smaller community groups can potentially use to augment leverage 
and/or resources, or to reduce the administrative burdens typically associated with 
applying the GNA approach.  Strategies include: self-executing agreements (e.g., upfront 
payments or one-time actions; transferring enforcement to an agency, such as in a 
permit), or requiring the company to finance some of the community group’s 
implementation activities.  Smaller groups may also find it advantageous to form 
partnerships or coalitions with other entities17, thereby broadening the base of 
organizational resources.18  Finally, we acknowledge that a single motivated activist can 
be remarkably effective.  As usual, there appears to be no substitute for leadership and 
personal commitment. 
 
Our findings regarding the salience of leverage and resources are summarized below in 
Tables 3 through 5.  These topics are also discussed extensively in the GNA Handbook 
prepared by the NPRC as part of this study. 
 
 
                                                 
17 It is worth noting that members of the GNA network report that mainstream national environmental 
groups are rarely helpful to groups pursuing GNAs.  In fact, community organizations seeking GNAs are 
frequently criticized by environmentalists and environmental justice advocates for “selling-out.” 
18 COCOA, for example, is now a member of the Idaho Rural Council.   
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Table 3.  Prerequisites to Using the GNA Approach Successfully: 
Stage 1:  Forcing the Company to Negotiate 
 
Sources of Leverage 
• Company needs a permit or similar public approval 
• Company is vulnerable to a lawsuit (particularly related to 
environmental law compliance) 
• Company requires/desires good public relations (or must 
avoid bad publicity) in order to maintain or expand 
profitability 
• A change in company personnel/ownership creates an 




• Litigation and/or permit challenge 
• Publicity, media relations, and activist strategies (e.g., 
letter writing, editorials, demonstrations) 
• Leadership; willingness of leaders (on both sides) to “try 
something new” 
• Knowledge of the company’s needs/desires 
• Environmental data (e.g., monitoring results) 
 
 




• Have a very clear idea of what you want before entering a 
negotiation; have a “bottom line” established 
• Articulate the possibility of a win-win solution 
• Pick your fights carefully, and be prepared to deliver on 
threats 
• Begin research on the company and its manufacturing 
processes; consult outside experts if needed 
• Beware being coopted or diverted through a company-






Table 4.  Prerequisites to Using the GNA Approach Successfully: 
Stage 2:  GNA Negotiation and Design 
 
Sources of Leverage 
• Must have something valuable to offer (e.g., drop a permit 
challenge or lawsuit; end bad publicity; assist in permit 
approval and generating good publicity) 






• Negotiation skills/training; coherent negotiating strategy  
• Adequate understanding of technical issues (e.g., science, 
law); must have appropriate data (e.g., monitoring data, 
company profile) 
• Must have a strategy for structuring an agreement that 
facilitates implementation and real problem-solving (e.g., 








  During GNA Negotiation:  
• Select negotiators carefully 
• Transcribe negotiations 
• Establish and enforce negotiation deadlines; understand 
that many companies’ strategies are designed to wear 
down communities (e.g., delays during negotiation, 
providing too much information, agreeing to things they 
plan to later fight during implementation, etc.) 
• Maintain community organization and activism 
throughout the process; maintain a unified front; guard 
against cooptation 
• Cultivate and maintain an image of reasonableness, 
credibility and professionalism 
  In the GNA Document:  
• Anticipate the implementation demands of all 
concessions: to the extent possible front-load the 
agreement by getting provisions that don’t require 
ongoing monitoring or enforcement; schedule company 
concessions to come before community group concessions 
• Strive to make agreements legally binding; consider 
having agreements embedded in federal court consent 
decrees or in permit conditions 
• Establish a process to deal with future, unanticipated 
issues (e.g., the sale or bankruptcy of the company); 
assume that the company will eventually try to walk away 




Table 5.  Prerequisites to Using the GNA Approach Successfully: 
Stage 3:  Implementation of the Agreement 
 
Sources of Leverage 
• Best leverage is a strategically designed agreement (e.g., 
self-executing; timing of concessions is equal or front-
loaded in the community group’s favor; legally binding, 
readily enforceable and transferable) 
• Demonstrate a commitment to monitoring, oversight, and 
follow-through; maintain contact with company and the 
public regarding GNA compliance; be vigilant 





• Budget sufficient funding, staff, and expertise to allow 
ongoing monitoring and oversight; maintain public and 
community group commitment/interest past GNA 
negotiation (when initial enthusiasm fades) 
• If necessary, consider relying upon an outside agency to 
oversee or assist in implementation (e.g., a state agency 
that adopted the GNA in a permit) 
 
Other Advice / 
Observations 
 
• Have the company finance some of the community 
group’s implementation costs 
• Be prepared to endure a long, labor intensive process 






CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The overall conclusion and recommendation emerging from this study is that GNAs are a 
process worth pursuing in the right circumstances.  Those circumstances are varied, but at 
a minimum, require a company with the potential to address community concerns while 
maintaining economic viability, and a community group with sufficient leverage, 
resources and skill to move through the often long process.  While most of the GNAs we 
identified were still working to fully achieve the GNA goals, the successes achieved to 
date have clearly identified that GNAs, as a tool, can be very effective.  Of course in each 
case, the GNA tool needs to be compared to other options available.  It is worth 
remembering that many communities throughout the United States have found ways to 
co-exist with industry without resorting to GNAs.  National regulations regarding air and 
water pollution, for example, are often sufficient to protect environmental resources and 
public health.  Additionally, many agencies can be relied upon to fight for community 
protections.  GNAs are not needed everywhere.  But where this governmental safety net 
is inadequate, GNAs can be a valuable addition to the toolbox of community activists.  
Like all tools, the trick is simply to use it in the right circumstances and in the right 
manner.   
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Two more specific recommendations are, first, to maintain in some form the GNA 
network established in this project.  The Northern Plains Resource Council (NPRC) has 
established a web site and listserv dedicated to this purpose, building on and 
supplementing the networking role so admirably carried for many years by Communities 
for a Better Environment (California) and by dedicated individuals such as Sanford Lewis 
and Denny Larson.  Additionally, Northern Plains has produced a GNA handbook to 
educate fellow community groups considering GNAs.  These are wise and commendable 
efforts that should be maintained.  Secondly, we encourage the funding community to 
consider grant-making to community groups with a defensible strategy and argument for 
pursuing a GNA.  Just as grants designed to support activism and litigation are ultimately 
judged by funders on a return-on-investment calculus, so too should funding decisions 
regarding GNAs—we do not advocate any special status or subsidy for GNAs.  
Maximizing this return-on-investment suggests only funding GNAs where the 
prerequisites for success can be met, and where both the funder and community group are 




APPENDIX A:  SELECTED GNA LITERATURE 
 
 
Adriatico, Marianne, The Good Neighbor Agreement:  Environmental Excellence Without 
Compromise, 5 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 285 (Spring 1999). 
 
Friends of the Earth Scotland, Love Thy Neighbour? The potential for Good Neighbour 
Agreements in Scotland.  June 2004.  (See http://www.foe-
scotland.org.uk/nation/gna_report.pdf) 
 
Illsley, Barbara, Good Neighbour Agreements: the first step to environmental justice?, 
Local Environment, vol. 7, no. 1, 69-79 (2002). 
 
Lewis, Sanford, and Diane Henkels, Good Neighbor Agreements:  A Tool for 
Environmental and Social Justice, Social Justice, vol. 23, no. 4 (Dec. 2, 1996). 
 
Lewis, Sanford, The Good Neighbor Handbook, 2nd ed., Apex Press (1993). 
 
Lewis, Sanford, Precedents for Corporate-Community Compacts and Good Neighbor 
Agreements, gnp.enviroweb.org/compxpr2.html (March 1996). 
 
Peters, Alison, Cooperative Pollution Prevention:  The Syntex Chemicals Agreement, 
Pollution Prevention Review 23 (Spring 1996). 
 
Siegel, Janet V., Negotiating For Environmental Justice: Turning Polluters Into "Good 




Additional literature and materials specific to the case studies are referenced at the end of 
the case studies summaries in Appendix D.
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APPENDIX B:  GNA SURVEY 
 
 
Community Group Participant Survey 
 
Instructions:  The questions below include both “check box” and “short answer” types.  Please write 
your answers in the space provided.  If more space is needed, please attach additional sheets of paper 
and indicate which question(s) you are responding to.   
 
Note that the term “Company” in this questionnaire refers to the company with which the good neighbor 
agreement (GNA) was negotiated. 
 
Additional Documents.  In addition to the survey, we are requesting copies of several documents, if 
available.  Providing these documents—especially the GNA itself—will significantly reduce the time and 
effort required to complete the questionnaire.  Please consult the cover letter to see which documents we 
already have.  The desired documents are: 
 
o The signed GNA and any relevant supporting documentation (attachments, appendices, and/or 
agreements drafted pursuant to a provision in the GNA). 
o Published articles about your GNA or which prominently feature your GNA (e.g., newspaper, 
newsletter, scientific journal, law review, editorials, etc.) 
o Documentation of the GNA negotiation process itself (timeline, meeting minutes, progress 
reports, correspondence between community groups and company, etc.) 
o Implementation documents or reports (e.g., results of GNA-mandated environmental audits). 
o Internal or external GNA evaluation studies or reports. 
o Breakdown of costs (for your group and the company, if known) relating to any aspect of 
negotiating and implementing the GNA. 
o Environmental compliance data collected or received pursuant to the GNA. 
o Material(s) describing your community group (size, goals, history, accomplishments, etc.). 
 
We realize this is a lot of material to request, but this information is generally not available elsewhere.  
We will pay for photocopying and postage charges in addition to the $50 payment to cover your time. 
 
 
Your Contact Information 
1.  Your name:          _______ 
2.  Your title/affiliation with community group:  _______________________________ 
3.   This is a  ____ paid staff position   ____ volunteer position. 
4. Your mailing address:  _________________________________________________ 
                   _________________________________________________ 
5. Your phone number: (        )  _______ - _________ 
6. Your fax number:      (        )  _______ - _________ 
7. Your email address:  _______________________________ 
 
Note:  At the end of the survey, you will have the option of requesting anonymity.   
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General Information about your Community Group  
 
8. Name of group:           ____________ 
9. Mailing address (only if different than question # 4):  ______________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
10. Web site:  __________________________________________________________________ 
11. Year founded: __________ 
12. Number of paid staff: ________ 
13. Annual operating budget (general estimate):  $ ______________ 
14. Major source(s) of funding (check all that apply): 
 ___ individual & member contributions  ..(approximate percentage of total budget:  _____%) 
 ___ government grants  ………………… (approximate percentage of total budget:  _____%) 
 ___ foundation grants ………………….  (approximate percentage of total budget:   _____%) 
 ___ the “Company” …………………….. (approximate percentage of total budget:  _____%) 
 ___ other ……………………………….  (approximate percentage of total budget:   _____%) 
 
 
General Characteristics of the Company and the Community-Company Relationship 
 
15. Approximately what year did “the Company” begin operations in your community?  __________ 
16. Approximately how many local residents does “the Company” employ?  ______________ 
17. On a scale of 1 to 10, how important is “the Company” to the local economy?   (1 = not important; 5 
= moderately important; 10 = extremely important). ____________ 
18. On the same scale of 1 of 10, how important is the sector represented by “the Company” (e.g., 
mining, petrochemicals) to the local economy?  __________________ 
19. At the time of GNA negotiation, “the Company” was: (check all that apply) 
 ___ profitable (i.e., in “good” financial health) 
 ___ expanding   ___stable in size   ___shrinking    
 ___ seeking financing 
___ privately owned   ___ publicly traded   ___don’t know 
 ___ concerned about public opinion 
 ___ perceived publicly as committed to environmental concerns 
20. Is “the Company” currently a subsidiary of another company?  ___ yes (name:________________ )  
                       ___no    ___don’t know 
21. Who is the appropriate contact person(s) at “the Company” regarding the GNA?  (Please provide 
one or more names, with complete contact information.)  __________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
      _________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Incidents/Events Which Led to the Negotiation of the GNA 
 
22. Which of the following types of issues prompted community concern about “the Company”? 
(Check all that apply.  If more than one category is selected, please number them in order of 
significance; 1 = most significant, 2 = second most significant, etc.) 
___ nuisance and quality of life issues (e.g., noise, traffic, odors) 
___ local economic or fiscal issues (e.g., jobs, overburdened community services) 
___ impacts on the environment (e.g., habitat loss, pollution) 
___ public health concerns (e.g., toxic releases/spills, illnesses) 
___ other (include as part of the description below) 





23.  What types of actions did your group take prior to negotiating the GNA?  (Check all that apply.) 
Working with Relevant Agencies and Governments: 
 ___ participation in public hearings; commenting on public documents (e.g., EIS) 
 ___ appeal of local, state or federal permit decision or other government action 
 ___ urge regulatory agencies to better enforce existing laws/rules 
 ___ urge agencies and/or other governmental bodies to adopt new rules or legislation 
 ___ other related action (specify): ____________________________________________ 
Lawsuits:  
 ___ lawsuit initiated by the community group  
 ___ lawsuit initiated by another party, but joined/supported by the community group 
 ___ campaign/lobby for federal/state/local agency to bring suit against Company 
 ___ other (specify): _______________________________________________________ 
Consultation with the Company: 
 ___ written correspondence to Company expressing concerns 
 ___ meeting(s) with Company representatives 
 ___ other related action (specify): ____________________________________________ 
Publicity and Grassroots Activism: 
 ___ negative publicity campaigns (media coverage, petitions, demonstrations, protests) 
 ___ boycotts (of the “Company”) 
 ___ support/oppose political candidates 
 ___ other related action (specify): ____________________________________________ 
Any other types of actions (specify): ________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
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24.  What final event, or sequence of events, resulted in the decision to negotiate a GNA? 
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
            ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
25.  Who first raised the idea of negotiating a GNA?  (If possible, please list the person by name, and    




Participants in GNA Negotiation Process 
 
26. In addition to “the Company,” who else was involved in the GNA negotiation? 
 ___ your group 
___ other citizen group(s)   (Please list:  ____________________________________________ ) 
 ___ union representatives 
 ___ local government representatives 
 ___ regulatory agency representatives (which agency: _________________________________ ) 
 ___ independent consultants or technical experts 
 ___ members of the general public (not directly affiliated with the above parties) 
 ___ others (please list): __________________________________________________________ 
 
27. Please list the names, titles, and affiliations of the primary negotiators (for all participating interests):  
      _________________________________________________________________________________ 
      _________________________________________________________________________________ 
      _________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. In the GNA negotiations, did your group (and/or your partners, if any) have adequate access to: 
o Lawyers & legal expertise  ___ yes   ___ no   ___ don’t know    
o Technical consultants         ___ yes   ___ no   ___ don’t know    
o Trained negotiators             ___ yes   ___ no   ___ don’t know    
o Technical/economic data    ___ yes   ___ no   ___ don’t know    
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Interests of Parties in the GNA Negotiations 
 
29. What were the specific commitments that the community group wanted from “the Company”?  
(Check all that apply.  Note that these are the items “wanted,” not necessarily those achieved.) 
o Specific Remediation and Mitigation Measures. 
 ___ specific pollution prevention/reduction/remediation goals 
 ___ traffic mitigation provisions 
 ___ worker transportation/housing provisions 
 ___ investments in local community 
       ___ local hiring 
       ___ job training 
       ___ infrastructure improvements 
       ___ contributions to local charities 
 ___ other specific remediation and mitigation measures (describe): __________________ 
         ____________________________________________________________________ 
         ____________________________________________________________________ 
o Information, Audits, Inspections and Monitoring. 
 ___ commitment to perform regular environmental audits and/or monitoring 
 ___ community access to relevant environmental data held by the Company 
 ___ access to company accident prevention and response plan 
 ___ whistleblower protections (for Company employees divulging information) 
 ___ advance notice to the community of any proposed changes in operations 
o Ongoing Role of Community Group in Company Practices 
 ___ active community involvement in audits, monitoring, and/or inspections 
 ___ community group representation on Company planning, advisory and/or decision- 
       making bodies 
 ___ financial support of the community group named in the GNA  
o Other Desired Commitments (describe): __________________________________________ 
 
30. What specific commitments did “the Company” want from the community group? (Check all that 
apply.)   
 ___ dismissal of pending lawsuit 
 ___ assurances that a lawsuit would not be filed 
 ___ end protests or negative publicity 
 ___ generate positive publicity for the Company 
 ___ confidentiality agreement 
 ___ other (specify): _____________________________________________________________ 
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31. If a regulatory agency of any kind took part in the negotiations, what was its interest and how did  
      that affect the final agreement? _______________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
32. In your opinion, what was the primary reason that “the Company” agreed to negotiate a GNA? ____ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. Please list any issues discussed during the GNA negotiation process which were not incorporated  






34. How long did the GNA negotiation process take, from the first meeting or correspondence 
suggesting a GNA to obtaining all required signatures of the final agreement?  _________________ 
 
35. If possible, please estimate the total costs of negotiating the GNA: 
$________ was spent by community group ( ___%  or $_____ for consultants/outside experts) 
$________ was spent by company 
 
Please attach any data that further summarizes the costs and time demands of the negotiation process. 
 
 
The Final Agreement 
 
36. Do you believe the GNA is legally binding? ___ yes   ___ no    ___ unsure 
 
37. Is the GNA integrated with a state/federal regulatory action? ___ yes   ___ no   ___ don’t know 
         If yes, please explain: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
38. If “the Company” is sold, will the GNA remain in effect? ___ yes   ___ no   ___ unsure 
 If “the Company” has already changed ownership since the GNA was negotiated, please describe 




39. Does “the Company” provide funding to your community group to ensure its continued participation 
in GNA-related activities?  ___ yes   ___ no.   If yes, how much per year:  $ _____________ 
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Implementation of the GNA 
 
40. Overall on a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent have the commitments listed in the GNA been honored, 
or are on schedule to be honored?  (1 = not at all; 10 = everything implemented as planned).  _____ 
 




42. Have any subsequent modifications been made to the original GNA? ___ yes ___ no 
         If so, please describe (include any provisions which have been deleted or abandoned): _________ 
         _______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
43. Does the GNA include specific procedures for dispute resolution? ___ yes   ___ no 
        How have implementation disputes been resolved?  ______________________________________ 
   ____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
44. If possible, please estimate the total costs (thus far) of implementing the GNA? 
$________ spent by community group ( ___%  or $_____ for consultants/outside experts) 
$________ spent by “the Company” 
 
45. If possible, please estimate expected future costs of implementing the GNA? 
$________ to be spent by community group ( ___%  or $_____ for consultants/outside experts) 
$________ to be spent by “the company” 
 
 
Lessons Learned and General Impressions: 
 
46. If similar disputes with this or a different company were to arise in the future, would negotiating 
      another GNA be your preferred course of action?  ___ yes   ___ no   ___ unsure 
          If no, what would you do instead? ___________________________________________________ 
 
47. If you had the chance to negotiate the GNA over again, what would you do differently regarding …. 
o … the negotiation process? _____________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
o … the structure of the agreement? _______________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
o … the specific content of the agreement? _________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
48. Were there any unexpected benefits to your group and/or community resulting from this whole 
       experience?  _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
49. Please rate the overall “success” of your GNA on a scale of 1 to 10: _____ 
       (1 = total disappointment; 10 = a complete success) 
 
50. What, if any, concerns do you have about the viability of your community group to monitor the 
       GNA and/or ensure its commitments under the GNA over the term of the agreement? ___________ 
        ________________________________________________________________________________ 
        ________________________________________________________________________________ 
 









Thank you very much for your time! 
 
 
Confidentiality.  It is our preference to list your name as an interview subject, and to give you credit for 
the answers provided.  Before publication, you will be given the opportunity to review and correct any 
case study write-ups about your GNA effort.  Nonetheless, you can remain confidential if desired. 
Can we use your name in project publications?  ___yes    ___no 
 
Payment.  We are happy to provide you with $50 in thanks for your efforts.  Unless you provide an 
alternate address below or indicate another recipient, we will address and send the check to the person 
and address listed in questions 1-6.   
 
Please provide a rough estimate of your copying and mailing expenses (if any): $ _______ 
Alternative address and/or recipient (only if applicable):  __________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thanks again for your assistance.  You will, of course, be provided with the results when available. 
 
RETURN TO.  Use the envelope provided, or mail to:  Doug Kenney, Natural Resources Law Center, 
University of Colorado School of Law, UCB 401, Boulder, CO, 80309-0401. 
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Finding a Path to Accord: 
A Case Study of a Good Neighbor Agreement 
 
Northern Plains Resource Council 
Cottonwood Resource Council, Stillwater Protective Association 
and  
Stillwater Mining Company 
 
You cannot shake hands with a closed fist. 
Indira Gandhi 
 
Case Study Overview 
This case study documents the Stillwater Good Neighbor Agreement (GNA), an unprecedented 
contract between the Northern Plains Resource Council (Northern Plains), Cottonwood Resource 
Council (CRC), Stillwater Protective Association (SPA), and the Stillwater Mining Company 
(SMC), to protect the environment and at the same time, avoid costly, time-consuming litigation. 
A number of people involved in the GNA process were interviewed, and written records 
reviewed in an effort to produce a report of the Stillwater GNA and how it came to be. Although 
there is much to be learned and applied from this particular GNA, it should be emphasized that 
each situation is different, and there is no ‘boilerplate’ solution for all. However, it is always 
important to build trust and work toward a common goal, especially when addressing crucial 
environmental and social impacts.  
 
Introduction 
Montana is a land of riches. Its environment encompasses mountains, rivers, open ranges, 
endless sky, and veins beneath the earth that still hold untapped treasures of rare ores. It is also a 
land of complex political forces that have a history of colliding in struggles for control of 
Montana’s abundant heritage of natural resources. 
 
Imagine for a moment what Montana might look like if cooperation and mutual trust were to 
replace the too-often adversarial approach between corporations and community action groups. 
A new approach might instead resemble an agreement among good neighbors to treat the land 
and its many resources with respect, with an eye toward actions that would benefit the earth and 
its inhabitants in a sustainable future. 
 
In fact, that is exactly what has been happening in two Montana counties over the past few years. 
Northern Plains and two affiliated citizen groups, CRC and SPA, forged a contract with the SMC 
to protect and conserve fragile watersheds in danger of degradation due to mining practices, and 
to preserve the character of local communities threatened by increased development and the 
influx of workers associated with such a project. The Stillwater GNA also helps protect the rural 
nature of the region, and builds relationships damaged by years of conflict over opposing visions 




The comprehensive and complex Stillwater GNA, signed in May 2000, is the result of long and 
often difficult negotiations, a journey undertaken jointly by Northern Plains, SPA, CRC, and 
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SMC. Thus, this case study, which highlights essential components of a landmark GNA, from 
inception to implementation, can be used as a tool to examine, analyze and, as appropriate, apply 
lessons learned. What follows is the story of bringing the GNA to life, a collaborative, 
sometimes arduous, and ultimately worthwhile path to accord. 
 
The largest mining operation in Montana, SMC is one of only three worldwide producers of 
platinum and palladium. An important resource throughout the world, palladium is a primary 
component of catalytic converters that reduce vehicle emissions. Thus, SMC plays a pivotal role 
in both global resource production and local environmental protection. 
 
Northern Plains is an established and respected grassroots action group, with a broad base of 
local support, combined with staff and consultant expertise, and a record of community 
organizing spanning 30 years. Northern Plains focuses on issues of land stewardship, 
preservation of family farms, ranches and small businesses, and providing information and tools 
for citizen action. Recognizing the need to balance the quest for economic gain with social and 
environmental responsibility, Northern Plains strives to protect Montana’s water, land, air, and 
quality of life.  
 
Affiliated with Northern Plains, both CRC and SPA organize and represent local communities 
affected by similar environmental, social and economic impacts of mining and development, in 
this case resulting from two separate SMC mines drawing from one vein of ore. Since the mid-
70s, SPA has dealt with socio-economic and environmental consequences related to the 
Stillwater mine, now in its 14th year of production. The organization has galvanized citizen and 
community protection efforts, and has been a formidable force in keeping mining interests in 
check. CRC, founded as a voice for citizen concerns in 1988, has as its current focus the East 
Boulder mine, which is projected to begin production in the fall of 2002.  CRC works to ensure 
sound practices and norms relating to waste and water quality, and to address environmental and 
social impacts of the mine’s future operations. Both organizations are deeply committed to 
citizen involvement and environmental action. 
 
A history of inadequate enforcement and erosion of state environmental laws made the GNA 
seem like a worthwhile gamble to Northern Plains, CRC and SPA, as all three organizations had 
long focused on helping citizens have an effective voice in social, economic, and environmental 
decisions that affect their lives. A GNA had the potential to protect the health and ecological 
integrity of the Stillwater and East Boulder Rivers and surrounding areas, where concern had 
been escalating about the harmful effects of the Stillwater mine on the local community and 
environment. The three citizen groups sought to raise the bar within the mining industry on 
environmental and community protection, and compel SMC to use the best available 
technologies to minimize the impact of mining in both watersheds. 
 
The GNA is a legally binding contract, which guarantees land, water and community protections 
in Sweet Grass and Stillwater counties, gives unprecedented access to information on SMC’s 
mining practices, and leverages citizen clout to block harmful consequences of mining 
operations. The GNA provides for citizen oversight and involvement in determining practices 
used to extract and process ore from SMC mines. Well crafted and unambiguous, the GNA 
serves as a road map to indicate intent and direction in addressing complex environmental and 
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social issues affecting the communities represented by CRC and SPA. The objectives of the 
GNA are to: 
 Minimize adverse impacts of mining operations on the local community and environment 
 Facilitate open communication among all GNA parties 
 Provide opportunities for citizen participation in decision making 
 Legally bind current and future mine owners to the GNA, for the life of the mine 
 Avoid or reduce the need for lawsuits to resolve disputes 
 
The Stillwater GNA is a powerful tool that supplements and exceeds federal and state legal 
requirements. Highlights of the contract include the following:  
 Water quality protection, such as expanded monitoring to ensure that water quality is not 
degraded and fishing operations are not disturbed due to mining activities 
 Investigation of improved mining technologies 
 Incorporation, of conflict resolution methods, such as arbitration, to minimize or avoid 
future legal challenges, whenever possible 
 Traffic reduction measures, such as restricting the use of private vehicles, improving car-
pooling programs, and providing buses between the mine and population centers 
 Conservation easements on company-owned land, including ranches used for land-
application of wastewater  
 Consultation with local citizen groups before property acquisition for future tailings and 
waste rock disposal, or for developing employee housing sites 
 Independent environmental performance audits at least every 5 years, funded by SMC 
 Citizen access to information regarding environmental compliance and performance, 
including the right to inspect environmental audit results and mine operations 
 SMC funding for technical and scientific consultants necessary for local citizens to 
understand mining operations and effectively participate in the SMC decision-making 
process 
 
Three committees, comprising members of SPA, CRC , Northern Plains, and representatives of 
SMC, are the formal entities that oversee the GNA: 
 Two Oversight Committees focus on issues specific to the mine in each of their 
geographic areas. The two committees monitor all aspects of GNA implementation, 
resolve any new issues that may arise, and keep lines of communication open among all 
parties. 
 The Responsible Mining Practices and Technology Committee identifies, investigates 
and recommends innovative methods to reduce waste and increase environmental 
protections in the areas affected by the mines. Currently, the Committee is working on 
waste and water issues surrounding the Hertzler and Boe sites. 
 
 History and Process 
The path to accord was built on a foundation of citizen action addressing local water quality and 
mining issues. The efforts of the three citizen groups to organize residents and encourage active 
participation in local decision making have long focused on social and environmental protection. 
As a result, a well-seasoned pool of citizen leaders with roots in the community was available to 
participate in the GNA negotiation process. Without such active citizen membership, achieving 
the GNA would not have been possible.   
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The forces leading to a GNA were in motion long before the negotiating process began. SMC 
had been a Montana presence since assuming ownership of the Stillwater mine in 1994. 
Economic and regulatory forces of the time were favorable, as the global demand for palladium 
increased. SMC wanted to capitalize on this higher demand for palladium by bringing the East 
Boulder project on-line. The company also sought removal of production caps and permission to 
build an additional tailings impoundment at the Stillwater mine. The Hertzler Impoundment, as it 
was called, was to include construction of a 700+ acre waste management facility, a tailing 
pipeline corridor, and a nearly 200 acre water management facility.  Local fears were that the 
plan would destroy open space, increase noise pollution, and have adverse affects on wildlife and 
on property values. The specter of such harmful consequences galvanized citizen groups to voice 
their concerns. 
 
The history of activism among the three citizen-based organizations runs long and deep. For 
years, Northern Plains, SPA and CRC have participated in numerous public permitting 
processes, including at least four Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) challenges to the Nye 
Mine and another to the East Boulder project. In fact, the lack of success with the EIS process 
and the use of citizen lawsuits to resolve complaints helped provide impetus to pursue a GNA. 
 
In the mid-1990s, CRC challenged SMC’s application for a waiver from Montana’s non-
degradation policy.  After three years of conflict, SMC and CRC agreed to drop the issue and 
take it up again at a later date. In early 1998, CRC challenged yet another SMC application, this 
time for a discharge permit for the new East Boulder mine and for proposed construction of a 
dormitory, or man camp, to house mine employees away from the population center. 
 
On the other side of the mountain, SPA was fighting the lifting of production caps at the 
Stillwater mine. At that time, SMC was seeking specific changes to its environmental permit, 
including the elimination of a 2000 ton-per-day production cap, permission to construct the 
Hertzler tailings impoundment, and expansion of the mine’s footprint. The final EIS supported 
all the changes SMC sought. In early 1999, SPA sued the Montana Department of Environmental 
Quality (MDEQ) over this Record of Decision that essentially resulted in no change for the way 
SMC conducted operations.  SPA’s pending lawsuit was put on hold as SPA explored the GNA’s 
prospect of success as an alternative to legal action.  
 
Jerry Iverson, CRC member, emphasizes the value of citizen group leverage and power in 
challenging mine operations: “One of the most important elements of CRC’s success is that we 
have for years actively lobbied at the legislature, testified at public hearings, provided comments 
on numerous Environmental Impact Statements (EIS), sponsored candidate forums, educated the 
public on the Hard Rock Impact Plan, and written letters to the editors of local papers. We’ve 
done everything, and people know us. And when the state and the mining company acted in a 
way we believed was improper, we sued. That’s how you build leverage.” 
  
Citizen group leverage would continue to be a powerful force for change. In August 1998, a 
guest editorial in the NY Times by CRC member Tom McGuane gave needed exposure to 
SMC’s plan to open a second mine in East Boulder, and establish a man camp to house workers, 
which would certainly have negative impacts on the local area, such as added traffic, and 
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potential problems with mine workers who were not integrated into the community. Bill Nettles, 
then SMC CEO, responded with his perspective on the issues, as did the Times. Press coverage 
served to put SMC on notice that they were being watched. Citizen groups vowed that SMC 
would have to deliver on their promises to be both community-friendly and environmentally 
responsible.  
 
New SMC company leadership, not wed to traditional mining industry approaches, was willing 
to consider new ways of doing business. Local activists praised the CEO as a man of his word 
who would honor commitments. SMC provided employment for a significant number of local 
residents, and to the company’s credit, had a record of complying with state and federal 
regulations. SMC believed a GNA could help avoid production delays resulting from legal 
challenges to expansion plans, provide SMC a positive profile as a “good neighbor” in Montana, 
and possibly increase its profitability. 
 
In the summer of 1998, informal yet strategic meetings with local activists, residents, and mine 
representatives helped identify issues and harness the forces that would lead to negotiating the 
GNA. A handshake agreement committed SMC to build a man camp near the populated area of 
Big Timber and try to resolve other differences with the community.  
 
Establishment of a formal GNA held interest for both sides because it met the needs of dissimilar 
players who otherwise might not have found reasons to collaborate. A shared benefit of the GNA 
is that it reduces and even eliminates expensive, time-consuming, adversary-creating legal suits, 
which none of the parties wanted. In addition, the GNA provided a golden opportunity for 
Northern Plains, CRC, SPA, and SMC to share in a win-win situation for organizations that on 
the surface did not appear to have compatible interests. 
 
However, common interests did exist among the parties, even if motivated by differing needs. It 
was at this intersection of interests and needs that useful movement occurred, and a valuable 
strategy emerged: public influence on environmental protection can exert a positive impact on 
the world of profit making and stockholders, especially when citizens have the necessary 
information. Michael Reisner, Northern Plains strategic support coordinator who participated 
throughout the GNA process, says, “A big issue was opening up public access to information on 
the mining company’s internal decision making, so we can try to resolve problems.”   
 
The GNA process also helped to facilitate cooperation among the parties. Chris Allen, SMC Vice 
President, concurs, “The heart of the GNA rests upon the principles of mutual trust and respect. 
We are not always going to agree with each other, and some issues may be sufficiently important 
to drive us to arbitration. But, if our playing field is both level and clearly defined, and the 
principles upon which this Agreement was founded remain our touchstone, then I believe the 
GNA will prosper.”  
 
From the perspective of SMC, the uncertainty of the legal arena was key. Delays in production 
often were a costly and time-consuming consequence of lawsuits. SMC was ready to move 




The variety and depth of forces and issues surrounding the evolution of the GNA were 
formidable. Each party began with an agenda based on constituencies and interests, which were 
sometimes compatible, but often at odds. Questions of water quality, waste disposal, pollution, 
traffic, wildlife habitat, employee housing, culture and esthetics, combined with potential legal 
hassles, and definitions of what is the “right” way to protect the environment, all swirled in a 
maelstrom of often opposing beliefs and behaviors.  
 
This was where the hard work of bringing people together to benefit the local environment and 
community began. Tammi Tragakiss, CRC Chair and negotiating team member, says, 
“Volunteer members spent years building leverage, and many months contributing countless 
hours and hard work to developing and negotiating the GNA.” It was a daunting task that 
required research, preparation and numerous meetings to bring the issues to the table and find 
agreement. Frustrating delays and disappointments interspersed with milestones of success 




Arriving at a negotiated agreement is never easy. Intuition and common sense are helpful, but do 
not take the place of finely honed negotiating skills. The art of knowing how to establish goals, 
bargain instead of debate, articulate a bottom line, speak in one voice, and know when to stay 
and when to walk are critical skills to ensure citizen clout. Margaret Vermillion, CRC 
negotiating team member, gets right to the point, “It’s important to have courage, be personable 
and isolate personal dislikes, be objective, stick to your guns, be honest and forthright, don’t be 
beaten by insulting comments, and have a good team.” 
 
An intensive negotiation skills training was the catalyst that produced competent and confident 
citizen teams. Jim Thomas, an expert negotiator, educated staff and citizen group members in the 
art of striking a deal. He says his task was “to detach them from reliance on logic, rhetoric and 
debate, and focus instead on using leverage in deal-making; to focus on the goal, rather than 
proving who was right or wrong. The likelihood of persuading the other side with a combative 
stance approaches zero, and tends to alienate people from what they want and can obtain.” Jack 
Heyneman, a SPA negotiating team member, expressed a sense shared by many: “The 
negotiation training was pivotal. We would never have known how to go about being tough-
minded without it.” 
 
A great help in the process of negotiating the GNA was Northern Plains’ staff member Michael 
Reisner, an attorney who served as legal language interpreter and more. In addition, Jim Kuipers, 
technical consultant and a former hard-rock miner with intimate knowledge of the mining 
industry, was, and continues to be, a bridge to understanding technical data. Daryl Jensen, SPA 
Oversight Committee member, acknowledges Northern Plains as a source of valuable expertise 
and leadership. He says, “Citizen groups are great, but without the staff work of Northern Plains, 
we couldn’t have won it.” 
   
Among the vital factors contributing to open and productive negotiations were the continuing 
opportunities to build trust and cooperation among Northern Plains-affiliated committee 
members and SMC representatives. Jim Thomas characterizes SMC as a worthy adversary and a 
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good player. Richard Parks, Technology Committee member says, “Without Bill Nettles’ 
leadership, the negotiations would have come unglued. He told his people it had to happen.” 
 
A commitment to the same goal kept the collective “eye on the prize” during difficult 
negotiations. Negotiating team member, Paul Hawks, says, “We had every right to be an equal 
playing partner, because we represented our local community. Something happens when you 
know you have permission to do what you believe in. No one gave us permission; we just picked 
up the mantle.”  
 
Given the spectrum of perspectives and uncertainties, some essential elements characterized the 
successful training and subsequent GNA negotiations: 
 Commitment to resolve areas of conflict to attain the goal 
 Willingness to do “homework” and prepare for meetings 
 Agreed-upon tactical ground rules, and process for consensus decisions 
 Delegation of primary responsibility for each issue among team members 
 Commitment to call for a caucus as often as necessary 
 Creation of negotiating “envelopes” for top, target, and bottom lines 
 Expression of positions in a unified voice  
 Focus on bargaining, not debating, as an effective negotiation tool 
 Well-run and recorded meetings, limited to involved parties 
 Walk-away points for key issues 
 
Citizen groups were frustrated by the outcome of prior adversarial approaches, such as lawsuits, 
and saw the GNA as a viable alternative to expensive, time- and resource-consuming legal 
actions that didn’t always result in long-term victories. Jerry Iverson, CRC Oversight Committee 
member, says, “There’s a risk in a lawsuit; you don’t know where it will go. It can go beyond 
what you originally intended.”  
 
Accord 
Although the GNA is an alternative to legal wrangling, participating citizen groups emphatically 
did not give up their right to sue in the future. The GNA remains in effect unless citizen groups 
decide to proceed with litigation. Should that occur, conservation easements to protect over 
4,000 acres of open space will continue, SMC will keep employee housing near existing towns, 
and will maintain their commitment to bus mine employees to and from work.  
 
In addition, there was approval of a plan to mitigate impacts to the Hertzler Ranch in Stillwater 
Valley as a result of SMC tailings impoundment. The Hertzler Mitigation Plan will give SPA the 
power to ensure the collection of baseline data and site monitoring to curtail or control any 
negative impacts. 
 
In the final agreement, citizen group negotiators prevailed in securing the right to monitor water 
quality and to inspect the mines and waste-treatment facilities.  CRC members Paul Hawks and 
Jerry Iverson remark, “This is the first GNA in the hard rock mining industry. It is a profound 
shift from the usual legal battles and threats that have dominated the discussion of natural 
resource issues. We believe we can work together to solve problems. Both sides can take credit 
for seeking a better way; only time will tell if we can succeed.” 
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Challenges and Lessons Learned  
Drafting the GNA required commitment by all involved parties, and a willingness to dedicate 
time and resources, even amidst doubt about the GNA’s potential for success. Chris Allen, SMC 
Vice President, comments, “SMC entered the GNA with decidedly mixed emotions. This 
ambivalence was born of many things, but it all boiled down to one word – uncertainty. A year 
ago, the path forward looked murky. Today, the landscape is better illuminated, and it seems to 
us that the prospect of failure recedes the longer we work together.” 
 
The GNA has faced and withstood initial challenges, such as delays in establishing trigger levels, 
lifting the production cap on the Nye mine, and comprehending and incorporating complex 
technical and scientific information. A particularly difficult point of contention shows signs of 
progress as SMC improves its record of notifying citizens of meetings and other important 
information in a timely manner.  SMC and the Councils have not always completed agreements 
by established due dates, but the groups demonstrate flexibility as long as they see movement 
toward compliance.  
 
According to Paul Hawks, “A major challenge has been changing the work habits and 
perspective of the corporation, bringing citizens on board for decision making, and keeping the 
community apprised about the timeline, and what’s happening to keep them in the decision 
making process.  We were pushing that process all the time, and still are. We’re finally seeing a 
change. At last, they recognize that we’re not going to put roadblocks in their way. Our interest 
is to do what is best for the community, which might be good for SMC, too.” 
 
Another central challenge to the GNA has been sustaining active involvement of community 
members and mine representatives. As is often the case, when the “front line” burns out or 
moves on, it is essential to have others step forward. The vitality of the GNA depends on 
continued infusion of motivated committee members who derive satisfaction from contributing 
and making a difference over the long-term. Arleen Boyd, SPA negotiation team member 
remarks, “Over the years, people have given enormous time and talent to solve problems in our 
area. In my best moments, I believe this will continue to happen.”  
 
The Stillwater GNA, although a signed contract, is still a work in progress. Its long-term viability 
will be measured by the extent to which it protects local communities and watersheds, and keeps 
both from development and further degradation. An indicator of GNA usefulness will be its 
ability to define this collaborative approach as an option for resolving other natural resource 
conflicts that impact the character and integrity of local communities. This is especially true if 
SMC is bought by an entity less willing to negotiate or honor the spirit of the accord.  
 
Can the GNA be a driving force to develop cleaner mining technologies, and more 
environmentally sustainable ways to extract needed metals? Will it work to protect communities 
from the negative social impacts of unbridled development? Concerned citizen groups hope 
SMC will show “good faith” in both the technical and human aspects of mining operations. SPA 
Oversight Committee member, Dot Gallagher concludes, “We hope the Stillwater GNA will set 
a trend for other places and other times. It’s bigger than this Valley.” 
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The most important lessons from the GNA process focus on collaboration, negotiation, and the 
need to search for common ground, especially among players motivated by disparate agendas. 
However, many involved in the GNA process emphasized that each situation will be different 
and there will be no boilerplate solution for every situation.  Although there are many 
perspectives, a common theme emerged from the key players on both sides of the GNA: Do your 
best to build trust based on sincere desires for a common goal, then commit to working together 
to forge a lasting agreement to be good neighbors. 
 
Current Realities 
Implementation and future compliance with the GNA is guided by local, regional, and global 
economic conditions. Since the signing of the GNA, many changes have marked the landscape, 
including a decline in the world price for palladium group metals. Global economic factors have 
exerted great influence on the way companies conduct business and attempt to satisfy 
shareholders. In recent times, SMC faced financial woes when expansions at the Stillwater and 
East Boulder operations coincided with plummeting global prices for platinum and palladium. 
Press coverage (Big Timber Pioneer, February 15-21, 2002; Northern Miner, February 1, 2002) 
reports that SMC has paused in its plan to expand mining operations, and has completed a $60 
million financing by issuing about 10% of its outstanding shares, in an effort to improve its 
financial structure. 
 
However, since the signing of the GNA, SMC’s operations have expanded in an effort to 
maintain a production rate that will keep the company solvent. At the East Boulder mine, surface 
infrastructure is complete and Stillwater crews are completing the underground facilities and 
mine development. SMC officials say they need to address the reality of a “lower cash-flow 
environment” while keeping their options open should prices improve and demand increases. 
 
A few years ago, SMC took steps to abandon a program to provide bus transportation to mine 
employees. After feeling intense pressure from the Councils and the community, SMC continued 
the bus transportation program. Over the years, SMC has realized bussing is an essential part of 
its operations and maintaining safety on the narrow winding county roads.   
 
In looking at the potential for a sustainable GNA, there is uncertainty about SMC’s future 
stability and profits, the influence of such change on the Montana landscape, and the willingness 
of SMC to honor its key commitments to the environment and local communities.  
 
Changes in SMC management have provided a challenge. Those who were instrumental in 
making the Agreement happen are gone, including Bill Nettles, Chris Allen, and Bob Taylor.   
 
In addition, SMC also has a new owner and a new board. In June 2003, Stillwater’s shareholders 
voted in favor of selling SMC to the Russian company Norilsk Nickel.   On June 23, Norilsk 
bought 51 percent of Stillwater Mining Co. The price was $100 million in cash and about 
877,000 ounces of palladium. On Aug. 27, Norilsk boosted its ownership to 56 percent by paying 
$7.50 per share for another 5 percent of Stillwater stock. 
 
Fortunately, the Good Neighbor Agreement is tied to the ore body and transfers with ownership.  
Therefore, it remains as a legally binding contract that Norilsk must uphold.  Members of SMC’s 
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board reaffirmed to the Councils in August 2004 that SMC is proud of the Agreement and firmly 
committed to its ongoing implementation.   
 
SMC continues to use and explore some of the best available environmental control technologies 
to manage its waste and water disposal.  Through the Agreement’s Responsible Mining Practices 
and Technology Committee, SMC, the Councils, and third party contractors have embarked on 
the paste pilot project to explore applying paste -  a slurry of dewatered mine tailings – on the 
surface land. SMC already applies paste with small amounts of concrete back below ground.  
Through implementing paste technology, SMC can reduce the size of its environmental foot 
print, extend the life of its current impoundment facilities, and reduce the need for additional 
large impoundment storage for tailings waste.    
 
To improve SMC’s water operations, the Council’s technical consultants – Kuipers and 
Associates – are drafting a Water Optimization or “mass balance” plan that outlines additional 
steps SMC can take to become a “zero discharge facility,” meaning no water would be 
discharged to groundwater or surface water.   The plan outlines further actions SMC can take to 
nearly eliminate nitrogen in the water – a by-product of the explosives SMC uses underground.  
High amounts of nitrogen in water can be unsafe to drink and can alter the biological integrity of 
the river.   
 
One area of contention has been how frequently annual biological monitoring should be 
conducted on the East Boulder River.  Biomonitoring consists of sampling aquatic inspects and 
algae at several sites along the river  to determine if SMC is impacting the health of the East 
Boulder River and riparian areas downstream from the mine.  The Councils would like to see 
annual biological monitoring happen, whereas SMC prefers conducting biological monitoring 
every three years.   After SMC refused to conduct biological monitoring in August 2003, 
members of Cottonwood Resource Council did the sampling with the assistance of Kuipers and 
Associates. SMC has agreed to do biomonitoring in 2004 and the dispute over the frequency of 
monitoring will be revisited in 2005. Neither SMC nor the Councils used the Agreement’s 
provisions for arbitration, allowing the parties to maintain a positive dialogue.  
  
Despite a few points of contention, the Councils applaud Stillwater Mining Company for its 
environmental excellence, and recommended SMC as a recipient for The Bureau of Land 
Management’s 2003 Hard Rock Mining Award, which SMC received. The award recognizes 
environmentally sound mineral development operations on public and private lands and 
acknowledges successful partnering efforts to ensure a safe and productive hardrock mining 
industry.  
  
The Agreement’s ongoing maintenance can be intense, but its benefits have been abundant and 
ongoing. The Councils and the community are thankful for the busing program, conservation 
easements, integration of employees into local communities, ability for local citizens to have 
access to critical information, opportunity to participate in the mine’s decision making process, 
and environmental and water quality safeguards above and beyond regulatory standards. The 
parties to the Agreement are proud of these accomplishments and the Councils hope that the 
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A Profile of Citizen Group Facts and Issues 






Stillwater Protective Association  (SPA) 
 






• Near Nye 
• 600 employees  
• Operating since 1986 
•  Stillwater River watershed 
EAST BOULDER MINE 
• Near Big Timber 
• 300 contract employees (during 
GNA negotiations) 
• In development phase 







• Impoundment (Hertzler site) 
a. Amount of waste  
b. Dissatisfaction with EIS-
proposed options 
c. Expanding SMC 
‘footprint’ 
d. Risk to river 
• Production cap removal     (from 
2,000 tons/day) 
a. Potential 2-to-3-fold 
increase in number of 
workers 
b. New ‘man camps’ that 
separate workers from 
community 
c. More traffic, employee 
cars, accidents, noise, dust, 
pollution 
• Culture and esthetics  
a. River degradation 
b. Quality of life  
 
 
• Worker housing, especially ‘man 
camps’ 
 
• Water treatment and tailings 
ponds (Boe Ranch) 
 
• Maintenance of production cap at 
2000 tons per day 
 







Responsible for identifying best practices and methods to decrease or eliminate adverse 
environmental impacts. Current issues: Water monitoring and tailings disposal methods, 







• As ultimate decision-making body, charged with maintaining open lines of 
communication, and addressing significant issues that may develop 
• Decision-making by voting, majority prevails. Tie vote leads to informal 





Stillwater GNA Timeline 
Winter 1997: SMC requests a permit amendment to remove production cap and build a 30-
year impoundment at the Hertzler Ranch site  
March 1998: SPA participates in EIS process, objects to removing cap at Nye site and 
adding a 30-year impoundment 7 miles from the mine site 
July 1998: CRC voices concern about planned employee housing (man camps) at yet-to-
open East Boulder mine, wanting instead, to promote ‘smart growth’ of workers and families 
becoming integrated in local towns 
August 1998: Guest editorials appear in NY Times 
August 1998: CRC, SPA, Northern Plains meet and decide to cooperate to ask SMC to 
discuss a GNA 
January 1999: US Forest Service and Montana Department of Environmental Quality 
(MDEQ) issue joint EIS record of decision on Stillwater Mine, lifting the 2000 tons per day 
production cap 
February 1999:  SPA notifies MDEQ of intent to sue, and formulation of a GNA as an 
alternative to legal action. After a 3-month delay, SPA withdraws the suit, but retains the 
intent to challenge mining practices in court 
March 1999: SPA and CRC communicate with SMC CEO, Bill Nettles, asking to begin 
negotiating a GNA 
April 1999: Northern Plains sends a letter to SMC to learn potential points for negotiation 
May 1999: Northern Plains, CRC, and SPA staff and members receive negotiation skills 
training 
June 1999: Preliminary meetings are followed by formal GNA negotiations with Northern 
Plains, CRC, SPA and SMC 
February 2000: Negotiations stall, then resume after discussions leading to SMC 
modifications of the contract 
May 2000: GNA signed 
June 2003:  SMC Sold to Norilsk Nickel 
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APPENDIX D:  GNA CASE STUDY SUMMARIES 
 
 
Boulder Residents for the Elimination of Air Toxics and Hazardous Emissions 









In 1995, Syntex Chemicals signed a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”) with the Boulder 
Residents for the Elimination of Air Toxics and Hazardous Emissions (“BREATHE”) and the 
City of Boulder (“City”).  The purpose of the GNA was to mitigate the health hazards associated 
with the release of hazardous air emissions from existing operations and future expansions at the 





BREATHE was formed in 1989 by a group of local residents.  The group’s purpose was to fight 
for reduced air emissions at local manufacturing facilities.  The group had an annual operating 
budget of about $2,000 derived from member contributions and foundation grants.  There were 
no paid staff.  This community group is no longer active. 
 
The Syntex facility began operating in Boulder in the 1950’s as Arapahoe Chemicals.  At the 
time of the GNA, Syntex Chemicals, an international pharmaceutical manufacturer, owned the 
facility and employed 250-300 local residents.  The company was profitable, expanding, publicly 
traded, and “aware of” (as opposed to “concerned about”) public opinion.  The chemical 
manufacturing sector does not represent an important part of the local economy (1 on a scale of 
10).19
 
The City of Boulder was also a party to the GNA.  The City became involved in the negotiations 




Nature of the Dispute 
 
In 1991, Boulder residents learned from Toxic Release Inventory (“TRI”) reports that a local zip 
code had the highest air emissions in the state, and that the Syntex plant was at the top of the TRI 
                                                 
19 Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from BREATHE’s responses to the GNA survey. 
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list.  In 1992, Syntex sought state and local approvals for a major expansion at the Boulder plant.  
To mitigate the effects of increased air emissions, Syntex proposed building a thermal oxidizer to 
capture and burn emissions, thereby reducing current plant emissions by about 85 percent, even 
with the increase in production.  Following a bitter year-long debate precipitated by the City’s 
insistence on a “use review” process, Syntex decided to withdraw its proposal and moved the 
expansion operations overseas.   
 
In the fall of 1994, after being acquired by Roche Pharmaceuticals, Syntex again applied for a 
construction permit to modify its existing facility in order to produce an AIDS drug (ganciclovir) 
which was growing in demand.  By this time, BREATHE had received a grant that enabled them 
to hire an attorney who was knowledgeable about air toxics.  The community group demanded 
and received a place at the table during the state and city discussions about Syntex’s proposed 
modifications. 
 
The issues of primary concern to BREATHE were public health concerns, impacts on the 
environment, and nuisance and quality of life issues.  Prior to negotiating the GNA, BREATHE 
had undertaken numerous actions, including participating in public hearings and commenting on 
public documents; appealing local and state permit decisions; urging regulatory agencies to 




Negotiation of the GNA 
 
The GNA was actually proposed by Syntex, and the community group did not have confidence 
in the GNA process, according to Jane Shellenberger, former president of BREATHE.  She 
states that it was not a priority for them as it seemed like a public relations tactic on their part.  
Nevertheless, representatives from BREATHE, the City, and Syntex all sat at the table together 
to negotiate the specifics of the GNA.  The leverage for these discussions came from the City’s 
refusal to issue a building permit until the issue of toxic emissions was resolved. 
 
BREATHE sought a number of commitments from the company, many of which were not 
included in the GNA.  In particular, BREATHE representatives wanted specific reductions in 
dioxins emitted and reductions in the use and discharge of other chlorinated compounds.  They 
felt there was too much emphasis on “end-of-pipe” treatment and not enough on front-end 
prevention.  The company proposed the GNA as a way to obtain their building permit as well as 
to end negative publicity and generate positive publicity for the company.  The final agreement 
included the following provisions: 
• Syntex agreed to: 
o install a thermal oxidizer, 
o testing and monitoring requirements including documentation of burn efficiency by a 
third party, 
o a fugitive emission reduction plan, and 
o an independent facility review by an outside consultant selected by all three parties. 
• The City and BREATHE agreed to: 
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o not require Syntex to go through the use review process for the proposed modification or 
for the building of the TDD itself, and 
o drop their insistence on limiting emissions due to future expansions in the GNA. 
 
Negotiations extended over a six-month period.  The survey respondents felt that they had 
adequate access to lawyers and legal expertise, technical consultants, and technical/economic 
data, but not to trained negotiators.  The GNA is a legally binding document.  It is not part of a 





BREATHE estimates it spent $8-10,000 on the negotiation process, 80 percent of which went to 
outside consultants.  The group did not spend anything on implementation other than the time of 
the group members (unpaid volunteers).  It is not known how much the company spent on 
negotiating or implementing the GNA.  The company did not provide any funding to BREATHE 
to assure its continued participation in the implementation process.  City of Boulder employees 
who participated in the process were paid by the City to oversee implementation as part of their 





BREATHE estimates that 70-80% of the commitments in the GNA have been honored.  The 
problem with implementation has been BREATHE’s lack of technical expertise to determine 
whether the company actually complied with the audit and testing requirements.  No subsequent 
modifications have been made to the original GNA.  The agreement does contain an enforcement 
provision that states that any party to the GNA is authorized to bring a civil action in state district 
court seeking specific performance of the terms of the agreement, or any other legal or equitable 
remedies.  This provision has never been invoked.  It must be noted that the group has essentially 





The two survey respondents gave their GNA an overall success rating of 8 and 9 out of 10.  They 
would possibly be willing to negotiate another GNA if similar circumstances were to arise in the 
future, but both are wary of the use of a GNA as a public relations tool by the company instead 
of as a way to reduce pollution.  If they had it to do over again they would keep the negotiation 
process in the public eye; focus more on the concurrent building of the community group to 
prevent burnout and dissolution; anticipate the possible break-up of the group and build in 
contingencies; and obtain formal commitments pertaining to reduction in chemical use.   
 
Unexpected benefits of the GNA process include an increase in anonymous involvement from 
company staff (and former staff); much more community awareness and scrutiny of the 
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company; and, on a personal level, empowerment through public speaking and the general 
effectiveness of a small group.   
 
Advice from BREATHE to other groups considering a GNA includes:  reserve the right to be 
critical of the company’s actions; reserve the right to negotiate additional agreements as future 
issues arise; allow for ample on-going review and monitoring of the agreement; be careful of 
public relations ploys; don’t confine yourself to the terms of pre-existing templates for an 
agreement; be bold and innovative; and ask for more than you want.  Advice contained in the 
article referenced below (written by the Director of the Office of Environmental Affairs of the 
City of Boulder) is that you have to get people talking; be sensitive to timing; work on a 
deadline; keep the process open; try to involve all interested parties; and make flexible use of 





1.  GNA 
2.  GNA Survey response and workshop briefing by Jane Shellenberger and Ed von Bleichert, 
BREATHE, Boulder, CO [On file with the Natural Resources Law Center (2002)].   
3.  Alison Peters, “Cooperative Pollution Prevention:  The Syntex Chemicals Agreement,” 
Pollution Prevention Review 23 (Spring 1996). 
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In October 1998, a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”) was signed by the Citizens of Owyhee 
County Organized Association (“COCOA”) and a dairy located in Owyhee County.  At the time 
the GNA was signed, the owner was operating one dairy.  Since that time, he opened a second 
dairy and agreed that this second dairy would also follow the GNA.   Because of the small size of 
the local community, COCOA has asked that we not refer to the dairies abiding by the GNA by 
their incorporated title.  Hence, the companies will be referred to as “the Dairies” throughout this 
document.  The purpose of the GNA was to address community concerns regarding the impact of 
dairies on the local community.  The greatest concerns were in relation to the impacts on both 
water quality and air quality from liquid manure being applied to agricultural fields through 
pivots/end guns.  COCOA was concerned with the change in levels of ammonia and nitrates 
found in local wells.  The area in question has sandy soils and shallow ground water, creating 
concerns within the community that ground water is also susceptible to contamination.  The 
conditions of the GNA have been included in the water right transfer permit issued by the Idaho 





COCOA is a non-profit grassroots citizens group comprised of farmers and rural citizens, many 
of whom have resided in the community for a number of generations.  The group is made up of 
volunteers and has an annual operating budget of approximately $14,000 generated primarily by 
foundation grants, with a small portion of the budget coming in via individual and member 
contributions.  A portion of the foundation grants received by COCOA is due to the fact that the 
organization is a chapter of the Idaho Rural Council.   
 
Since 1996, three commercial sized dairies moved into the Marsing and Homedale areas of 
Owyhee County.  Two of these dairies abide by the GNA created, while the third has chosen not 
to participate in any of the GNA negotiations or conditions.  The Dairies at issue are regarded as 
moderately important to the local economy.  In general, the sector represented by the Dairies is 
not perceived to be of great importance to the local economy (1 on a scale of 10).20  This rating 
was given in light of the fact that Idaho is the sixth largest dairy state in the nation, and as such, 
these Dairies represent only a small fraction of the dairy sector as a whole.  At the time the GNA 
was negotiated, the Dairies were profitable, expanding, and privately owned.   
 
 
                                                 
20 Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from COCOA’s responses to the GNA survey. 
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Nature of the Dispute 
 
The commercial size Dairies moved into Owyhee County between Marsing and Homedale in 
1998.  The Dairies moved cattle to the area prior to obtaining a water permit.  COCOA 
recognized this as an opportunity to try to stop the Dairies from being established by protesting 
their water permit.  Local citizens were concerned with how the Dairies were impacting the air 
and water quality of Owyhee County.  The most significant issues were public health concerns, 
the impacts on the environments, and nuisance and quality of life issues.  In addition to the 
protesting of the water permit, the group began to test the water of their own individual wells and 
hired a professional hydrologist at their own expense.   
 
The Dairies are located within a half-mile radius of one another, and are within two miles of the 
Snake River.  There are also waste-holding ponds full of manure.  Citizens have noticed a 
dramatic change in water quality since the building of the two Dairies.  The water is described as 
“murky” with a noticeable amount of sand in the water.  COCOA believes that the volume of 
water used by the Dairies, combined with the location of the Dairies, have a direct relation to the 
water quality problems.  It is noted that the Dairies convert irrigation water from a typical use 
into a “commercial” use.  This commercial use consumes high volumes of water twelve months 
out of the year, rather than just using water from April through October (the time period of the 
“typical” use).  During the winter months, when the aquifer may not be recharging quickly, 
pumping in the sandy soils may cause draw-down effects on surrounding domestic wells.  
Citizens have also noticed an increase in the presence of sulfur and ammonia in domestic wells 
after the Dairies began pumping water twelve months a year.  It was the protesting of one the 
Dairies’ water permit by COCOA that resulted in the decision to negotiate a GNA.       
 
Prior to negotiating the GNA, COCOA participated in public hearings, urged regulatory agencies 
to better enforce existing laws/rules, urged agencies and/or other governmental bodies to adopt 
new rules, and protested the water permit used by the Dairies.  COCOA, in working directly with 
the Dairies, sent written correspondence to the Dairies expressing their concerns, met with Dairy 
representatives, and hired their own hydro-geologist to assist in the monitoring of water quality.  
The monitoring of personal wells occurred on a monthly basis.  The Idaho Division of 
Environmental Quality and the Idaho State Department of Agriculture were contacted to study 
the water.  The two departments agreed to conduct a five-year water project to monitor wells 
around the Dairies.     
 
Both of the Dairies are owned by the same person, and have agreed to follow the GNA.  There is 
a third dairy in the region, but the management of this dairy has chosen not to be a party to the 
GNA at all.  The two dairies that are owned by the same person have separate water permits.  
Under the GNA, the dairy that signed off on the agreement has allowed COCOA to test water 
from wells located on the dairy.  The second dairy also allows the testing of water, even though 
they are not named parties to the GNA.   
 
 
Negotiation of the GNA 
 
The Dairies’ willingness to negotiate a GNA was prompted by COCOA’s challenge of a water 
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permit.  At the time, the Dairies had been using water beyond what had been allocated to them, 
and had then applied for a water transfer permit.  Every large dairy (more than approximately 
300 total head) must obtain written approval for the dairy use of water from the IDWR.  This is 
accomplished by filing an application for a new water right permit or an application to transfer 
an existing water right to the dairy.  After hearing COCOA’s complaints, the IDWR made the 
negotiated GNA terms part of the water transfer, an approach supported by the Dairies and 
IDWR.  
 
During the negotiations, COCOA felt that they did not have adequate access to lawyers and legal 
expertise, technical consultants, trained negotiators, or technical/economic data.   
 
COCOA began the process wanting the following commitments from the Dairies:   
• Specific remediation and mitigation measures in relation to specific pollution prevention 
• Traffic mitigation provisions 
• Commitment from the Dairies to perform regular environmental monitoring 
• Community access to relevant environmental data held by the Dairies 
• Advance notice to the community of any proposed changes in operations 
• Active community involvement in audits, monitoring, and/or inspections 
 
The bottom line issue for the Dairies was for COCOA to end all protests and negative publicity 
targeted toward the Dairies.   
 
The resulting GNA contained the following major provisions: 
• Dairies agreed to allow the testing of water from wells located on the dairy.  The conditions 
were included in their water transfer permit issued by the IDWR. 
o Dairies are required to submit a detailed plan for the monitoring program to the 
department for review and approval prior to diversion and use of water.  The plan shall 
provide for testing of water from at least one well hydrologically up-gradient from the 
Dairy and at least one well hydrologically down-gradient from the Dairy. 
o If the Dairies do not comply with the conditions of approval for this permit, the IDWR 
may revoke the permit.   
• The operation of the Dairies will not cause contamination of ground water and/or drinking 
water. 
• There will be no discharge of pollutants into water except as permitted by state and federal 
agencies. 
• Agreed to a maximum density of animals per acre. 
• Agreed that the facility would not be a nuisance as defined by Idaho regulations. 
• Lights on the Dairies shall be shielded to keep the light source pointing down and inside the 
property lines of the Dairy. 
• The lagoon is to be lined with a grade of vinyl appropriate for manure management. 
• The settling ponds are also to be lined with vinyl or concrete. 
• The best available odor controlling practices are to be used in manure storage structures. 
• The Dairy agreed to requirements relating to the total capacity of manure storage structures.  
These structures must also have adequate diversions to contain any spillage or rupture. 
• There must be an EPA approved clean-up plan in place for the manure storage facilities. 
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• Requirements were established as to what may be deposited in the manure storage structures. 
• The Dairies agreed that the water consultant will select the monitoring wells and will 
determine if a test well is needed.   
• If the Dairies close, they agree to submit to an EPA closure plan for the facility 
• COCOA agreed to: 
o End protests and negative publicity targeted toward the Dairies. 
 
The negotiation process lasted approximately one month.  The GNA is a legally binding contract.  
The GNA has been integrated with a state regulatory action, where the IDWR adopted the 
conditions of the GNA into the dairies’ water permit.  If the Dairy is sold, the GNA will remain 
in effect.  The Dairy does not provide funding to COCOA to ensure its continued participation in 
GNA-related activities.  The Dairy does, however, pay for its share of the cost for a hydrologist 





COCOA estimates that they have spent a total of $4,500 on the negotiation of the GNA.  The 
total cost thus far of implementing the GNA is estimated to be $13,000.  The largest expenditure 
was the hiring of a hydro-geologist to set up the water quality monitoring system.  COCOA 
expects to spend $10,000 to maintain the conditions of the GNA.  The Dairies do not provide 
funding to COCOA to ensure its continued participation in GNA-related activities; however, 





COCOA rates the GNA as a general success in terms of the extent to which commitments have 
been honored.  One lingering problem has been the inadequate resolution of the pest and odor 
issues.  The Dairies were not using effective pest control measures, and continued to sprinkle 
liquid manure onto fields using irrigation pivots and end guns.  This practice attracts flies and 
creates extremely foul odors.  Also, by using more water than was allowed by the water permits, 
the Dairies were not abiding by the conditions of the water permits   In response, COCOA 
brought the problem to the attention of the Dairies and to the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources.  Additionally, COCOA has been constantly patrolling the area to verify that 
conditions are being followed by the Dairies.  There have been no subsequent modifications 
made to the original GNA.  The Dairies has recently applied for a new permit, raising the 
potential for additional negotiations.  The GNA does not include specific procedures for dispute 
resolution.      
 




The GNA Provision: What Actually Happened: What Didn’t Happen: 
Water Quality 
 
 Water testing has been 
conducted monthly and data 
has been submitted to 
COCOA 
 Testing of wells 
 Monitors have locks on them; 
able to determine if monitors 
have been tampered with 
 Operation of the Confined 
Animal Feeding Operation 
(CAFO) has not caused 
contamination of ground 
water or drinking water 
 Negotiating for three test 
wells (2 paid for by Dairy, 1 
paid for by COCOA) 
 No pollutants have been 
discharged to surface or 
ground water except as 
allowed by permit 
 Dairy paid two years in 
advance for monthly water 
testing.  Thereafter, the dairy 
has paid a hydrologist 
selected by COCOA to 




 The maximum density of 
animals has not exceeded five 
Animal Units per acre 
 The CAFO has not been a 
nuisance as defined by Idaho 
Code §52-101 
 
Site Requirements  
o Manure storage structure 
capacity is sufficient for 180 
days at maximum capacity 
(animal units) 
o All manure storage facilities 
have adequate diversions, dike 
walls, or curbs and direct any 
spillage or runoff to 
appropriately-sized areas 
o All manure storage facilities 
have EPA approved clean-up 
plan  
o CAFO has given public notice 
within 24 hours of any spillage 
or rupture of storage facilities 
 Lights for the CAFO have 
been placed and shielded to 
direct the light source down 
and inside the CAFO 
property lines  
 The lagoon has been lined 
with vinyl 
 Settling ponds have been 
lined with vinyl or concrete 
 All manure storage structures 
employ the best available 
odor controlling practices 
(much improved) 
 Consultant selected 
monitoring wells and deter-
mined if test well required 
 Although settling ponds 
have been lined with 
vinyl, the liners are being 
ripped apart when settling 
ponds are cleaned out by 
front loaders 
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 Animal parts and afterbirth 
have not been deposited in 
manure storage structures 
General Requirements  
 Adequate housekeeping 
practices have been maintained 
to prevent creation of a nuisance 
 Dead animals have not been 
picked up more than three times 
every 48 hours.  The pick-up 
storage area is not within 500 
feet of a public road.  A panel 
has been constructed to block 
public view of the storage area 
 The ratio for liquid manure 
application is five parts water to 
one part lagoon mixture 
 Facilities have been designed 
and located with full 
consideration of:  proximity 
to adjacent uses, effect on 
surrounding properties, and 
reduction of nuisance factors  
  
Facility Closure 
 If dairy ceased operation, a 
closure plan is to be submitted 
to the EPA (with duplicates 
submitted to the Idaho DEQ, 
Owyhee County Public Health 
Dept., Idaho Soil conservation 
District, and COCOA), and 
removal and disposal of 
livestock waste is to be 
completed within ninety days of 
the final day of facility 
operation 
 EPA regulations are to be 
followed for the closure and 
clean up of CAFO facilities 
 In the event that the dairy is sold 
or leased to another individual 
or entity, this agreement 
remains in effect as a condition 
of the sale 
  Level of implementation 
not known because the 






COCOA gives their GNA an overall success rating of 7 out of 10.  If similar disputes were to 
arise in the future, negotiating another GNA would be their preferred course of action.  If they 
had to do it over again, they would have added shallow test wells, and testing for hydrogen 
sulfide and odors, to their negotiating process.  They also would have added a provision to the 
GNA asking for funds to hire an attorney.  One unexpected benefit of the GNA experience was 
that some of the neighbors seemed to bond together, and it was also viewed as an outlet to keep 
people involved in their community.  COCOA is concerned about the potential financial burdens 
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of the GNA over the length of time that the Dairies are in operation.  Their advice to others 
considering negotiating a GNA is to involve a professional to assist in the production of a 




1.  GNA  
2.  GNA Survey response (as later revised) by Ilene Dobbin, COCOA, Marsing, ID (on file with 
Natural Resources Law Center). 
3.  Briefing on GNA implementation by Ilene Dobbin and Joan Chadez (July 2003).     

















In December 1997, a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”) was signed by the Community/Labor 
Refinery Tracking Committee (“C/LRTC”), the City of Philadelphia (“City”), and Sun Oil 
Company (“Sun”).  The GNA was in the form of a Consent Decree negotiated as a settlement to 
a lawsuit brought by C/LRTC against Sun for violations of the Clean Air Act.  As Sun has 





Formed in 1993 with the help of the local chapter of Clean Water Action (“CWA”), the C/LRTC 
is a coalition of organizations, workers, and individuals from South and Southwest Philadelphia 
who are working to improve the quality of life for the communities that are impacted by Sun Oil 
Refinery’s pollution.  There are no paid staff, and the group operates on an annual budget of 
$5,000-6,000 derived mostly from foundation grants (90%) and individual contributions (10%).  
The mission of the C/LRTC is to bring together residents and workers to create a powerful voice 
to protect the communities’ health, economic security and quality of life. 
 
Sun bought the Philadelphia refinery in 1990.  Sun and the refinery sector in general are 
moderately important to the local economy (4 on a scale of 10).  At the time the GNA was 
negotiated, Sun was profitable, stable in size, publicly traded, concerned about public opinion, 
and perceived publicly as committed to environmental concerns. 
 
 
Nature of the Dispute 
 
A number of issues prompted community concern about Sun’s operations, including public 
health concerns, nuisance and quality of life issues, and impacts on the environment.  Prior to 
negotiating the GNA, C/LRTC had urged state regulatory agencies to better enforce existing 
laws, written letters to Sun expressing their concerns, met with company representatives, and 
conducted negative publicity campaigns.  In 1995, after learning of multiple incidents in which 
the refinery emitted illegally high levels of sulfur dioxide, the C/LRTC sent a 60-day notice of 
intent to sue the company under the citizens suit provisions of the Clean Air Act. 
 
 
Negotiation of the GNA 
 
Following the filing of C/LRTC’s lawsuit, it took approximately two and a half years to 
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negotiate a settlement (“Consent Decree”).  During the negotiations, C/LRTC had adequate 
access to lawyers and legal expertise and technical consultants, but did not utilize trained 
negotiators.  They also felt that there was not adequate access to technical and/or economic data.   
 
C/LRTC was looking for specific commitments with respect to pollution prevention, reduction, 
and remediation as well as an active involvement in audits, monitoring, and plant inspections.  In 
agreeing to negotiate, Sun was seeking a dismissal of the pending lawsuit, an end to protests, and 
positive publicity.  The City intervened in the lawsuit to collect a share of the fines paid by the 
company as part of the settlement. 
 
The major provisions of the Consent Decree are as follows: 
• Sun agreed to invest more than $5 million to improve its air pollution controls to decrease the 
release of sulfur dioxide, smoke and odors, including installation of color TV cameras and 
video recorders for observing flares. 
• Sun agreed to pay $500,000 in pollution penalties, with $150,000 going directly to the City, 
$200,000 going to projects that would benefit the environment and health of the communities 
around the facility, and $150,000 going toward establishing a community emergency 
notification system. 
• Sun agreed to provide more information to residents on activities at the refinery, including: 
o Quarterly reports concerning various operations, 
o Incident investigation reports on significant airborne releases of contaminants, 
o Notification of planned maintenance or repairs along with environmental impact studies 
seven days in advance, and 
o Notification of emergency repairs. 
• Both the City and C/LRTC had the right to conduct site visits to observe operations and 
inspect monitoring records. 
• The parties agreed to establish a three member Operating Committee to carry out certain 
provisions of the Consent Decree. 
• Sun agreed to pay stipulated penalties if it failed to comply. 
 
C/LRTC also sought a better fenceline monitoring system but this issue was not addressed in the 
final agreement.  
 
As a lawsuit settlement, the Consent Decree was a legally binding document but was not part of 
a state or federal regulatory permit.  If the company had been sold, the GNA would have 
remained in effect.  The agreement contained specific dispute resolution procedures for any 
disputes that might have arisen under the Consent Decree.  The result of the proposed 





C/LRTC spent $0 on the negotiation process.  Organizing support was provided on a pro bono 
basis by Clean Water Action.  Legal representation was provided on a contingency basis by the 
Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (“PILCOP”).  As part of the agreement, Sun paid 
PILCOP $75,000 plus $4,500 per quarter until Sun’s obligations were met.  The company spent 
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an estimated $5,500,000 on implementing the agreement.  Sun did not provide funding to 





This GNA (i.e., the Consent Decree) was negotiated to reduce the high levels of sulfur dioxide 
emissions being produced by Sunoco.  The community group threatened to sue Sunoco unless 
they worked to improve the situation.  To date, the timeline of this GNA is over, hence, the 
agreement is no longer in existence.  The primary issues negotiated included public health, 
nuisance, noise, traffic, environmental impact, and air issues.  A fair number of the 
implementation strategies have been achieved, but only through a great deal of work on the part 
of the community groups.  C/LRTC estimates that Sun honored 80% of its commitments.21  
Some of the process improvements listed in the GNA were not made due to technical reasons.  
Today, a number of the community members that worked on the GNA have left, leaving only a 
few active members remaining.  To address remaining issues, the groups are currently seeking to 
meet with the tracking committee to discuss areas for improvement.  No subsequent 
modifications were made to the GNA.   
 
Additional details regarding the status of implementation provisions are presented in the 
following table: 
 
The GNA Provision: What Actually Happened: What Didn’t Happen: 
Sulfur Recovery Unit  Sulfur recovery unit was 
installed 
 
 Provide incident investigation 
reports pertaining to events 
resulting in a significant 
release of contaminants to the 
air to C/LRTC for review 
 Reports were received  Although the reports 
were received, it was 
only after the community 
group requested them; 
they did not come 
automatically 
Evaluate potential methods to 
reduce emission of fine particles in 
the Point Breeze FCCU. 
 Submit report with 
recommendations to C/LRTC 
within 120 days of GNA 
going into effect. 
  Air is not particularly 
cleaner 
Quarterly Reports to C/LRTC  Reports were received  Although the reports 
were received, it was 
only after the community 
group requested them; 
they did not come 
automatically 
*In light of the current status and small size of the group, the committee was unable to assess the 
implementation status of several provisions.   
                                                 




C/LRTC gives their GNA an overall success rating of 8 out of 10.  Bob Wendelgass, State 
Director of Clean Water Action and participant in the process, is unsure if he would seek to 
negotiate another GNA under similar circumstances in the future.  If he had it to do over again, 
he would have liked the GNA to last longer than the Consent Decree did.  He reports that a 
significant amount of work went into getting the siren system and other projects implemented 




1.  GNA (Consent Decree) 
2.  GNA Survey response and workshop briefing by Bob Wendelgass, CWA, Philadelphia, PA 
[On file with the Natural Resources Law Center (2002)].   
3.  “Sun Oil Reaches Good Neighbor Agreement with Neighbors/Workers 12/30/97 (Cover Note 
from Bob Wendelgass, Clean Water Action-Philadelphia to Denny Larson, Coordinator of the 
National Oil Refinery Action Network (NORAN) (CBE),” at http://www.igc.org/cbesf/flash.html 
4.  “More Control Over Sun,” South Philadelphia Review, Jan. 8, 1998. 
5.  Briefing on GNA implementation by Anne Fitzgerald (July 2003).     
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In 2002, Shell Oil Company negotiated a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”) with the 
Concerned Citizens of Norco (“CCN”).  The primary purpose of the agreement was the 
relocation of the residents from the Diamond community immediately adjacent to the refinery in 
Norco, LA.  The GNA is a legally binding commitment that was negotiated in response to long-






CCN is comprised of the affected neighbors in the Diamond community.  In the GNA process, 
CCN was advised and supported by the Louisiana Bucket Brigade (“LABB”).  Founded in 2000, 
LABB is a non-profit organization that works with community groups.  There are three full-time 
and three part-time employees.  The LABB has an annual operating budget of $225,000 which is 
generated by individual and member contributions (12%), government grants (8%), and 
foundation grants (80%).  The LABB provided hands on support to the CCN to force Shell to 
agree to the relocation demand. 
 
A number of other NGOs also participated in the GNA negotiations and support activities, 
including Earthjustice, Xavier Deep South Center for Environmental Justice, Commonweal, 
Refinery Reform Campaign, and the Environmental Health Fund. 
 
Shell Oil began operations in Norco in 1915.  The company employs only one resident of the 
neighboring community.  The oil industry and Shell Oil are both very important to the local 
economy.  At the time the GNA was negotiated, Shell was profitable, expanding, publicly traded, 
and concerned about public opinion. 
 
 
Nature of the Dispute 
 
The Diamond community is 100 percent African-American and sandwiched between the Shell 
Chemical facility and Shell/Motiva refinery.  Community members are rarely employed at these 
facilities.  A number of residents have developed strange cancers and many people have had 
respiratory problems.  Additionally, two members of the community were killed in an explosion 
in the 1970s, and there was a massive explosion in 1988.  Due to these chronic public health 
issues, the community had been fighting for relocation for twenty years. 
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Prior to negotiating the GNA, the community took a number of actions, including participating in 
public hearings and commenting on public documents; urging regulatory agencies to better 
enforce existing laws; initiating personal injury lawsuits (note that the community lost a law suit 
demanding relocation in 1997); writing to and meeting with company representatives, and 
conducting negative publicity campaigns.  One other action that the community took was to 
monitor the refinery’s stack discharges as well as the resulting air quality.  Samples were 
collected exposing violations of state air standards, photographs were taken and a web cam used 
to expose flaring abuses, and Shell’s public records were researched to expose other examples of 
“bad behavior.”  
 
 
Negotiation of the GNA 
 
During 1999 and 2000, due to community activism, Shell offered to relocate two of the four 
streets in the Diamond community.  These two streets were nearest the fenceline with the 
chemical facility.  Some of the community members accepted the offer, while others did not, 
creating division within the ranks of community members that had long argued for relocation of 
all four blocks.  In June 2001, the Coming Clean Initiative, a national consortium of 
environmental groups, visited the Diamond Community, meeting with community and Shell 
plant and corporate officials.  This effort created further pressure on Shell to relocate all four 
streets. 
 
In June 2002, Shell made an offer to purchase and relocate property owners or provide $25,000 
home improvement loans (20 percent forgiven each year) to all Diamond community members.  
Community members had two months to sign up for the program, an option exercised by all but 
two property owners. 
 
According to Anne Rolfes, the unquestionable catalyst for Shell making the final offer (i.e., the 
GNA) was the aggressive organizing and media campaign.22  One prominent example involved 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in August of 2002.  Shell 
knew that the activists and the community would be there on a world stage bringing up the issue 
of the Norco refinery.  This presented a significant threat to Shell since they wanted to present 
their global program of Sustainable Development, but they knew that they would have to explain 
the apparent community “abuse” that was occurring in Norco.  Shell knew that its opponents 
were well organized and had the resources to carry out their negative publicity campaign.  Shell 
was also “vulnerable” at this point due to some other negative international publicity around the 
same timeframe.  At the point Shell agreed to a relocation plan, Anne Rolfes believes that Shell 
was just tired of the relentless pressure on a world stage and wanted to put the situation behind 
them so they would not be further embarrassed.  Iris Carter of CCN expressed a similar 
sentiment, explaining that it was the “drama”—i.e., the constant repeating of heart-wrenching 
stories of citizen health issues—that pushed the company to settle the dispute. 
 
Shell proposed the relocation plan as a way to do what the community wanted without losing 
face.  They combined relocation with a number of other programs which were proposed by Shell 
itself and not really a result of the negotiation process.  Note that the community’s main focus 
                                                 
22 Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from LABB’s responses to the GNA survey. 
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was relocation; at that point they simply did not care about other issues such as pollution 
prevention or effects on the local economy because they would no longer be living in the shadow 
of the refinery if they were relocated. 
 
Negotiation of the GNA focused on determining a fair price to be paid to the landowners.  In 
addition, the company sought an end to protests and negative publicity as well as positive 
publicity for the company.  (The activist groups involved in the GNA campaign made it clear to 
the company that the campaign would not stop during negotiations.)  It took approximately three 
months to finalize the agreement.  Participants included the Concerned Citizens of Norco, the 
Louisiana Bucket Brigade, Refinery Reform, Environmental Health fund, Subra Company, 
Earthjustice, Commonweal, along with company representatives.  Anne Rolfes felt that during 
the negotiations the community group and its supporters had adequate access to lawyers, legal 
expertise and technical consultants, but not to trained negotiators and company technical and 
economic data.  However, she would have liked to have obtained a better deal for landowners 
than they ultimately achieved.   
 
The GNA is considered by CCN to be a legally binding document that is not integrated with a 
state or federal regulatory action.  As the buyout is happening over a period of six months to a 
year, a future transfer of ownership of the company should have no effect on the agreement.  The 





The costs of negotiating the GNA included $8,000 for a facilitator (split between Shell and the 
community) and $1,000 for conference calls to link out of town participants to the negotiating 
sessions and to conduct strategy sessions.  In addition, members of the seven participants 
representing NGOs contributed an average of 15 hours per person per week.  The company did 
not provide any funding to the community group or the NGOs to ensure their continued 
participation in monitoring the implementation of the GNA. 
 
The costs of the implementation process so far include $5,000 spent by the Louisiana Bucket 





This GNA was negotiated by residents of Norco, Louisiana and Shell Oil, Co.  Shell’s answer to 
community concerns was to relocate the residents to another area.  However, once they offered 
to move the residents, the company began to improve their air monitoring system.  Shell drafted 
legal documents indicating to the residents that they were being paid fair market value for their 
homes.  Yet, this fair market value did not take into account the loss of culture and historical ties 
to the community.  Families have been split because some individuals simply do not want to 
leave the community even though they know that it is not a safe environment.  Approximately 
85% of the neighborhood is being relocated.  Generally, it is reported that Shell had more input 
in the decision making than the community groups.  In this instance, the community groups 
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found themselves faced with Shell’s version of a GNA, termed a “Good Neighbor Initiative.” It 
is important to recognize that this “Initiative” is different from a GNA (initiated by community 
groups to address concerns about an area company). 
 
If this situation should be encountered again in the future, the community groups recommend the 
residents have more of a voice as to what is going to be the end result.  They also encourage the 
residents to take a “hard stand” with these companies.  Additionally, the residents should band 
together with other groups to try to get significant legislation passed, and to help politicians 
recognize that change is needed.  The community groups here express frustration with the 
number of inconsistencies.  Provisions allocating health care and associated costs to Shell have 
not been solidified.  There are concerns that the health study may not be done properly.  No 
subsequent modifications have been made to the agreement.  Some of the paperwork is taking 
longer than expected, and some of the contractors who are working with the community on 
behalf of Shell have been rude, impacting company-community relations.  
 
Additional details about the status of implementation provisions are provided in the following 
table:   
 
The GNA Provision: What Actually Happened: What Didn’t Happen: 
All eligible owners and renters who 
wished to do so were to sign up for 
the Diamond Options Program by 
August 31, 2002 
 Provision implemented (a few 
families choose to stay) 
 
Shell to pay a temporary relocation 
allowance to families who chose to 
have extensive renovations done to 
their homes 
  No knowledge of any 
temporary relocation 
allowance being paid to 
any families 
Shell paid the following expenses to 
owners or renters who were moving 
out: 
 miscellaneous expenses 
 moving allowance 
 rent disruption allowance 
 professional service allowance 
 clear site bonus 
 equity advance 
 Moving allowance provision 
implemented 
 Rent disruption allowance 
provision implemented 
 Professional service 
allowance provision 
implemented 
 Clear site bonus provision 
given 
 Equity advance provision 
implemented.   
 Misc. expenses were not 
distributed according to 
the original GNA.  
Originally, Shell agreed 
to provide $15,000 per 
household for misc. 
expenses.  Instead, Shell 
distributed $15,000 per 
family (for example, the 
$15,000 to be allocated to 
one household was 
divided into thirds and 
distributed to three 
biologically related 
family members serving 
as the heads of their own 
households). 
All home improvements and 
property sales to be completed by 
Dec. 31, 2002 
  Incomplete; only one 
home in Norco has had 
all improvements 
completed, as of July 




Anne Rolfes rates the overall success of the GNA a 7 on a scale of 10.  She was happy that the 
company agreed to the relocation, but she wishes the residents had received higher prices for 
their homes.  An unexpected benefit to her organization was achieving credibility with Shell and 
being able to use this credibility in other battles.  If she had a chance to do it over again she 
would have had more training for the negotiation team prior to meeting with the company.  Her 
advice to other groups considering a GNA is to try to get what you want in a closed time frame 
so you don’t have the headache of having to monitor the company into the future.  The group is 
still in negotiations with Shell regarding a health clinic that has yet to be determined.  There are 
also concerns that very few residents, other than those attending the meetings, were made aware 





1.  GNA  Survey response and workshop briefing by Anne Rolfes, Louisiana Bucket Brigade.   
2.  Memo from Wilma Subra, Jan. 21, 2003. 
3.  Briefing on GNA implementation by Iris Carter, CCN (July 2003).   




Northern Plains Resource Council, Stillwater Protective Association, 









In May 2000, a Good Neighbor Agreement (“Agreement”) was signed by the Northern Plains 
Resource Council (“Northern Plains”), the Stillwater Protective Association (“SPA”), the 
Cottonwood Resource Council (“CRC”), and the Stillwater Mining Company (“SMC”).  The 
purpose of the Agreement was to ensure that SMC would protect local watersheds from 
environmental degradation due to mining activities and mitigate the impact of the influx of mine 





Northern Plains was founded in 1971.  With a staff of 15 and an annual operating budget of 
$800,000, Northern Plains is committed to land stewardship, to the preservation of family farms 
and ranches and small businesses, and to providing the information and tools necessary to give 
citizens an effective voice in decisions that affect their lives.  Recognizing the need to balance 
the quest for economic gain with social and environmental responsibility, Northern Plains strives 
to protect Montana’s water, land, air, and unique quality of life in order to pass them on, 
unimpaired, to future generations. 
 
Both SPA and CRC are citizens groups that are affiliated with the Northern Plains.  These groups 
were founded in 1978 and 1988, respectively, to respond to the potential environmental and 
social impacts that local mining operations and other commercial developments posed to the 
local community. 
 
Stillwater Mining Company owns both the Nye and East Boulder mines which are the subjects of 
the Agreement.  The Nye mine began operations in 1986 and the East Boulder mine began 
operations in 1998.  Both mines produce platinum and palladium, drawing from the same vein of 
ore which is 28 miles long and 10 feet wide.  Between them the mines employ 1460 workers.  
The company and the mining industry in general are moderately important to the local economy.  
At the time the Agreement was negotiated, SMC was profitable, expanding, seeking funding, 





Nature of the Dispute 
 
The price of palladium began to increase dramatically in 1997.  Anticipating a shortfall in 
palladium, SMC management sought to expand their operations.  Their plans included opening 
the East Boulder mine, increasing production at Nye above the current production cap, and 
opening a new tailings impoundment on company owned property eight miles downstream from 
the mine.  All of these projects required state approval.  In addition, in 1998, SMC sought a 
Montana Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“MPDES”) permit for discharging 
wastewater into the East Boulder River from the East Boulder mine as well as approval for 
construction of a new “man camp” to house mine employees. 
 
Both the SPA and CRC were concerned with SMC’s expansion plans and participated in the 
permitting and approval processes to the extent possible.  Unfortunately, the citizens groups 
ultimately felt that their concerns were not being adequately addressed by the government 
agencies involved.  SPA subsequently filed an intent to sue the Montana Department of 
Environmental Quality (“MDEQ”) based on what they felt was approval of an inadequate 
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”).  CRC also considered filing suit over the MPDES 
permit.  One CRC member wrote an editorial for the NY Times exposing the potential negative 
impacts of the East Boulder mine on the local area.  Because SMC is a publicly traded company, 
and because at the time, several “green” funds had a stake in the company, SMC was especially 
sensitive to accusations that it does not live up to expectations regarding environmental 
protection.  The pending and threatened lawsuits in addition to the local and national publicity of 
the dispute, coupled with SMC’s determination to proceed with the expansion, resulted in a very 
contentious situation in Sweet Grass County as both sides braced for a protracted battle. 
 
About this time, Tom McGuane, a CRC member, arranged a meeting between members of the 
local community and SMC management.  The results of this meeting were encouraging.  Paul 
Hawks, the then-chairman of CRC, followed up with a letter requesting a second meeting.  At 
the same time SPA requested a meeting with SMC.  Fortunately, SMC was open to pursuing a 
dialogue with the citizens groups, and the parties, including support staff from Northern Plains, 
took the first tentative steps toward negotiating a Good Neighbor Agreement. 
 
 
Negotiation of the GNA 
 
Both sides took negotiation of the Agreement seriously.  The citizens groups identified key 
negotiators who underwent two days of training with a professional negotiator in preparation for 
the process.  At the initial meeting in June 1999, 28 issues were put on the table.  Over the course 
of the next 11 months, the parties had numerous meetings, sometimes productive, often 
contentious, with the ultimate success occurring in May of 2000:  a signed Agreement that was 
truly a joint effort of all of the parties.  During the negotiations, the citizens groups demanded 
and received adequate access to legal advice, technical consultants, and company data to 
facilitate their understanding of the issues and to equalize the expertise of the parties. 
 
The citizens groups originally sought a number of specific commitments in the areas of pollution 
prevention and remediation, traffic mitigation, worker transportation and housing, investments in 
 65
the local infrastructure, regular environmental audits and monitoring, community access to 
company environmental data, community participation in environmental audits and monitoring, 
advance notice of any changes in operations, and financial support of the community groups to 
ensure their continued participation in Agreement-related activities.23  The company likewise 
sought specific commitments, including dismissal of all pending lawsuits, assurances that no 
further lawsuits challenging their operations in court would be filed, ending negative publicity, 
generating positive publicity, and a confidentiality agreement to ensure that confidential 
company information shared with the community groups would go no further.  Concessions were 
made on both sides, with the overall result representing acceptable compromises on all of the 
major issues, although many issues discussed along the way did not appear in the final 
agreement. 
 
The SMC Good Neighbor Agreement is a legally binding document.  The agreement will 
continue in effect until mining operations have ceased, the mine sites have been closed and 
reclaimed, all SMC performance bonds are released, and the water quality of all discharges from 
the mines has returned to “baseline” quality.  In addition, provision was made in the agreement 
for the Agreement to be binding on any and all future purchasers of the mines. 
 
The GNA contains the following major provisions: 
• Mitigation of environmental impacts at the new tailings impoundment,  
• Mitigation of socioeconomic impacts due to the influx of new workers, 
• Environmental audit performed every five years, 
• Citizen participation in all state inspections and the ability to conduct an independent 
citizen inspection, 
• Establishment of conservation easements on over 2,000 acres of company-owned farm 
and ranch land, 
• Access to almost all environmental performance data, 
• A commitment to investigate improved mining technologies, 
• Extensive water quality monitoring, agronomic application of wastewater, and a long-
term goal of zero discharge, 
• Traffic mitigation and control at each site including a busing plan for workers, 
• Oversight and technology committees featuring equal participation from the citizens 
groups and SMC, 
• Confidentiality agreement,  
• Mechanism for dispute resolution, and 
• Funding provisions that state the specific amounts that SMC will provide for 
implementation purposes as well as providing funding to the citizens groups for their 
continued participation in Agreement-related activities. 
 
The most current status of implementation provisions are discussed later in this case study 
summary.   
 
 
                                                 




Detailed cost records are not available.  However, Northern Plains estimates that they spent at 
least 3,000 hours of staff time and $63,000 on consultants and outside experts during the 
negotiation process.  The Agreement has cost SMC a minimum of $4 million per year to 
implement.  In addition, SMC provides Northern Plains with money each year to offset the cost 
of participating in the implementation and monitoring of the GNA.  The amount of money is 
negotiated each year, but cannot exceed $135,000 and has averaged approximately $120,000 in 
the first four years of the Agreement.  The company’s costs are expected to decrease only 





The NPRC indicates that a majority of the commitments listed in the GNA have been honored.  
Problems have been encountered where the company did not keep the citizens groups informed 
of changes in operations as well as with the worker busing provisions.  A year-long dispute 
exists about the level at which long-term water quality monitoring should be maintained.  The 
busing dispute was resolved under tremendous public and worker pressure put on the company to 
continue this popular program.  The purpose of negotiating this Agreement was to ensure 
environmental excellence in two counties, to include community oversight and awareness, and to 
implement new technologies to deal with waste from the mine.  The community groups 
recognized the need to develop some type of dispute resolution tool to be used when working 
with the mining company.  The community groups stated that the Agreement process involved 
more work then they had anticipated.  The groups are pleased with the resulting Agreement and 
believe they have developed a very sound process.  This is supported through quarterly meetings 
with the company as well as meetings with a committee focused on responsible mining practices 
and new technologies to reduce mine waste.  Most meetings are transcribed to preserve a record 
for the future.  It was important to Northern Plains to be able to hire experts, but there was the 
concern that SMC would view these experts as a hindrance.  However, SMC has frequently 
benefited from hiring these experts.  For both Northern Plains and SMC, community support has 
grown substantially.  Northern Plains states that having an expert who was also a miner was a 
huge advantage because he truly cared about the process and could relate to the mine owners.  It 
must be noted that Northern Plains had more legal leverage at the time the Agreement was 
negotiated than what is currently available.  During negotiations, SMC had applied for a permit 
and Northern Plains was able to use the permit process as leverage.  At the time, SMC could 
afford to commit to the provisions suggested by Northern Plains.  However, a majority interest in 
SMC is now controlled by a Russian mining giant with a very poor environmental record.  The 
Russians have pledged to honor the Agreement with Northern Plains and its affiliates, but the 
company is now more insulated against American market pressures and perceptions.   
 




The GNA Provision: What Actually Happened: What Didn’t Happen: 
Disclosure of Information  All information as required 
by the GNA, including 
confidential information, was 
disclosed by SMC 
 The timing of the 
disclosure is not always 
optimal, but it is 
eventually disclosed 
Funding for Program Maintenance   A majority of programs have 
been funded 
 A dispute exists about the 
level of future funding for 
water quality monitoring; 
the company has indicated 
funding beyond the first 
five years of the 
Agreement may be up for 
grabs.   
Council Participation  The Councils have been 
allowed to participate in all 
aspects of the audits, reports, 
studies, projects, plans, and 
sampling completed by Third 
Parties 
 
Establishment of New Technologies 
Team  
 The Councils and their 
consultants have taken over 
this function due to lack of 
SMC initiation.  The 
Company is receptive to this 
new dynamic.   
 
Access to Premises  Councils have been allowed 
to enter mine premises and 
inspect mine facilities, 
conduct Citizen Sampling, 
take photographs, and meet 
with relevant SMC 
employees 
 
Creation and Donation of 
Conservation Easements to 
Montana Land Reliance  
 Donated conservation 
easements to Montana Land 
Reliance 
 
 The implementation of 
this provision took longer 
than expected 
 Only four of six 
easements signed 
Mine-Sponsored Housing   The company dropped plans 
for mine-sponsored housing 
 
Busing and Traffic Plans  SMC developed, 
implemented and funded 
comprehensive busing and 
traffic reduction plans for the 
East Boulder and Stillwater 
Mines 
 
Commercial Traffic Reduction Plan 
 
 SMC developed, 
implemented and funded a 
comprehensive commercial 
traffic reduction plan 
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Environmental Audit Program  SMC established, 
implemented, maintained and 
funded an environmental 
audit program 
 
Reclamation Plan   Consultants working with 
NPRC in response to SMC’s 
current permit and 
reclamation action 
 State agency delay in 
moving the reclamation 
and bond process forward 
has delayed 
implementation 
Tailings and Waste Rock Project  SMC participated in and 
funded tailings and waste 
rock project 
 Independent waste rock 
characterization is underway 
 SMC is about a year 
behind in implementing 
the waste pilot project.  
More time may be needed 
to test new tailings 
technology prior to 
negotiating 
implementation.  
Notification of Permit 
Modifications or Amendments  
 SMC disclosed and provided 
Councils with an opportunity 
to review and comment on all 
Amendments and Revisions 
to the mine operating permits 
and MPDES permits no later 
than 3 months prior to the 
commencement of the 
permitting process 
 Implementation of 
provision is acceptable, 
but SMC is sometimes 
late in their notifications 
 Difficulty because both 
parties have different 
definitions of what 
constitutes an 
“amendment” 
Water Program  
 SMC designed, implemented 
and maintained electronic 
database of all water data 
 SMC funded a third party 
review and water quality reports 
 SMC developed, implemented, 
maintained, and funded the 
supplemental monitoring 
programs  
 SMC participated in and funded 
supplemental ground water 
studies  
 SMC designed, implemented, 
maintained, and funded the 
Tiered Trigger Level 
Framework  
 SMC designed, implemented, 
maintained, and funded any 
programs necessary to 
implement the response and 
remedial actions  
 SMC designed, implemented, 
maintained, and funded the 
“Water Program” 
 SMC has provided Councils 
with the opportunity to 
participate in the design, 
implementation, and 
oversight of the Water 
Program 
 SMC has given Councils at 
least 72 hours notice of all 
meetings, inspections, 
sampling, and monitoring 
events 
 Councils receive the required 
notice approximately 95% of 
the time 
 SMC designed, implemented 
and maintained an expanded 
reporting program 
 SMC funded Baseline 
Fisheries Study and Plan 
 Councils sometimes do 
not receive the required 
notice 
 Councils have not 
followed up on the 
expanded reporting 
program; the reporting 
tends to be very technical 
 The optimization plan has 
been difficult and will be 
negotiated next year 
Boulder River Watershed Group   SMC contributed to Boulder 
River Watershed Group 
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Main Boulder Road 
 
 SMC initiated the process 
necessary to rebuild the 
remaining sections of the 
Main Boulder Road – 
completed summer of 2003  
 
Big Timber City Council 
 
 SMC initiated additional 
negotiations with the Big 
Timber City Council and 
made significant additional 
funding contributions toward 
the expansion of city services 
 Implementation of this 
provision has been 
difficult, but it appears to 
be moving in the right 
direction 
Mitigation Plan   SMC developed, 
implemented, and funded 
Mitigation Plan 
 Some complaints from 
local residents about the 
new tailings impound-
ment; being investigated 




 Consulted Councils before 
purchasing property for 
future tailings/waste disposal, 
and has not constructed 
tailings impoundments 
 SMC has not moved to 
purchase any additional 
property since the 





Speaking for the citizens groups, Northern Plains rates the Agreement as a success.  If similar 
disputes were to arise in the future they would be willing to negotiate another Agreement if it 
were determined that that was the best alternative under the circumstances.  Northern Plains feels 
that the GNA process was beneficial for the whole community, as it brought more respect for the 
citizens groups who stood their ground, while at the same time demonstrated their willingness to 
put in the hard work necessary to forge the agreement.  As for the future, Northern Plains does 
have some concerns whether they will be able to maintain the current level of commitment to the 
GNA from new members, especially with respect to filling committee positions.  Overall, their 
advice to other groups considering this tool is to make sure they are ready for a lot of hard work 





1.  GNA 
2.  GNA Survey response and workshop briefing by Darlene Bos, NPRC [On file with the 
Natural Resources Law Center (2002)]. 
3.  Anne Fitzgerald and Laura Goldman, “Finding a Path to Accord:  A Case Study of a Good 
Neighbor Agreement,” published by NPRC, June 2002 [herein as Appendix C]. 
4.  John Clayton, “The Stillwater Mine Good Neighbor Agreement,” prepared for the Liz 
Claiborne, Art Ortenberg Foundation, Workshop on Collaborative Resource Management in the 
Interior West, Red Lodge, MT, October 18-22, 2001. 
5.  Briefing on GNA implementation by NPRC staffers (July 2003). 
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In May 2001, Rohm and Haas Co. (“R&H”) made a commitment to Ohio Citizen Action 
(“OCA”) and Environmental Community Organization (“ECO”) to improve air quality and 
reduce noise near its Reading plant near Cincinnati, Ohio.  Neighbors of the plant had been 
complaining about the plant’s air, water, and noise pollution for over a decade before their 
concerns were finally addressed.  Between May and December 2001, the company met monthly 
with a local Community Working Group (“CWG”) to work out the details of the agreement.  The 






OCA, founded in 1975, is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization with 150,000 dues 
paying members and an annual budget of $2.1 million.  With a program staff of 20 plus 150 paid 
canvassers statewide, OCA campaigns on issues from public health and the environment to 
utility and insurance rates.   
 
ECO is a nonprofit citizen-based industrial air pollution group founded in 1995.  This group 
joined forces with OCA in the Campaign for Safer Neighborhoods to force R&H to address 
issues of concern to the local community. 
 
R&H bought the Reading plant from Morton Chemicals in 1999.  This plant produces specialty 
chemicals for the PVC plastics industry and employs approximately 200 local residents.  R&H is 
fairly important to the local economy (7 on a scale of 10), and the chemical sector as a whole is 
very important to the local economy (9 on a scale of 10).24  At the time the GNA was negotiated, 
the company was profitable, expanding, publicly traded, and concerned about public opinion. 
 
 
Nature of the Dispute 
 
Neighbors of the R&H plant had complained about “rotten egg” and “dead fish” odors emanating 
from the plant for over a decade.  More recent complaints included toxic releases of methyl 
chloride, after-hours diesel truck parking, and emergency response issues.  In February 2000, 
OCA and ECO embarked on a campaign to force plant management to address these issues.  As 
part of the Campaign for Safer Neighborhoods, OCA took numerous actions prior to negotiating 
                                                 
24 Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from OCA’s response to the GNA survey. 
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the GNA, including door-to-door canvassing; initiating a letter writing campaign which 
generated nearly 10,000 letters addressed to the plant manager and over 200 letters to R&H’s 
CEO in Philadelphia; and reviewing company documents to compile a “Citizen Audit” detailing 
the company’s air pollution record, which was released in November 2000.   
 
Immediately following the release of this audit, top management agreed to meet with the 
citizens’ groups.  The company established a Community Advisory Council (“CAC”) in January 
2001.  However, many members of the community were upset because they were not invited to 
attend the meetings.  The company finally agreed to meet on a monthly basis with the CWG, 
composed of community leaders and OCA staff, between May and December of 2001.  The 
purpose of these meetings was to work out the details of their stated commitments to improve air 
quality and reduce noise pollution.  The company agreed to this arrangement with the 
understanding that as of January 2002, the CWG would be “folded into” the CAC. 
 
 
Negotiation of the GNA 
 
The specific commitments that the CWG sought were to:  
• Eliminate truck parking/idling outside the plant before 7 a.m., 
• Eliminate odors, 
• Reduce/eliminate toxic releases of chloromethane, and 
• Establish an emergency response and notification plan for neighbors. 
 
In exchange for agreeing to address these issues, R&H sought an end to the canvassing and letter 
writing and cooperation of the community group with the CAC process. 
An independent facilitator was hired by R&H to oversee the monthly CWG meetings.  The 
primary representative from the plant was an environmental engineer who was familiar with the 
processes where changes were demanded.  Neither state nor federal regulatory agencies 
participated in the meetings. 
 
Unlike most GNAs, the resulting agreement was not a formal written contract.  Rather, R&H 
simply agreed to continue working with the CAC to resolve the issues.  The GNA is not legally 
binding, nor does it embody formal dispute resolution procedures.  It is not known if it would 
remain in effect if the company were sold.  The status of each GNA implementation provision 





OCA estimates that it spent roughly $3,000 on the negotiation process and another $6,000 on 
implementation.  R&H spent an estimated $10,000 for the meeting facilitator and will spend over 
$2 million on implementation costs after all process modifications are completed.  R&H does not 






Ohio Citizen Action group typically runs door-to-door and phone canvassing operations to 
encourage community participation.  In addition to the GNA with Rohm & Haas, OCA has an 
ongoing campaign with Sunoco and a negotiated GNA with Columbus Steel Drum.  Thus, the 
organization has some experience working with GNAs.   
 
Rohm & Haas is a chemical company based out of Philadelphia.  OCA meets monthly with the 
company.  During the negotiation and implementation of this GNA, OCA encountered some 
problems recruiting community members.  One notable glitch was a two-month delay in 
obtaining equipment for one particular process modification.  As of the summer of 2004, it was 
estimated that 95% of the GNA has been implemented.  No subsequent modifications have been 
made to the original GNA. 
 
Additional details about the status of implementation activities are presented in the table below: 
 
The GNA Provision: What Actually Happened: What Didn’t Happen: 
Reduce Chloromethane (to as near 
zero as possible) 
 Implemented to a certain 
extent (about 95% so far) 
 98% recovery efficiency of 
chloromethane  
 Company has now applied 
for minimal permit levels 
(less than 10 tons per year 
limit) 
 Company has had to change 
out compressors from the 
1980s, so this provisions is 
still being implemented 
 
Eliminate foul odors that plague 
neighbors of the plant 
 Currently being 
implemented 
 Pressure from neighborhood 
assists with day-to-day 
follow-up 
 Installed work station 
technology to improve 
ventilate and eliminate 
odors 
 
Prohibit after hours truck parking 
and idling outside the plant gate 
 Implemented 
 Continues to work with 
contractors and supplies 
 Upgraded their gate security 
 
Establish an emergency response 
and notification plan with 
community input 
 Some community oversight, 
especially with toxics and 
odors issues 
 Still working on better 
notification for all workers 
*There is no formal document for this GNA; these commitments were taken from OCA’s press 






OCA gives their GNA an overall success rating of 9.5 out of 10.25  Rachael Belz, Southwest 
Ohio Director of OCA, would seek to negotiate another GNA under similar circumstances in the 
future.  If she had it to do over again, she would consider trying to get a signed agreement, 
although that has not been necessary to this point.  One unexpected benefit of the GNA process 
was that the plant manager became more involved with his employees even outside of this 
process.  Another benefit was the great working relationships that developed among the 
participants.  OCA has no concerns about the future of the GNA at this time as the company 
meets monthly with neighbors and community groups to address any concerns.  If the company 
were to renege on its commitments, the OCA could canvass again at any time to bring them back 





1.  GNA Survey response and workshop briefing by Rachael Belz, Ohio Citizen Action.  [On file 
with the Natural Resources Law Center (2002)].   
2.  May 1, 2001 press release, “Campaign for Safer Neighborhoods, Rohm and Haas Reach 
Agreement.” 
3.  March 26, 2000, phone conversation with Rachael Belz. 
4.  OCA’s website – ohiocitizen.org. 
5.  “Neighbors, plant go over fine print of air, noise pact,” The Cincinnati Enquirer, May 3, 2001. 
6.  Briefing on GNA implementation by Rachael Belz, OCA (July 2003).   
 
                                                 
25 This figure (of 9.5) was provided orally in July of 2004, updating the original estimate of 9.0 from the written 
survey in 2002. 
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 Seneca Babcock Environmental Subcommittee (SBESC),  









In 1993, the Seneca-Babcock Environmental Subcommittee (SBESC) and the Buffalo Common 
Council Good Neighbor Committee (GNC) embarked on a campaign to negotiate Good 
Neighbor Agreements (GNAs) with polluting industries in the Seneca-Babcock neighborhood of 
Buffalo, New York.  To date, GNAs have been signed with three companies:  PVS Chemicals, 






The SBESC was formed in 1991 by residents of the Seneca-Babcock neighborhood in response 
to concerns about the harmful effects of the pollution emitted by local industries.  There are no 
paid staff and the group operates on an annual budget of $500 made up solely of individual 
contributions. 
 
The GNC of Buffalo is a community, labor, environmental, and academic committee established 
in 1993 by the Buffalo Common Council (BCC) to negotiate with industries in the Seneca-
Babcock neighborhood and along the Buffalo River for reductions in pollution.  There is one 
“very part time” paid staff member.  The annual operating budget is approximately $400.  The 
mission of the GNC is to reduce the use, release, and storage of toxic chemicals to protect the 
health of workers, the community, and the environment. 
 
The three companies that have entered into GNAs with the SBESC are privately owned and 
concerned about public opinion.  These companies are fairly important to the local economy (6-7 
on a scale of 10).26
 
 
Nature of the Dispute 
 
For years, the residents of the Seneca-Babcock neighborhoods have been exposed to pollution 
from the chemical companies in their midst.  The problems ranged from foul odors to accidental 
releases of toxic chemicals.  Finally, a sulfur dioxide release in 1991 galvanized the local 
residents to join together and take action, forming the SBESC.  The primary concerns included 
impacts on the environment, public health concerns, and nuisance and quality of life issues.  The 
                                                 
26 Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from responses to the GNA survey. 
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SBESC met with representatives of several companies in the area in an attempt to open a 
dialogue about environmental, health, and safety concerns.  They also undertook a number of 
different actions in their efforts to be heard, including participating in public hearings, urging 
regulatory agencies to better enforce existing laws and/or to adopt new laws, writing to and 
meeting with company representatives, and conducting negative publicity campaigns.  They took 
their concerns to the Buffalo Common Council (“BCC”), the Dept. of Health (DOH), and the 
Dept. of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) which agreed to aid them in their efforts to clean 
up the community.  In response, the BCC formed the GNC.   
 
In 1993, following a 2,000 gallon diesel fuel spill into the Buffalo River by one of the targeted 
Seneca-Babcock companies, the GNC adopted a resolution that called on polluting companies to 
negotiate GNAs with local citizen’s groups.  The GNC also enlisted the help and support of 
regulatory agencies and the state attorney general’s office.  After no substantial progress was 
made more than a year after the resolution, the AG’s office sent a letter to four companies 
pressuring them to honor the commitments of the Chemical Manufacturers Association 
Responsible Care Program in which they participated by meeting with local residents and 
signing GNAs.  The pressure from the BCC and government agencies as well as the bad 
publicity the polluting companies were receiving finally prompted some of them to sit down and 
negotiate with the SBESC. 
 
 
Negotiation of the GNAs 
 
The GNC proposed a Good Neighbor Process as follows: 
• Meet quarterly with the company to discuss the company’s efforts to achieve three 
Community Goals which are supported in the Responsible Care Pollution Prevention 
Code – pollution prevention, protecting community health, and notification and 
emergency response planning; 
• Before starting these meetings, hold a joint press conference to announce the good 
neighbor process and express hopes for a fruitful dialogue; 
• Prior to each meeting, exchange specific information in preparation for the meeting; and   
• After three meetings, evaluate the progress made to date and decide on future forms of 
communication and methods of resolving any remaining differences. 
 
During negotiations with the various companies, the SBESC/GNC generally had adequate access 
to legal expertise, technical consultants, and technical/economic data, but did not have enough 
access to trained negotiators. 
 
The SBESC generally sought commitments in the areas of pollution prevention/reduction, traffic 
mitigation, investments in the local community, emergency response planning, regular 
environmental audits and community access to environmental information, and an active 
involvement in audits, monitoring and inspections.  The companies sought an end to protests or 
negative publicity, positive publicity for the company, confidentiality agreements, access to the 
community to satisfy government public participation requirements under the Responsible Care 
initiative, and relief from the pressure to negotiate. 
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The final agreements were tailored to each individual company.  Specific provisions include the 
following: 
 
• Natural Environmental, Inc. (waste processing facility) – GNA signed 5/6/95 prior to the 
company commencing operations as settlement of permit challenges by the SBESC. 
o Traffic mitigation provisions specifying truck routes and prohibiting incoming truck 
backups or engine idling. 
o Noise limitations on machinery and prohibitions of certain types of operations (stone or 
concrete crushing). 
o Limitations on hours of operation. 
o Property upkeep requirements. 
o Prohibition on accepting certain types of waste materials. 
o Installation of plastic dust curtains if necessary. 
o Requirement of advertising all job openings at local community center. 
• PVS Chemicals, Inc. (sulfuric acid plant) – GNA signed 5/8/97 
o Environmental assessment to be performed by member of GNC. 
o Report of pollution prevention progress, including plans and initiatives, provided to 
SBESC annually. 
o Public portions of Process Safety Management Plan, Risk Management Plan, Process 
Hazard Analysis, and Facility Response Plan provided to SBESC at no charge at same 
time they are filed with appropriate regulatory agencies. 
o Maintenance of a Continuous Emissions Monitoring System. 
o Continued participation in operation and maintenance of Community Alert Network 
(CAN) emergency notification system. 
o Participate in neighborhood emergency response drill. 
o Notification provided to SBESC of unusual plant activities such as shut down or start up 
as well as spills or releases to air, soil, or water. 
o Annual meeting upon request of SBESC. 
• BOC Gases (industrial gas producer) – GNA signed in 1997. 
o Annual meeting upon request of community members. 
o Establish and update a repository of documents at the local community center, including 
TRI data and an emergency response plan. 
o BOC will develop a system for sharing emergency information with potentially affected 
neighbors. 
o Specific incident follow-up procedures concerning notification and reporting. 
o Maintain public access along the Buffalo River’s edge and continue to participate in the 
City’s Greenway efforts. 
 
The GNAs are not legally binding and do not contain specific dispute negotiation procedures.  It 
is not known whether they would remain in effect if the companies were sold. 
 
In addition to the individual GNAs, the GNC also negotiated an agreement with three 
companies—Buffalo Color, PVS and Allied Signal—to install an automated emergency 
notification system that dials the numbers of local residents in minutes, giving them warnings 
and instructions on how to respond in the event of any release.  The actual implementation 






The GNA negotiation and implementation costs for the SBESC have been less than $1,000.  The 
BCC spent about $3,300.  The individual company costs are not known.  None of the companies 





The implementation record for these three GNAs is highly variable and generally disappointing.  
SBESC considers the agreement with National Environmental to be a success because little 
pressure was needed to get the company to comply with the provisions.  The GNA with BOC 
Gases, however, is described as a “flop,” particularly in the area of safety issues.  The 
community groups fought unsuccessfully to prevent BOC Gases from “going remote” (i.e., 
automated), an operational modification perceived by the community to elevate the risk of 
accidents.  Finally, it is estimated that about half of the commitments made by PVC Chemicals 
have been met.  Generally, the environmental issues have been addressed, with some 
improvement resulting from the agreement.  The CAN system, a computerized telephone system, 
was installed so that everyone in the community will be called if there is a spill or release.   
 
In terms of implementation, SBESC states that little was gained from the agreements.  However, 
because of the large amount of energy required in fighting for each item, they will “take what 
they can get.”  There is a great deal of frustration with the companies, especially in light of the 
imbalance of power.  SBESC advises others considering such negotiations not to back down 
from larger, resourceful companies.  Generally, there has been some improvement found in the 
Seneca-Babcock community, but the improvements are far from complete.  The nature of the 
companies may also present some difficulties.  For example, one of the companies the 
community group was working with is now in the process of shutting down, staffed by only a 
skeleton crew.  This is disheartening for the community because the purpose of negotiating 
agreements with companies is not to force them to shut down, only to improve their 
environmental practices.  One other possible tactic being explored by SBESC is the use of Urban 
Renewal Plan, whereby redevelopment of the area may be encouraged and environmental 
hazards may be regulated or removed.  In the future, the organization asserts that they need 
funding to hire a staff that is able to concentrate on future agreements or proposals.  In this case, 
the local government has provided a great deal of assistance, but the SBESC would like to see 
more assistance from the state Department of Health.  SBESC estimates that 50-60% of the GNA 
commitments have been honored, while BCC estimates that 70% have been honored.  No 
subsequent modifications to the agreements have been made.  Problems have arisen when the 
companies have used stalling tactics to avoid complying with the provisions of the GNAs.  Also, 
the GNC has stopped meeting. 
 




Natural Environmental, Inc. Commitments (5/6/95) 
The GNA Provision: What Actually Happened: What Didn’t Happen: 
Traffic 
 
 All company truck traffic 
approaches the facility from 
I-190 on Keating St. 
 NE personnel are on site by 
6 a.m. each work day and 
trucks are not allowed to 
line up on Kellogg St. 





 The wood chipping machine 
is operated at an average of 
no higher than 80 dB and is 
not audible from inside the 
houses on Kellogg St., is 
operated only when facility 
doors are closed, and is not 
operated after 8 p.m. 





 Facility only accepts 
materials from 7 a.m. to 5 
p.m. Monday-Friday and 8 
a.m. to noon on Saturdays 
 Processing ends by 11 p.m. 
Monday-Friday and by 8 
p.m. on Saturday 
 
Property  The property is kept up at 
all times and any spills are 




 Neither painted/treated 
wood nor materials 
containing asbestos are 
processed 
 
Plastic Air Curtains 
 
 If complaints were received 
about dust, NE installed 
plastic curtains on the 





 NE advertised all job 
openings at the Seneca 
Babcock Community Center 
 
Good Neighbor Process 
 
 NE has contacted the 
Lovejoy Councilmember 
and the Seneca-Babcock 
Community Center when it 
anticipated changes to any 




BOC Gases Commitments (early 1997?) 
The GNA Provision: What Actually Happened: What Didn’t Happen: 
Community Meetings  On request, BOC holds an 
annual meeting with 
community members 
 
Public Information  BOC established and updates 
a repository of public 
information at the Old First 
Ward Community Center 
 
Emergency Notification  Where needed, BOC 
developed a system for 
sharing information with 
potentially affected neighbors 
 
In the event of any release, fire, 
accident, or explosion 
 BOC supplied the Old First 
Ward Community Center and 
the GNC with a one page 
memo within 24 hours 
 BOC held a public meeting 
within 10 days if requested or 
warranted 
 
Process Modifications and Public 
Access 
 Utilized the Cornell Chemical 
Information Program to 
facilitate process 
modifications 
 Maintained public access 
along the Buffalo River 
 
Future Review  After five years, reviewed the 
need for the GNA and agreed 
to terminate and/or revise as 
deemed mutually appropriate 
 
 
PVS Chemicals, Inc. Commitments (5/8/97) 
The GNA Provision: What Actually Happened: What Didn’t Happen: 
Plant Access  Allowed member to tour 
plant and recommend process 
improvements for pollution 
prevention   
 
l Reports and Meetings   Provides GNC with annual 
report on pollution prevention 
progress 
 Conducts an annual meeting 
with GNC (if requested) 
 
Access to Management and 
Response Plans 
 Provided GNC with free 
copies of the public portions 
of:  (1) the Process Safety 
Management and Risk 
Management Plans, (2) the 
Process Hazard Analysis, and 




Emissions Monitoring System  Has maintained a Continuous 
Emissions Monitoring 
System with real time data 
available to the DEC via 
modem 
 
CAN system  Continues to participate in the 
operation and maintenance of 
the CAN system 
 
Emergency Drills and Plume Maps  Has performed an emergency 
response drill within the S-B 
neighborhood 
 Has provided GNC with a 
copy of plume maps 
 
Notification of Unusual Activity or 
Incidents  
 Notifies the SBESC of 
unusual plant activities such 
as shut down or start up 
 During spills or releases with 
off-site impacts, notified the 
SBESC as soon as practical 
 Provided GNC with a copy of 
any incident report submitted 






Dawn Caldarelli, Director of SBESC, gives their GNAs an overall success rating of 5 out of 10, 
while Bill Nowak of the BCC gives them a 6.  They will both continue to seek to negotiate 
GNAs with other local companies in the future.  If Dawn had it to do over again, she would like 
to speed up the process and possibly come out with a more legally binding document.  Bill would 
also like to see quicker solutions to prevent wearing down community activists.  He would also 
like to obtain full scale agreements with some legal teeth that would contain specific pollution 
reduction goals.  Unexpected benefits of the process were increased knowledge, meeting great 
people, and implementing the emergency notification system.  Dawn and Bill’s advice to other 
groups considering a GNA is to stay committed, don’t give up or become intimidated, develop 
strong strategies to get the companies involved, and hire someone to monitor the company and 





1.  GNAs 
2.  GNA Survey response and workshop briefing by Dawn Caldarelli, SBESC, and Bill Nowak, 
BCC [On file with the Natural Resources Law Center (2002)].   
3.  Notebook of information and other materials compiled by survey respondents. 
4.  Briefing on GNA implementation by Dawn Caldarelli, SBESC, and Bill Nowak, BCC (July 
2003).   
5.  Briefing on GNA implementation by Dawn Caldarelli, SBESC (July 2004). 
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On April 7, 1995, a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”) was signed by Union Oil Company of 
California (“Unocal”), Shoreline Environmental Alliance (“SEA”), Crockett/Rodeo Coalition 
(“CRC”), and Communities for a Better Environment (“CBE”).  The purpose of the GNA was to 
address issues of concern to the local community regarding accidental chemical releases from the 





CBE is an environmental health and justice non-profit organization, promoting clean air, clean 
water and the development of toxin-free communities.  CBE’s three-part strategy consists of 
grassroots activism, environmental research and legal assistance within underserved urban 
communities.  CBE directly equips residents impacted by industrial pollution with the tools to 
inform, monitor, and transform their immediate environment.   
 
A direct result of CBE’s involvement with the Crockett/Rodeo community and the GNA 
negotiation process was the formation of the community group SEA in 1994.  SEA has a paid 
staff of three and an annual operating budget of $50,000 derived from individual and member 
contributions (5%), government grants (75%), and foundation grants (20%). 
 
Unocal began operations in the community in 1879.  The refinery employs 200-400 local 
residents and is moderately important to the local economy.  At the time the GNA was 
negotiated, Unocal was profitable, expanding, and publicly traded.27
 
 
Nature of the Dispute 
 
In September 1994, Unocal had two separate releases of toxic substances, one of which was 
potentially deadly hydrogen sulfide gas which hit the local elementary school and sickened many 
children and teachers.  (The first release lasted sixteen days and was the result of the company 
intentionally keeping on-line a unit known to be leaking.)  Complaints from the community fell 
on deaf ears at Unocal.  As community outrage and demands for action grew, there were several 
public meetings and strategy sessions attended by community leaders, environmental groups, and 
labor unions.  The groups decided to challenge Unocal’s expansion permits to try to force them 
to sign a legally binding GNA.  In spite of initial resistance, Unocal finally agreed to negotiate 
                                                 
27 Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from SEA’s responses to the GNA survey. 
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after county supervisors directed them to do so if they wanted to be approved for their 
reformulated fuel construction permits. 
 
The citizens’ primary concerns were public health, nuisance and quality of life, and impacts on 
the environment.  Prior to negotiating the GNA, the community groups, as well as individual 
residents, took numerous actions, including participating in public hearings, appealing permit 
decisions, urging regulatory agencies to better enforce the laws, filing individual lawsuits, trying 
to get regulatory agencies to file suit, meetings with company representatives, phone calls, 
negative publicity campaigns, and community “bucket brigades.” 
 
 
Negotiation of the GNA 
 
Numerous parties took part in the GNA negotiations, including CBE, SEA, CRC, Bayo Vista 
Housing Project, union reps, local government reps, members of the general public, and Crockett 
and Rodeo Chamber of Commerce reps.  The agreement took eight months to complete, during 
which time one to three meetings per week were held which lasted up to five hours each.  During 
negotiations, SEA had access to lawyers and legal expertise, trained negotiators, and 
technical/economic data, but Ms. Kessler felt they did not have access to technical consultants.  
Denny Larson states that SEA did, in fact, have access to numerous technical consultants such as 
CBE’s scientists, other medical and scientific experts, and Mr. Larson himself, who served as a 
media/organizing and negotiation advisor. 
 
SEA and other participants sought numerous commitments from Unocal including specific 
pollution prevention, reduction, and remediation measures; traffic mitigation; investments in the 
local community; performance of and community involvement in regular environmental audits 
and monitoring; access to emergency response plans; financial support for the community 
group(s); and a fenceline monitoring system.  One measure that the community desired but did 
pursue in negotiations was the removal of the only elementary school in the area from the Unocal 
fenceline.  Unocal instead agreed to conduct an area wide risk assessment of all the schools in 
the vicinity of the plant, both public and private.   
 
At the suggestion of the unions involved in the negotiations, Unocal was asked to sign a simple 
statement that committed them to negotiating a list of concerns in good faith to resolution 
(similar to what unions do at the start of contract talks).  In agreeing to negotiate, Unocal was 
seeking to end the challenge to their land use permit for the clean fuels expansion project.  
However, Unocal subsequently tried to back out of actually signing an agreement to negotiate, 
and the community groups went to the press and the county planning department that was 
hearing Unocal’s permit case.  As a result, the county took the extraordinary step of passing a 
permit condition that required the company to sign a GNA. 
 
Mr. Larson stated that one successful negotiation tactic was to bring a court reporter to each 
meeting to take exact minutes that were then written up and approved.  This was a very 
important strategy which prevented Unocal from backing out of signing the agreement to 
negotiate in good faith.  Other important sources of leverage were the revelation that the 16-day 
leak was 100% preventable and the support of Ed Masry and Erin Brockovitch who filed the 
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toxic tort cases.  Also, leverage was provided by an agreement with the trade unions to not sign a 
labor contract unless a GNA was signed and the GNA parties to not sign a GNA unless a labor 
contract was signed. 
 
In the final document, Unocal agreed to the following provisions: 
• Health Risk & Medical Monitoring 
o Continue to fund independent health risk assessment; 
o Fund the establishment and operation of a medical clinic for diagnosis and treatment of 
people affected by the Unocal Catacarb release incident; 
o In the event of a release, work with local health care providers to provide early medical 
intervention for affected residents; 
o Fund epidemiological study of the health impacts of recent chemical release on the 
affected members of the community; and 
o Fund an emergency response van. 
• Emergency Response and Community Warning 
o Create and fund a health effects database; 
o Participate in a working group to develop a feasible community-based information and 
notification system that will meet the community’s needs; and 
o Fund the purchase and installation of a siren as part of the county community warning 
system. 
• Vegetation and Parks 
o Plant vegetation on land between the refinery and Rodeo; 
o Fund construction of a bike path through Unocal property; and 
o Contribute $5,000 each to Lindsay Museum and to the Carquinez Preservation Trust for 
trees. 
• School Safety Issues 
o Install and maintain a permanent monitoring station at the local elementary school; 
o Provide emergency response education and training to teachers and students; and 
o Contribute $500,000 to the elementary school for chemical safety issues. 
• Vocational Training and Local Hiring 
o Fund vocational training at local high school; 
o Announce job opportunities locally; and 
o Institute and fund a local hiring outreach program. 
• Transportation 
o Mitigate traffic impacts from construction of the Reformulated Gasoline Project; 
o Contribute $4.5 million to county for local roads; and 
o Discontinue use (and transportation) of anhydrous ammonia by 12/31/01. 
• Environmental Issues 
o Install a state-of-the-art fenceline monitoring system; 
o Fund an independent audit of the refinery; 
o Reduce onsite emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), and 
o Make audit and study results available through the Community Advisory Panel. 
• Financial Issues 
o Contribute $300,000 annually to local communities and schools; 
o Funds not spent can be carried over to the following year; and 
o Agreement to negotiate continuation of payments after 15 years. 
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The community groups agreed to drop permit challenges to Unocal’s Land Use Permit and the 
associated Environmental Impact Report as well as the Authority to Construct and Permit to 
Operate issued by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District. 
 
The GNA assigns the task of developing a process for distribution of the funds within six months 
to CRC and SEA.  It further assigns oversight of the GNA to CRC.  Unocal also agreed to submit 
a quarterly summary to the CAP reporting progress on implementation of the GNA. 
 
The GNA does contain dispute resolution procedures – specifically, mediation – with Unocal 
agreeing to pay one-half the cost of the mediator.  If mediation fails to resolve the dispute, any 
party may bring a lawsuit; however, the agreement expressly prohibits payment of attorney’s 
fees to the victorious party. 
 
The provision which discusses a change in ownership states that a party may transfer or assign 
the GNA to a successor as long as “the affiliates, successors, or surviving corporation shall agree 
in writing to assume all of the obligations hereof.”  According to Denny Larson, this “clause is as 
airtight as it gets.”  However, when the plant was sold the new owners tried to get out of the 
GNA and only agreed to continue to abide by it when they were “pressed.”  The most current 





No specific cost information was available for negotiation of the GNA.  An estimated $45,000 
was spent by SEA for implementation, and it is not known how much Unocal spent, but the 
funding commitments easily exceed several million dollars.  The GNA did not specifically 
provide for funding for oversight and implementation activities performed by SEA or other 
community groups.  Kasha Kessler states that a portion of the annual $100,000 contribution to 
each community was supposed to go to oversight, but Community Foundation politics prevented 





This toxic substance accident destroyed any previously existing trust held by the county, cities 
and area agencies.  The lack of trust set the stage for negotiating the GNA.  The community 
members decided to focus their attention to finding ways to reduce waste, clean-up materials, 
provide health care, and implement a monitoring system.  At the same time, the refinery had just 
applied for a land use permit, a permit that the community groups could use as leverage during 
negotiations.  The GNA was negotiated and signed within three months of the accident.  Portions 
of the GNA were adopted into the final permit award, assisting with the enforcement of certain 
provisions.  
 
As of July 2004, representative Janet Callaghan estimates that approximately 60% of the 
commitments in the GNA have been honored by Unocal.  Some problems have been encountered 
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with the implementation process.  The company previously known as Unocal has since been sold 
twice, and is now Conoco/Phillips.  The subsequent owners have disregarded many sections of 
the GNA.  In fact, no disputes have been resolved following the procedures outlined in the GNA.  
Unfortunately, SEA is currently a shadow of its former self.  When the GNA was first formed, 
SEA had access to $50,000 for monitoring purposes and was present at meetings.  Now, there is 
no money left and no direct line of communication.  Because SEA has not continued its 
oversight activities, it is unknown how many other commitments have not been met.  There are 
five active board members that meet once a year to help monitor the GNA.  Enforcement of the 
GNA relies solely on the tenacity of the individuals involved.  For example, one person receives 
real-time fenceline monitoring data over the internet, another receives month Conoco/Phillips 
fenceline emission summary reports, while two others continue to interface with the plant as 
CAP members.  Four SEA members are actively involved in the fenceline monitor upgrade 
taking place in 2003-2004.  Although the plant is supposed to publish quarterly implementation 
progress reports, the last reports were viewed on May 31, 2002 and in the fall of 2003.  
Regarding advice for further GNA negotiations, it was noted that it is difficult to maintain a 
GNA without the necessary funding and follow through.   
 
Because of the difficulty experienced by the community group in obtaining funding to monitor 
their GNA, the current implementation condition of several provisions are unknown.  Additional 
details about the status of implementation activities are provided in the table below: 
 
 
The GNA Provision: What Actually Happened: What Didn’t Happen: 
Health Risk and Medical 
Monitoring 
 Pay for medical 
assessment and treatment 
of victims 
 In the event of a 
subsequent release, work 
with local health care 
providers to provide early 
medical intervention 
 Contribute up to $238,000 
to epidemiological study 
of the health impacts of 
the recent chemical release 
 Provide up to $20,000 to 
fund an Emergency 
Response Van 
 The company paid for 
medical assessment and 
treatment of victims 
 It is difficult to assess the 
provisions regarding 
subsequent releases because 
(a) no “major” releases 
since the agreement, and (b) 
the community group lacks 
access to individuals’ 
medical records 
 The company was to 
establish and operate a 
medical clinic to treat 
people affected by the 
release incident for up to 6 
months (at $120,000 
month); in actuality, the 
company set up the clinic 
for 18 months 
 Funded independent health 
risk assessment and released 
a final report 
 Although the 
independent health risk 
assessment was 
conducted, SEA felt the 
findings were skewed 
and followed up with a 
report of their own 
Emergency Response and 
Community Warning 
 Funded the purchase and 
installation of siren as part 
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 Create and fund a health 
effects database for 
refinery chemicals by 
March 1, 1995 
 Participate in a working 




 Notification system 
designed by July 1, 1995 
and installed by December 
31, 1995 
of warning system 
(although it is unclear if the 
system really works) 
Vegetation and Parks 
 Continue funding Lindsay 
Museum at previous level 
 Contribute $5,000 to 
educational programs 
 Make $5,000 donation to 
Carquinez Strait Preser-
vation Trust for trees 
 Maintain membership in 
Carquinez Strait 
Preservation Trust 
 The company did a lot 
regarding vegetation (and is 
committed to spend $30,000 
per year for nine years to 
vegetate appropriate areas) 
 The company did little to 
implement provisions 
relating to parks 
 Company was supposed 
to build bike path 
through Unocal property, 
but decided it was a bad 
idea to invite people into 
this hazardous area 
Transportation 
 Mitigate traffic impacts 
from construction of 
Reformulate Gasoline 
Project 
 Contribute $4.5 million to 
county for local roads 





 Install a state-of-the-art 
fenceline monitoring 
system 
 Fund independent audit of 
refinery 
 Transmit to SEA all 
written and verbal incident 
notifications and written 
materials provided to 
Community Advisory 
Panel (CAP) 
 Make hydrogen sulfide 
facility study results 
available through CAP 
 Do not seek emission 
reduction credits for any 
air pollution reductions 
listed in GNA 
 Infrared air monitoring 
system in place 
 Reduced fugitive emissions 
of Volatile Organic 
Compounds (VOCs) by 






If similar disputes were to arise in the future, group member Janet Callaghan would choose to 
negotiate another GNA.  In addition, the group could pursue options such as filing suit, “taking 
to the streets”, and applying political pressure.  If the group had it to do over again, they would 
reduce the number of people at the negotiating table; only negotiate issues that dealt directly with 
the mitigation of the toxic releases; keep the issues more focused; get more money; and have an 
airtight redress process and legal section.  Denny Larson points out that the parties did “take it to 
the streets” and applied political pressure; that allowed certain provisions in the GNA to be 
enacted even before the GNA was signed.  He also points out that initially Unocal tried to cut a 
deal with a county supervisor, and if the community groups had not demanded that the process 
be opened up and more parties allowed a place at the table, there would not have been a GNA.  
He feels that most of their strength came from the 100% inclusion demand.   
 
One unexpected benefit of the GNA was follow-through on installation of the state-of-the-art 
fenceline monitoring system.  After this system was installed in 1997, there have been no further 
releases of toxic chemicals into the community. 
 
Kasha’s concerns regarding the ability of SEA to monitor the GNA stem from SEA being 
“hamstrung” from the beginning by the Foundation (which was formed to distribute the 
mitigation funds).  (Mitigation funds are used for a variety of community programs, and are not 
necessarily reserved for dealing with GNA implementation or the issues at the heart of the 
GNA.)  Her advice to other groups is to go in with a united front, a clear idea of your goals, and 
make sure your legal section is enforceable and legal action financed.  Mr. Larson points out that 
the difficulties SEA has had with the Foundation are more a reflection on SEA’s organizing 
strength and not that the GNA would not allow for any implementation monitoring funding.  Mr. 
Larson agrees that the provision that “no payment of attorney’s fees shall be allowed” should not 
have been included, at least with respect to citizens’ suits filed to force implementation of the 
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In November 1992, a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”) was signed by Texans United 
Education Fund (“TUEF”), members of local neighborhood groups in Manchester, Texas, and 
Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chemicals Company (“RP”).  The purpose of the GNA was to facilitate 
community input into environmental and safety auditing and decision-making at the plant.  The 
agreement is a legally binding document that was incorporated into the company’s incinerator 





TUEF, founded in 1988, is a non-profit public interest organization with a paid staff of one and 
an annual operating budget of approximately $25,000.  Since its inception, TUEF has confronted 
powerful corporate polluters and ineffective government agencies on pollution-related issues 
affecting local communities with a focus on chemical plants, refineries and toxic waste sites.  
TUEF teamed up with local neighborhood associations to work on the GNA.  The key to 
winning the agreement and seeing it implemented was organizing the community and forming a 
Community Advisory Committee (“CAC”) made up of representatives from local neighborhood 
groups.  
 
RP began operations in Manchester, Texas, in 1970.  The company employs approximately 200 
local residents.  The company and the chemical sector are moderately important to the local 




Nature of the Dispute 
 
Two types of issues prompted community concern about RP’s operations:  nuisance and quality 
of life issues (odors, noise, traffic) and public health concerns (toxic releases/spills and illnesses.)  
One specific event that galvanized community forces was an accidental release of sulfur dioxide 
in June 1992 which sent 27 people to area hospitals.  Prior to negotiating the GNA, community 
groups had participated in public hearings; appealed state permit decisions; urged regulatory 
agencies to better enforce existing laws; wrote to and met with company officials, and conducted 
negative publicity campaigns. 
 
Three primary factors ultimately motivated the parties to sit down at the bargaining table:  
community opposition to modification of RP’s permit issued by the TWC;  the negative publicity 
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surrounding the sulfur dioxide release; and the community’s growing awareness of its right to 
information.  RP was willing to negotiate a GNA when they realized that 1) it would not hurt 
them, 2) it would improve community relations, and 3) that they would possibly have their 
permit denied if they did not reach a settlement with TUEF/CAC.  The participation of TUEF 
was a key component of the community’s leverage.  This was evidenced by RP’s attempt to 
remove TUEF from the final provisions of the agreement. 
 
 
Negotiation of the GNA 
 
Negotiation of the GNA took a period of approximately six months.  TUEF/CAC met directly 
with the company and their attorneys.  TUEF/CAC had access to attorneys but did not need 
them.  They brought negotiating experience to the table but had never been formally trained.  
TWC was deliberately excluded from the negotiations, but was not completely removed from the 
process because it had to approve the settlement as it was made part of the company’s permit; 
thus, TWC served as a consultant if any particular regulatory questions arose.  Two state senators 
and one city council member showed up at one or two meetings to lend their support for the 
citizens’ groups.  These representatives were also signatories to the final agreement. 
 
The specific commitments sought by TUEF/CAC were pollution prevention/reduction/ 
remediation goals; traffic mitigation; regular meetings, information, and accountability; 
commitment to perform regular environmental audits and/or monitoring; community 
involvement with environmental and safety audits, access to results, and participation in RP’s 
planning, advisory, and/or decision-making process; access to company accident prevention and 
response plan and relevant environmental data collected by RP; split environmental samples to 
allow for independent analyses; and radio station alerts whenever an accidental release occurred.  
In return, RP wanted TUEF/CAC to drop the permit challenge. 
 
In the final agreement, RP agreed to the following provisions: 
• Recognize and work with the CAC. 
• Upon request, provide financial assistance to the CAC in an amount agreeable to both the 
CAC and RP to cover administrative costs of the CAC. 
• Discuss and negotiate improvement of local emergency notification procedures.  The CAC is 
allowed to have input into the design of this system. 
• Notify the CAC of any changes to designated hazardous waste transportation routes and 
provide the CAC with information regarding frequency of shipments of hazardous waste or 
materials into the plant.   
• Make available to the CAC groundwater and surface water monitoring data as well as 
providing split samples for independent analysis. 
• Provide the CAC with employee health study results and work with the CAC to determine 
the feasibility of a citizens’ health survey.  If pursued, RP will help develop the survey and 
cover the administrative expenses incurred by the CAC in performing the survey (up to 
$4,000). 
• Allow the CAC to participate in emergency response planning involving potential fires, 
explosions or releases of hazardous substances 
• Provide the CAC with information regarding OSHA recordable accidents on a monthly basis. 
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• Fund and participate in an annual environmental and safety audit program by an independent 
auditor; allow citizen participation in the audit process; allow citizen inspections of plant 
operations by appointment at all reasonable times; provide TUEF and the CAC with copies 
of the audit findings; negotiate in good faith to implement the audit recommendations. 
• Maintain an off-site sulfur dioxide monitoring system and keep the CAC advised of major 
changes to the system. 
• Conduct dispersion modeling and prepare hazard assessments or consequence analyses which 
identify potential plumes of contamination into the community; negotiate modeling scenarios 
with the CAC and make the results public. 
• Household hazardous wastes will not be received by the facility unless RP is requested to do 
so by TWC and can maintain all permit parameters while processing the waste. 
 
It is not known whether the GNA survived the subsequent permit renewal process which occurs 
every five years.  The actual status of each implementation point will be discussed later in this 





No information is available regarding the costs of negotiating or implementing the GNA.  RP did 
not provide funding to TUEF to ensure its continued participation in GNA-related activities.  





Rick Abraham (TUEF Director and survey respondent) estimates that 90-100% of the 
commitments in the GNA have been honored.  As previously stated, this process was initiated 
after there had been an accident next to the plant.  The CAC participated in the permitting 
process, exercising their right to oppose the permit as “leverage.”  As part of the emergency 
notification system, an AM radio station and siren were established to alert the community of 
any problems.  Both the radio station and siren are still in place.  The primary concern of the 
CAC was centered on air pollution.  As such, CAC entered into these negotiations looking for 
opportunities to improve the quality of living in the area.  In addition to guarantees regarding air, 
they also negotiated GNA provisions addressing hazardous waste and water pollution.  The 
purpose of the CAC was to have the opportunity to exercise these provisions.  Some were 
exercised, others were not.  Under certain provisions (e.g. preparing a citizens’ health survey, 
requesting financial assistance from Rhone-Poulenc, etc.) it was up to the CAC to request 
implementation.  Other than the provisions where CAC opted not to request implementation, 
Rhone-Poulenc met their GNA responsibilities.  One suggestion presented was to involve groups 
beyond just local groups, including state and national groups that may assist the group by 
providing resources.  The one problem noted is the difficulty in keeping the community group 
together and involved.  To date, no significant modifications have been made to the original 
agreement.     
 




The GNA Provision: What Actually Happened: What Didn’t Happen: 
Recognize and work with 
Community Advisory Committee 
(CAC) 
 Provided documents to CAC 
and public library unless 
confidential 
 Provided representatives to 
answer questions 
 Rhone-Poulenc (RP) did 
not provide financial 
assistance to CAC, 
however, this provision 
was only to be 
implemented at the request 
of CAC.   
 CAC never requested this 
financial assistance.   
Improvement of local emergency 
notification procedures 
 CAC provided input into the 
system design. 
 Necessary license and 
approvals obtained within 
120 days of signing GNA 
 
Improve the transportation of 
hazardous wastes 
 Advised CAC of changes in 
transportation routes 
 Provided CAC information 
about frequency of shipments 
 Informed community about 
the DOT hazardous materials 
placard system 
 CAC provided input about 
RP’s efforts to minimize 
transportation risks 
 Transportation routes and 
enforcement policies were 
provided at first CAC 
meeting 
 
Provide CAC with copies of any 
ground and surface water 
monitoring analyses on a monthly 
basis 
 CAC reps were allowed to be 
present during sampling 
procedures to receive split 
samples 
 RP was to split samples 
with CAC on request.  
CAC never requested the 
implementation of this 
provision 
Provide CAC with a copy of its 
1992 employee health study  
 The study was provided to 
CAC 
 RP worked with CAC to 
review feasibility of a 
citizens’ health survey 
 GNA provisions whereby, 
if a citizens’ health survey 
was conducted, RP would 
cover administrative 
expenses and negotiate the 
possible need for a local 
off-plant health survey 
 It was determined that a 
citizens’ health survey was 
not necessary. 
Allow CAC to participate in RP’s 
“tabletop” emergency drills 
These drills are still being 
conducted 
 
Provide CAC with monthly OSHA 
recordable accident information 
Provision was implemented  
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Fund and participate in 
independent environmental and 
safety audit program 
 Initiated first audit procedure 
within 90 days of receiving 
modified permit 
 Allowed citizen participation 
in the audit process 
 Allowed other citizen 
inspections by appointment at 
all reasonable times 
 Auditor provided findings of 
audit to TUEF 
 Considered recommendations 
from citizens for 
implementation 
 
Maintain off-site SO2 monitoring  Kept CAC advised of any 
major changed made to 
monitoring system 
 Allowed inspection of system 
by CAC and TUEF within 90 
days of receiving modified 
permit 
 Provided CAC and TUEF 
with all information relevant 
to system 
 On request, provided CAC 
with analytical information 
 Allowed for follow-up 
inspections by CAC 
 
Make groundwater data from 
RCRA corrective action 
investigation available to 
“undersigned citizens” 
Provision was implemented 
 
 
Conduct “worst case” scenario 
models 
 Provided analysis and plume 
maps to CAC 
 Negotiated modeling 
scenarios with CAC 
 
Do not receive household 
hazardous wastes at the facility 
unless able to continue to operate 
within all permit parameters while 
processing the waste, and request 







Speaking on behalf of TUEF, Rick Abraham rates the GNA a nearly complete success.28  If 
similar disputes were to arise in the future he would be willing to negotiate another GNA.  If he 
                                                 
28 Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from TUEF’s response to the GNA survey. 
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had it to do over again he would speed up the process; be more clear on what they want; better 
prepare the group for the negotiating process; and make the agreement less legal and more easily 
understood. 
 
As for the future, Rick Abraham does have concerns about his group’s ability to address all of 
the issues involving communities and companies operating in their midst and the fact that there 
are “too many other companies.”  Overall, his advice to other groups considering this tool is to 
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In 1992, a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”) was signed by the Richmond, California, 
Chevron Refinery, the West County Toxics Coalition, Citizens for a Better Environment, and 
People Do!  The agreement incorporated commitments to both reduce/prevent pollution and 
invest in the local economy.  The GNA is a legally binding agreement that was negotiated in 





The Richmond-based West County Toxics Coalition (“WCTC”) was founded with assistance 
from the National Toxics Campaign.  The San Francisco-based Citizens for a Better 
Environment (“CBE”) furnished the group with technical assistance and documentation of the 
local environmental problem.  
 
Chevron began operating the Richmond refinery in 1980.  The company employs about 60 local 
residents.  Chevron and the refinery sector are both very important to the local economy.  At the 
time the GNA was negotiated, Chevron was profitable, expanding, publicly traded and 
concerned about public opinion. 
 
 
Nature of the Dispute 
 
Over its long history, Chevron has had innumerable accidents and has been cited for serious 
violations of almost every conceivable environmental law.  The issues of greatest concern to the 
neighboring community were public health concerns, impacts on the environment, and nuisance 
and quality of life issues.  The community was also very concerned with the potential for fire and 
explosions and the company’s ability to quickly and effectively respond to an emergency. 
 
Prior to negotiating the GNA, the community groups took a number of actions, including 
participating in public hearings and commenting on public documents; appealing local, state, or 
federal permit decisions, urging regulatory agencies to better enforce existing laws and/or to 
adopt new laws; threatening to file a lawsuit; writing to and meeting with company 
representatives; pressuring elected officials; shareholder resolutions; and conducting negative 
publicity campaigns.  The primary events that resulted in the decision to negotiate a GNA were 
permit appeals by the community before the Bay Area Air Quality Control District 
(“BAAQCD”).  These meetings occurred because Chevron was applying for permits to make 
“cleaner fuels” which required various construction projects and process changes. 
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Negotiation of the GNA 
 
In 1990, the WCTC brought in the Reverend Jesse Jackson to negotiate with Chevron.  This 
meeting included representatives from the WCTC, the National Rainbow Coalition, and the 
Sierra Club.  Chevron was presented a six-point plan that included the following: 
• Annually set aside 1 percent of the cost of Chevron’s proposed $1 billion modernization 
for a clean-up fund.  Uses of the fund should include employing Richmond’s unemployed 
to help clean up the environment, financing community health care, and purchasing new 
pollution-reduction technology; 
• Establish a 24-hour medical clinic to provide services to those harmed by Richmond’s 
polluting industries; 
• Reduce the quantity of toxic waste burned in Chevron’s Ortho Chemical plant 
incinerator; 
• Bring together representatives of other polluting industries and pressure them to reduce 
their companies’ toxic emissions; 
• Divest from South Africa; and 
• Negotiate a timetable for accomplishing the above goals. 
 
While Chevron did not agree to this specific plan, it did agree to negotiate.  In return, Chevron 
sought assurance that a lawsuit would not be filed and sought to generate positive publicity for 
the company.  During the negotiation process, the community groups felt they had adequate 
access to lawyers and legal expertise, technical consultants, trained negotiators, and 
technical/economic data. 
 
It took approximately one and a half years to negotiate the GNA.  The final agreement contained 
the following provisions: 
• Pollution Elimination 
o Install leakless valves 
o No pollution credits for the valve emission reductions 
o Fenceline air pollution monitoring with community-suggested target chemicals 
o Continue toxic emission reductions 
• Local Economic Commitments 
o $5 million over five years to nearby neighbors through United Way and nonprofit 
service organizations 
o Skilled job training to 100 fenceline neighbors 
o Aggressive pursuit of community-based hiring 
• Emergency Response and Health Care Commitments 
o Install sirens/computers and train emergency workers 
o Establish and fund city emergency services coordinator position for 5 years 
o Contribute $2 million to local health center. 
 
The GNA is a legally binding document that was negotiated in compliance with rulings by the 
BAAQMD as part of the permitting process.  If the company is sold, the agreement will remain 
in effect.  The agreement contains no dispute resolution process.  The success of the community 




Cost information is not available for this GNA.  Chevron did not provide funding to any 





The negotiation of this GNA helped to establish one of the first environmental groups in the 
region.  The primary concern in 1986 was how to get Chevron to negotiate with the community 
group initially.  It was not until 1990 that Chevron appeared at the negotiating table, after WCTC 
came to the meeting with Jesse Jackson.  City officials convinced Chevron to negotiate the GNA 
only after WCTC did a great deal of political organizing.  Chevron became concerned with the 
level of publicity they were receiving.  During negotiations, WCTC asked Chevron to provide 
medical assistance to the surrounding community, to get rid of their incinerator, and to use part 
of their modernization campaign to clean-up the area, among other things.  There was no real 
progress during negotiations until WCTC discovered that Chevron had applied for a permit to 
build expansions in order to burn oil.  WCTC used this permit as a type of leverage, recognizing 
that the permit process provided an opportunity for the community group to stall the proposed 
expansion.  It was clear to Chevron that talking to the group may expedite the process.   
 
At that point in the negotiations, WCTC preferred to focus on the economic side of their 
requests.  In the past, Chevron had historically donated a great deal of money to organizations 
that did not necessarily pertain to the local community.  WCTC encouraged Chevron to continue 
to donate to these organizations, but asked Chevron to donate to the people and projects in the 
area surrounding the company at the same level.  Overall, there have been some gains achieved 
through the implementation of certain GNA provisions.  It is estimated that the company initially 
honored nearly 100% of its commitments under the GNA.  However, it is reported that there has 
been some “backsliding” and conduct not “continuing in the spirit,” causing some neighbors to 
be unhappy with Chevron.  Follow-through is identified as the primary problem, but WCTC is 
reluctant to enforce the GNA provisions because enforcement would require the use of economic 
and legal resources.  Community groups, such as this one, often focus on one issue at a time.  
Many members have moved on to the next battle, and as a result, no one is currently monitoring 
this GNA.  No subsequent modifications were made to the agreement.    
 
Additional details regarding the implementation of the GNA are provided in the table below: 
 
The GNA Provision: What Actually Happened: What Didn’t Happen: 
Elimination of pollution 
 No pollution credits taken for 
the valve emission reductions 
 Chevron installed leakless 
valves 
 Fenceline air pollution 
monitoring did not happen  
 Have not continued to 
reduce toxic emissions 
Provide economic assistance to the 
local community 
 Skilled job training to 100 
fenceline neighbors 
 Seek community-based hiring 
 Chevron began donating 
more money to non-profit 
organizations located in areas 
surrounding the refinery 
 Chevron has increased 
local donations, but it is 
unclear if Chevron has met 
the $5 million over five 
years provision 
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Provide for emergency response 
system and health care assistance 
 Install sirens/computers and 
train emergency workers 
 Establish and fund city 
emergency services 
coordinator position for 5 
years 
 
 Initially, Chevron did not 
follow through with the $2 
million contribution they 
committed to donate toward 
the building of a local health 
center 
 Chevron finally donated the 
money, but has not continued 
to fund the health center 
 Chevron recognized that 
the GNA only required that 
they build the health 
center, but did not require 
continued funding 
*These commitments were gleaned from various press releases and articles, as we do not have a 





Survey respondents rated the GNA an 8 and a 10 in terms of overall success.29  Both respondents 
would choose to negotiate another GNA under similar circumstances.  Unexpected benefits from 
the process were the feelings of community empowerment and the education received by those 
who were new to such an endeavor.  The primary concern is the ability of the community group 
to monitor the implementation process.  Both respondents consider a GNA to be worth pursuing, 





1.  GNA Survey responses and workshop briefing by Dr. Henry Clark, West County Toxics 
Coalition, and Dr. Sarah Eeles, Richmond, CA [on file with the Natural Resources Law Center 
(2002)].  
2.  Robert D. Bullard (ed.), Confronting Environmental Racism, Voices from the Grassroots 
(1993), pp. 32-36. 
3.  Good Neighbor Project web page:  http://gnp.enviroweb.org/chevron.html. 
4.  Briefing on GNA implementation by Anne Fitzgerald, on behalf of WCTC and CBE (July 
2003). 
                                                 
29 Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from the two responses to the GNA survey, as submitted by Drs. 
Clark and Eeles. 
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In February 2000, a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”)—termed a memorandum of 
understanding—was signed by the Western Slope Environmental Resource Council (“WSERC”) 
and Bowie Resources Ltd. (“BRL”).  The purpose of the GNA was to mitigate potential impacts 
on the local community resulting from a proposed increase in coal production by several local 
mines.  The GNA is a legally binding document which addresses issues related to truck and rail 





Western Slope Environmental Resource Council (“WSERC”), founded in 1977, is a non-profit 
organization dedicated to protecting and enhancing the natural environment and quality of life in 
Delta County, Colorado, and Colorado’s Western Slope.  WSERC seeks to build an aware and 
active community that can live with harmony and respect for the land and other natural 
resources.  The group has 250 members and an annual operating budget of approximately 
$100,000, which is generated by membership dues, special events, donations and grants. 
 
The Concerned Citizens of Garvin Mesa, a group of about 20 local residents, also participated in 
the GNA negotiations.  It was this group’s appeal of the permit process which sparked the GNA 
negotiations in the first place. 
 
Addington Enterprises opened the Bowie mine in the North Fork Valley in 1994 and began 
operations as BRL.  BRL is fairly important to the local economy (8 on a scale of 10), while coal 
mining in general represents a significant sector of the local economy (6 on a scale of 10).30  At 
the time the GNA was negotiated, BRL was expanding, seeking financing, privately owned, and 
concerned about public opinion. 
 
 
Nature of the Dispute 
 
Three coal mines operate in the North Fork Valley:  Oxbow, Bowie, and West Elk.  In 1998, 
local citizens became concerned over the potential impacts of the three mines’ plans to more than 
double the valley’s production from 8.3 million tons in 1998 to nearly 20 million tons in 2003.  
Of particular concern were the significant increases in rail and truck traffic.  Also of concern to 
nearby residents was BRL’s plan to mine the Iron Point deposit underlying a reservoir on Garvin 
                                                 
30 Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from WSERC’s response to the GNA survey.  
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Mesa and the increase in noise levels anticipated to accompany the increase in production. 
 
Of the three companies, only BRL needed a new federal coal lease to expand its mining 
operations.  The leasing process, conducted by the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), 
provided citizens with the opportunity to voice their concerns.  WSERC distributed a fact sheet 
that detailed potential impacts and raised questions about the proposed expansion.  After a 
controversial Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) was approved by both the BLM and the 
Forest Service, a group called the Concerned Citizens of Garvin Mesa filed an appeal.  BLM 
responded by abandoning the EIS and undertaking a year-long study to look at the valley-wide 
impact of Oxbow’s existing coal lease and the new Iron Point lease requested by BRL.  An 
issues forum was held which was attended by many members of the community including both 
proponents and opponents of the expansion.  As a result of this meeting, the North Fork Coal 
Working Group (“NFCWG”) was formed.  This group was composed of representatives from 
WSERC, the Concerned Citizens of Delta County & Mine Neighbors, irrigation and domestic 
water companies, Delta and Gunnison Counties, West Elk, Bowie and Oxbow coal mines, the 
City of Delta, mine employees, and members of the community at large.  It was through the 
efforts of this group that the GNA came to fruition. 
 
 
Negotiation of the GNA 
 
BRL’s willingness to negotiate a GNA was spurred by the realization that until citizens’ 
concerns were addressed, their proposed expansion could be delayed as long as two years by the 
EIS appeals process.  Such a delay would have likely put BRL out of business.  However, the 
majority of the citizens’ groups did not want to put their neighbors out of work and were also 
interested in negotiating an agreement that would avoid a protracted appeals process and would 
address the specific issues of concern rather than derailing the whole permitting process.  Thus, 
the NFCWG focused primarily on issues that the EIS would not address—the increase in train 
and truck traffic caused by the expansion.   
 
After five months of weekly meetings, BRL proposed a 5-point plan.  This plan became the basis 
for negotiating a formal Memorandum of Agreement (the GNA) between the mine and WSERC.  
During the negotiations, WSERC felt that they had adequate access to lawyers and legal 
expertise, but did not have access to or utilize outside consultants, trained negotiators, or 
technical/economic data.  WSERC identified two issues that were discussed but not incorporated 
into the final agreement:  conservation easements on BRL’s private land and contributions to the 
community not related to rail traffic.   
 
The bottom line issues for WSERC were to: 
• get the coal trucks off of Highway 133; 
• secure money for railroad safety upgrades; 
• ensure significant impact mitigations on Garvin Mesa; and 
• not allow an outside appeal to negate the agreement. 
 
BRL’s bottom line was that the citizens’ groups had to drop all opposition to the EIS and support 
BRL’s application for a new coal lease. 
 101
 
The resulting GNA contained the following major provisions: 
• BRL agreed to: 
o Substantial reclamation work; 
o Build a new mine-to-train conveyor and loadout which would eliminate 978 trucks/day; 
o Construct turning and acceleration lanes on Highway 133 as an interim measure; 
o An annual production cap; 
o Pay a penalty if the annual production cap is exceeded; 
o No new mine portals in certain areas; 
o Conduct a baseline noise study; 
o Not exceed baseline noise levels when production increases; 
o Pay a penalty for noise violations; 
o Prepare a state-approved water augmentation plan prior to mining within one mile of 
Terror Creek Reservoir; and 
o Contribute up to $500,000 to the community rail mitigation trust. 
• WSERC agreed to: 
o Support BRL’s ongoing permit; 
o Support BRL’s pending application to mine the Iron Point Lease; 
o Intervene on behalf of the mine should an appeal by an outside group threaten the GNA; 
and 
o Formally oppose any stay of the lease resulting from an outside appeal. 
 
It took approximately one year to complete the GNA.  The GNA was designed to be a legally 
enforceable contract.  The GNA is not part of a state or federal regulatory action.  If the company 
is sold, the GNA will remain in effect.  BRL posted two $1 million performance bonds which 
will be forfeited to WSERC should BRL default on any or all parts of the GNA (subject to 





WSERC estimates that they have spent at least $15,000 annually on the negotiation and 
implementation of the GNA.  The primary expenditure is staff time.  WSERC expects to spend 
an additional $10,000-15,000 in the future for implementation.  It is not known how much was 
spent by the company for negotiation or implementation beyond the $500,000 for the rail 
mitigation trust.  BRL does not provide funding to WSERC to ensure its continued participation 





As of 2002, WSERC rates the GNA a complete success in terms of the extent to which 
commitments have been honored—although many provisions have been modified.  For example, 
WSERC agreed to change their request for a passing lane on Hwy. 133 to construction of 
flashing signs.  The difference in costs was then applied to rail traffic mitigation.  The production 
cap was also modified at the request of BRL and after several weeks of intense and sometimes 
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unfriendly debate among the WSERC board.  While the GNA does have specific dispute 
resolution procedures, they have not been used to resolve any disputes thus far. 
 
Based on the GNA, WSERC now has at its disposal approximately $500,000 in mitigation funds 
(soon to be $800,000), and is now faced with the unusual (but pleasant) task of determining a 
spending strategy.   
 
Other changes to the GNA were prompted after BRL filed for bankruptcy.  Some of these 
amendments were made at the urging of the bankruptcy judge (e.g., removing some bonding 
requirements), with others occurring after discussions between WSERC and BRL.  It is difficult 
to determine how a bankruptcy would impact a different GNA in a different industry.  The other 
issue that WSERC has been dealing with is a change in leadership.  This has caused the 
organization to focus energies on areas other than the GNA provisions.   
 
Additional details about the status of implementation activities are provided in the table below: 
 
The GNA Provision: What Actually Happened: What Didn’t Happen: 
Transfer permit for existing silo 
train load-out area from old Bowie 
#1 to new Bowie #2 permit.   
 
  Unsure if this actually 
happened   
Repair damaged paved portions of 
Stevens Gulch Road by the end of 
2001, w/a $100,000 maximum 
contribution from mine. 
 
 Road has been repaired 
 The portal that was served by 
the road is no longer being 
used – the road is essentially 
used only as a forest access 
road now 
 
Discontinue using Highway 133 
stockpile once new Bowie #2 coal 
storage area becomes operational 
 
 
 Stockpile was removed   The reclamation plan of 
this area has been 
modified 
 The mine is in the process 
if pursuing alternative 
mitigate whereby the area 
would be turned into an 
orchard 
Reclamation work will begin in 
2000, with all work completed 




Provision has been implemented 
 West portal has been 
recontoured and reseeded – 
waiting to see if vegetation 
will come in 
 Portal #1 has had 90% of its 
structural facilities 
disassembled – current 
proposal on table to turn the 
area into a residential area 
 The original reclamation 
plan was modified, and 
the mine is looking at the 
alternative reclamation of 
creating a residential area 
 Alternative reclamation 
plan proposed because the 
mine filed for bankruptcy 
Examine and report reclamation 
status of Bowie Portal #1 by the 
end of 2001 
 
 Some reclamation completed 
 
 Because of bankruptcy, 
mine sought assistance 
from county to create a 
residential area 
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Cap total production at 5 million 
tons/year for the life of the Bowie 
#1 and #2 mines 
 
 
 This has been amended 
 The new agreement states that 
this mine can only exceed the 
cap if both of the other mines 
in the valley are producing less 
than 50% of their capacity 
 Cap is now set at 5.25 million 
tons because the train cars 
have been lengthened, so now 
more can be transported 
without introducing any 
additional safety hazards 
 This has been amended 
 
If production cap is exceeded, the 
mine is to pay liquidated damages 
of $1.00/excess ton 
 Has not been necessary – mine 
has not exceeded production 
cap 
 When the mine filed for 
bankruptcy, the 
bankruptcy judge required 
WSERC to remove the 
bonds put into place to 
cover the penalty 
 Now, there is no bond 
requirement 
 The penalty is still 
enforceable (but WSERC 
would have to go to court) 
Meet with CDOT in the first 
quarter of 2000 to identify 
upgrades to Highway 133 
(including turning and acceleration 
lanes) as interim measures; 
compete within 90 days of 
receiving permits from CDOT 
Provision has been implemented 
 Turning and acceleration lanes 
constructed 
 There is no more truck traffic, 
now that the new load-out 
facility has been built 
 
Install downward focused lighting 
hoods, baffling or housing around 
fans, and high grade precision 
sealed bearings for the conveyer 
rollers 
Provision has been implemented  
Incorporate noise mitigation into 
the design of new facilities and 
hold at least one public meeting to 






Provision has been implemented 
 Company did a baseline noise 
study and used high quality 
materials to keep noise at the 
pre-expansion levels 
 Company is pleased with the 
higher quality of the system 
because of the reduced number 
of repairs 
 Enclosed and insulated load-
out facility 
 Did an initial reading 
regarding noise, but have 
not done a second noise 
study to follow up 
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Liquidated damages provision if 
noise levels are exceeded 
 Noise levels have not been 
exceeded 
 
 If permit received to mine 
under Terror Creek, BRL will 
not use Garvin Mesa or 
Garvin Mesa roads to 
transport coal 
 BRL will not establish portals 
on or immediately north of 
Garvin Mesa for purposes of 
ingress and egress of men, 
materials or coal 
 If BRL uses existing roads for 
other purposes, BRL will 
maintain the road during the 
first week of operation and at 
least once a month thereafter 
Provision has been implemented 
because there are no facilities 
above Garvin Mesa at this time 
 
Restrictions on ventilations fans 
for Bowie #1 and Bowie #2 
 
Provision has been implemented 
 Concrete barrier was placed 
between ventilation fans and 
Garvin Mesa 
 
Finalize water augmentation plan, 
with no secondary mining or 
longwall mining within one mile 
of Terror Reservoir until plan is 
approved 
  Not sure if this has been 
implemented 
Maintain open door policy 
including meeting with concerned 
residents and/or organizations to 
discuss any of the above items, 
changes in the current situation, or 
new problems 
 This has been implemented to 
the extent that BRL 
approached WSERC to discuss 
the possible impact of the 
bankruptcy on the GNA  
 
Contribute up to $500,000 to the 
Delta County Rail Transportation 
Mitigation Fund 
 
Provision has been implemented 
 $500,000 was donated to 
improve railcrossing safety  
 BRL submitted their last 







WSERC gives their GNA an overall success rating of 9 out of 10.  Negotiating another GNA 
would be their preferred course of action if similar disputes were to arise in the future.  If they 
had it to do over again, they would have asked for funds to pay someone to monitor the 
implementation.  Additionally, the bankruptcy contingency is something that should be planned 
for in the GNA, as is the internal challenge of transferring GNA implementation responsibilities 
during staff turnovers.  One unexpected benefit of the GNA process was that in some circles 
WSERC acquired a new reputation for being “reasonable.”  Their advice to others considering a 
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GNA is to be very clear about why you are choosing this tool, be sure it will get you further than 





1.  GNA (Memorandums of Agreement, Performance Bond). 
2.  GNA Survey response and workshop briefing by Tara Thomas, WSERC [on file with the 
Natural Resources Law Center (2002)]. 
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4.  Tom Morse, “The Great Paonia Coal Treaties:  Negotiations Between Mines, WSERC and 
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Newsletter of the Western Slope Environmental Resource Council, April 2000. 
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6.  Briefing on GNA implementation by Jeremy Puckett, WSERC (July 2003). 




 APPENDIX E:  SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESPONSES 
 
by Miriam Stohs and Jessica Chavez, Natural Resources Law Center 
 
Overview of the Parties 
 
• Survey responses received from 11 community groups in 9 states (CA, CO, ID, LA, MT, 
NY, OH, PA, TX) representing 13 GNAs with 13 companies. 
• Annual budgets of community groups range from $500 to $2.1 million per year 
• Number of paid staff ranges from 0 to 170. 
• Company types: 
o Chemical (3) 
o Dairy 
o Industrial Gas 
o Mining (2) 
o Pharmaceuticals 
o Refinery/Petrochemicals (4) 
o Waste Processing 
• Number of local residents employed by the companies: from 0 to 1,460. 
• On a scale of 1 to 10, the importance of the sectors that the companies represent to the local 
economy ranges from 1 to 10, with an average of 6. 
  
Characteristics of Companies at Time of GNA Negotiations 
 
Characteristic # of Companies
Concerned about public opinion 11 
Profitable 9 
Publicly traded 7 
Expanding 8 
Privately owned 5 
Seeking financing 2 
Perceived as committed to environmental concerns 2 




Issues Prompting Concern 
 
Type of Issue # of Companies
Nuisance (noise, traffic, odors) 12 
Public health concerns 10 
Environmental impacts 10 








Examples of “specific issues of greatest concern”:
• Public health – strange cancers, breathing problems 
• Mining under agricultural water supplies (ditches, reservoirs) 
• The potential for fire and explosions 
• Releases and spills of hazardous substances to the air and water 
• Nuisances (e.g., odors, overnight truck parking) 
• Adequacy of the company’s emergency response and evacuation plans 
• Danger of contamination of domestic water wells and groundwater from dairy activities 
 
 
Prior Actions Taken 
 
• All groups reported that prior to negotiating the GNA they: 
o Took their concerns to relevant government agencies 
o Consulted with company officials 
o Engaged in publicity campaigns and grassroots activism 
• Five groups reported filing or threatening to file lawsuits. 
• At least eight groups challenged permit applications. 
 
Examples of specific actions taken by different groups: 
• Distribution of a “fact sheet” 
• Neighborhood canvassing (letter writing campaign) 
• Compile “citizen’s audit” based on publicly available documents 
• Lobby political candidates 
• Write editorial for the NY Times 
• Air monitoring by community members 
• Media coverage, petitions, demonstrations 
 
 
Commitments Sought From Company 
 
Commitment # of GNAs
Pollution mitigation 12 
Regular environmental audits 10 
Access to environmental data 10 
Citizen involvement in audits 10 
Traffic mitigation 9 
Advance notice of company changes 9 
Access to emergency response plan 8 
Infrastructure improvements 7 
Local monetary contributions 5 
Citizen participation in company decisions 4 
Local hiring 3 
Whistleblower protection 3 
Job training 2 
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Financial support of community group 2 
Worker transportation/housing 1 
Community relocation 1 
 
 
Commitments Sought From Community Groups 
 
Commitment # of GNAs
End negative publicity 9 
Generate positive publicity 8 
Drop permit challenge   8* 
No lawsuit will be filed 3 
Dismissal of pending lawsuit 2 
Sign confidentiality agreement 1 
 *Estimate - not specifically asked in survey. 
 
 
GNA Negotiation Process 
 
•  The GNA negotiation process took 
2 months to 1.5 years for all GNAs 





Citizens had adequate access to: # of GNAs
Lawyers and legal expertise 9 
Technical consultants 9 
Technical/economic data 8 
Trained negotiators 3 
GNA Structure 
 
 Feature                            # of GNAs
Legally binding 9 
Remain in effect after sale 7 
Procedure for dispute resolution 6 
Integrated with permit 5 
Clear termination point 3 
Company funding of community group 2 














              # of GNAs
Extent to which commitments were honored:  
40% 1 
50 – 60% 1 
70 – 80% 5 
  90 – 100% 7 
  









Would you do it again?  
Yes 8 





What Would You Do Differently? 
 
• Reduce the number of people at the negotiating table 
• Keep the issues more focused 
• Get more money 
• Have an airtight redress process 
• Keep negotiation process in the public eye 
• Obtain formal commitment to reduce chemical use 
• Focus more on building the community group to prevent burnout and dissolution 
• Anticipate possible break-up of group and build in contingencies 
• Increase the term of the GNA 
• Speed up the process 
• Create a more legally binding agreement 
• Better prepare the community negotiating group 
• Make the GNA less legal and more easily understood 
• Ask for funds to monitor the implementation 







• Increased respect for community group 
• Empowerment of community group 
• Increased credibility of community group 
• Learning experience 
• Plant manager became more involved with employees 
• Developed great working relationships between the parties 
• Implementation of state of the art monitoring systems 
• Greater community awareness 
• Water monitoring in place 
 
 
Concerns About Viability of Group 
 
• Lack of funding 
• Insufficient staff /volunteers to monitor GNA 
• Staff turnover 
• Need for new members to take an active role 





• Go into the process with a united front 
• Make sure legal section is enforceable and legal action financed 
• Reserve the right to be critical of company actions 
• Be careful of a company’s public relations ploys 
• Ask for more than you want 
• Make sure you are ready for a lot of hard work and a long-term commitment 
• If possible, hire someone to monitor the company and report back to the group 
• Canvassing is a very effective tool 
• Be clear, keep it simple, keep government agencies out of the process, be tough 
• Worth pursuing, but won’t solve all problems 
• Be sure you will get further than using other tools (lawsuits, etc.) 
• Have bottom lines and stick to them 
• Try to get what you want in a closed timeframe 
• Obtain financial commitments prior to entering into negotiation to level the playing field 




          Survey Respondent: WSERC WCTC TUEF OCA SBESC NPRC C/LRTC BREATHE SEA LABB COCOA
Characteristics of the company at time of GNA negotiation.  The company was … 
Profitable         X X X X X X X  X X 
Expanding X          X X X X X X X 
Stable in size       X     
Seeking financing X          X  
Private / publicly traded Private          Public ? Public Private Public Public Public Public Public Private 
Concerned about public opinion X        X X X X X X X  X  
Characteristics of the GNA document, negotiation process, and the survey respondents’ degree of satisfaction. 
How long did GNA negotiation 
take? (months) 
12          12 6 10 1 to 12 12 18 4 8 3 2 
Legally binding? X          X X X X X X X X 
Procedures for dispute 
resolution? 
X          X X X X X  
Remain in effect after sale? X          X ? ? ? X X X ? X X 
Integrated with permit?           X X X X X 
Clear termination point?           X X X  
Company funding of 
community group? 
          X X  
Subsequent modifications? X          X  
Extent commitments honored (1 
to 10) 
10 9, 10 9.5 9.5 5-6, 7 9 8 7-8, 8 4 10 8 
Rating of overall success (1 to 
10) 
9 8, 10 9.5 9 5, 6 9 8 8, 9 5 7 8 
Would you do it again? Yes          Yes Yes Yes Yes Unsure Unsure Unsure,
Most Likely 
No Unsure Yes  
WSERC = Western Slope Environmental Resource Council; WCTC = West County Toxics Coalition; TUEF = Texans United Education Fund; OCA = Ohio Citizen 
Action; SBESC = Seneca-Babcock Environmental Subcommittee; NPRC = Northern Plains Resource Council; C/LRTC = Community/Labor Refinery Tracking 
Committee; BREATHE = Boulder Residents for the Elimination of Air Toxics and Hazardous Emissions; SEA = Shoreline Environmental Alliance; LABB = 








ENVIRONMENTAL GOOD NEIGHBOR AGREEMENT EVALUATION 
METHODOLOGY:  AN OVERVIEW 
 
Doug Kenney, Natural Resources Law Center 
Revised, September 2002 
 
 
The following pages describe the general philosophy being used to conduct the 
evaluation of environmentally oriented Good Neighbor Agreements.  The term “Good 
Neighbor Agreement” (GNA) is poorly defined and is used in a variety of contexts to 
describe arrangements voluntarily negotiated between companies and local communities 
(or local governments) (Lewis and Henkels, 1996).  Communities generally see 
environmental GNAs as a way of making polluting businesses more accountable for 
negative public impacts, while companies seek positive publicity for, and avoided 
community opposition to, business operations.   
 
No central or comprehensive listing of GNAs exists, however, it is estimated that 
approximately 50 examples exist worldwide.31  In this study, we are interested in 
examining GNAs with the following characteristics: 
 
1. Feature a written agreement; 
2. Located in the United States; 
3. Concerned with environmental issues; and 
4. Prominently involve one or more non-profit community groups.  
 
Several techniques have been utilized to find GNAs with these qualities, including key 
word searching of academic publication databases (e.g., Lexus/Nexus), web searching, 
phone conversations with prominent leaders in this field (e.g., Sanford Lewis) and GNA 
oriented organizations (e.g., Communities for a Better Environment), and the review of 
related documents.  The survey has identified just over a dozen candidate GNAs. 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN PROGRAM EVALUATION 
 
Everyone conducts evaluations of various types as part of normal daily life.  The formal 
evaluation of management programs and strategies, however, is a specialized task ideally 
informed by theories and methodologies described mainly in the program evaluation 
                                                 
31 This estimate is provided by Sanford Lewis.     
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literature.  Much of the theoretical literature describes sophisticated, quantitative 
evaluation methodologies based largely on experimental methods that are often of little 
practical value in real-world applications where data and budgetary constraints 
necessitate more qualitative approaches (Patton, 1988).  Arguably, the evaluation 
literature is currently as rich with descriptions about constraints and impediments to 
formal evaluations, than in advice on conducting pragmatic evaluations.  The situation is 
particularly murky regarding the assessment of efforts concerned with environmental 
protection and management.32  Nonetheless, the literature can provide some help in 
guiding the design of an evaluation protocol.   
 
The formal evaluation of environmental programs and management strategies is a 
relatively new endeavor.  Modern goals such as cost-effectiveness, performance based 
management, and maximized return-on-investments have recently prompted a variety of 
evaluations.33  The purpose of these evaluations can include identifying successes and 
failures, improving program effectiveness and/or efficiency, guiding funding decisions 
regarding program expansion or discontinuation, or comparing the efficacy of one 
program to another.  Such evaluations have a long history in many public sectors—
particularly in education, health care, welfare, and criminal justice—but are less common 
regarding the issue of environmental protection.  This omission partly reflects the 
newness of many environmental programs, and the difficulty in linking program activities 
to frequently nebulous environmental goals such as ecosystem health and ecological 
sustainability.34  Several strains of thinking are beginning to congeal, however, into a 
literature of environmental program evaluation.   
 
Techniques seen in environmental program evaluations typically reflect some 
combination of three different evaluation foci: (1) process analysis, (2) environmental 
outcome (or impact) assessment, and/or (3) efficiency measurement (Knapp and Kim, 
1998a).   
 
o Process Analysis.  The “process” evaluations typically utilize methodologies 
pioneered in the program implementation literature, and are concerned with 
describing and assessing activities occurring between program initiation and the 
presumed future achievement of results.35  These studies focus on activities (i.e., 
                                                 
32 As Knapp and Kim (1998b:349) conclude: “Whereas the state of the art in program evaluation is in flux, 
the art of environmental program evaluation has no state at all.  It has only artists.”  
33 Much of the recent evaluation work has focused on Superfund (i.e., CERCLA), the Clean Water Act, the 
Endangered Species Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and related efforts (Rich, 1998).   
34 As Bryner (1998:321) observes, “Program evaluation is particularly challenging in environmental policy.  
The uncertainty over the causes and consequences of ecological problems makes it difficult to assess the 
impact of public policies.  The long lag time between exposure and evidence of a problem makes it difficult 
to identify the factors responsible for environmental problems.  Pollutants may be transferred to another 
environmental medium instead of actually being reduced in volume, making evaluation of programs 
incomplete.  The challenges in changing human behavior in ways that are more protective of the 
environmental are inextricably intertwined with a host of other concerns, from economic growth to 
individual freedom.”  
35 Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky are considered the pioneers of this work.  This work tends to 
focus on outputs, rather than on-the-ground outcomes.  Environmental outputs can include “the number of 
hazardous waste site inspected, the number of actions taken to protect the habitat, the number of species 
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outputs) and decision-making involving challenges such as problem 
identification, the formulation of solutions, and the processes used to coordinate 
action.   
 
o Outcome (or Impact) Assessments.  In contrast to the process oriented evaluations, 
the outcome (or impact) evaluations draw from the environmental assessment 
literature largely inspired by National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
compliance.  These efforts feature a strong emphasis on defining and measuring 
environmental indicators and outcomes, often in the context of natural science 
theories and models used to explain causality.36  Comparing alternatives is a core 
element in many impact assessments. 
 
o Efficiency Evaluations.  These efforts are sometimes also labeled as “economic” 
evaluations, due to their heavy dependence on economic theory and their reliance 
on methodologies such as benefit/cost analysis, cost-effectiveness studies, 
compliance cost estimates, and risk assessment.  Much like outcome (impact) 
assessments—and in contrast to most process evaluations—these efforts often 
emphasize the comparison of alternatives. 
 
 
Sometimes overlying these three classes of evaluations are studies that “assess how 
processes work and outcomes are produced within a larger institutional framework” 
(Bartlett, 1994).  These “institutional studies” typically focus on broad parameters such as 
behavioral incentives, agency/organizational cultures, value systems, and decision rules, 
and how these larger institutional attributes might be shaped over time by a particular 
program to create a new institutional context—presumably one more conducive to 
environmental protection (Kraft, 1998).  The literature of institutional analysis is useful 
for guiding these efforts, even though it is not always considered as a core element of the 
program evaluation field.37
 
As noted above, each focus implicates a different set of tools and methodologies, 
described in a different tributary of the evaluation literature.  Determining which 
combination of concepts and tools is most applicable in a given evaluation exercise is a 
complex challenge, especially since many researchers have concluded that several 
programs are simply not amenable to any type of evaluation.  Those researchers suggest 
that an “evaluability assessment” be conducted before any evaluation effort is considered 
(e.g., see Wholey, 1983, 1987; Schmidt et al., 1979; Rich, 1998).   The primary constraint 
on environmental program evaluations is the lack of appropriate data, especially as it 
pertains to environmental indicators and outcomes.  This is well illustrated by U.S. 
General Accounting Office environmental evaluations that tend to reach few conclusions 
                                                                                                                                                 
recovery plans that have been approved, the number of environmental impact statements that have been 
submitted, and the amount of pollution in the air or water” (quote by Rich, 1998:32-33 Rich, drawing on 
research by Rosenbaum, 1991, and Bartlett, 1994).   
36 The selection of appropriate indicators is an active area of research and writing.   
37 Kenney and Lord (1999) provide an explanation of how institutional analysis techniques can be used to 
assess natural resources and environmental problems and problem-solving strategies. 
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about program effectiveness, while identifying in detail the data deficiencies that prevent 
a comprehensive evaluation (Solomon, 1998).  These deficiencies include the quality of 
environmental data, the adequacy of techniques used to gather data, and the integrity of 
the analytical techniques used to evaluate that data.  GAO recommendations, 
consequently, primarily focus on ways to improve the databases needed for future, 
methodologically rigorous, evaluations.  These recommendations tend to have little 
practical use in short-term decision-making.   
 
The availability of information is a major consideration in designing a program 
evaluation.  For example, the availability of data often shapes whether the approach 
selected is quantitative or qualitative.  Quantitative approaches often rely on a quasi-
experimental or “scientific” approach, and utilize statistical methods to analyze data and 
support conclusions.  Such approaches can be expensive, time-consuming, and 
impractical where data is not readily available, and may encourage researchers to focus 
only on those dimensions of a problem that are operational and measurable.  Often, more 
practical evaluations are those that use qualitative methods, such as interviews, 
observations, and the review of written documents, to support conclusions (Rich, 1998).  
The status of qualitative approaches has risen in recent decades.  As King et al. (1987:15) 
explain: “The development of evaluation thinking over the past twenty years has led 
away from the notion that the quantitative research study is the only or even the ideal 
form for an evaluation.” 
 
The efforts of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) highlight several 
difficulties of program evaluation.  Historically, the agency based its evaluations on 
activity (or output) measures, such as number of permits issued, and was roundly 
criticized for not measuring what was really important: environmental outcomes (Mintz, 
1995; NAPA, 1997).  In this respect, the agency was primarily engaged in so-called 
formative evaluations, which are most typical of young programs, are usually reliant on 
output measures, and are most often conducted internally with the goal of improving 
program performance.  Critics, in contrast, were calling for so-called summative 
evaluations, which are often more appropriate for mature efforts, use outcome data, and 
are often conducted by (and/or for) outside entities responsible for making decisions 
about continuing or discontinuing programs.38  The agency responded in recent years by 
focusing more on environmental outcomes such as water quality data, thereby balancing 
process analyses with outcome assessments.39  This, however, has led to a new 
methodological problem: trying to link outcomes to EPA activities.   
 
This experience highlights a great paradox in evaluation: focusing on means (i.e., 
processes and outputs) tells you little about ends (i.e., impacts and outcomes); focusing 
                                                 
38 The distinction is credited to Scriven (1967). 
39 One example of this commitment to better integrate outcome measures into program evaluations is the 
National Performance Measures Strategy (NPMS).  According to EPA, the strategy not only “includes 
traditional measures, such as the number of inspections and enforcement actions conducted each year, it 
also establishes new outcome measures for evaluating the behavioral and environmental results of our 
activities.  These measures include compliance rates for selected regulated populations, pollutant reductions 
resulting from enforcement actions, behavioral changes stemming from compliance assistance, and average 
time for significant violators to return to compliance” (EPA, 2000:3). 
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on ends tells you little about means.  Without an explicit knowledge of how means and 
ends are related, it is impossible to generate advice for making programs more successful 
(Knapp and Kim, 1998b; Wholey et al., 1970).40  This suggests two related lessons in 
evaluation design.  First, truly valuable evaluations are those pursued from multiple foci, 
featuring measurements and theories necessary to relate on-the-ground outcomes to 
program activities and, at the least, to distinguish between the achievements of the 
program versus what would have happened in its absence.  An articulation of this 
perspective is found in Minnesota law guiding the evaluation of state programs:  
 
[Evaluations should determine] the degree to which the activities and 
programs entered into or funded by the state are accomplishing their goals 
and objectives, including a critical analysis of goals and objectives, 
measurement of program results and effectiveness, alternative means of 
achieving the same results, and efficiency in the allocation of resources.41
 
Second, the goal(s) of the evaluation should largely shape the focus and methodology 
employed, as suggested below in Table 1.  For the reason stated above, evaluations 




TYPES OF EVALUATION EXERCISES 
Question to be Answered Type of Evaluation Required
How is the program being implemented? Program Review 
Is the program in compliance with specified 
agreements? 
Compliance Evaluation 
Is the program managed efficiently? Economy and Efficiency 
Evaluation 
Is the program accomplishing its goals and 
objectives? 
Effectiveness Evaluation 
What are alternative ways of reaching the program’s 
goals? 
Policy Evaluation 
Adapted from figure 4, Evaluation Categories, in Guide to the Program Evaluation Division, Office of the Legislative 
Auditor, State of Minnesota, August 2001, page 7. 
 
 
                                                 
40 “Although data on outcomes provide perhaps the ultimate measures of program success, they offer little 
of use for making programs successful.  Constructive criticism requires not only an assessment of what is 
achieved but also an understanding of why achievement suffers.  Such an understanding requires 
knowledge of the institutional context” (Knapp and Kim, 1998b:350). 
41 Minn. Stat. §3.971, subd. 2. 
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CRAFTING THE EVALUATION STRATEGY 
 
An initial review of GNAs has identified several factors that influence what types of 
approaches and evaluation methodologies are (and are not) possible in this study.  While 
that work is still ongoing, it is sufficiently complete to have produced several insights 
that have relevance to the design of an evaluation, including: 
 
o In most cases, GNAs are very poorly documented; 
o GNAs very greatly in terms of structure, function, goals, subject matters, and  
other organizational and substantive characteristics; 
o Environmentally-focused GNAs are relatively uncommon; and, 
o GNAs operate in an environment where success or failure can be greatly 
influenced by a wide variety of exogenous factors that cannot be controlled for 
through typical experimental methods (especially given the low sample size 
available to us). 
 
Additionally, the goals of the evaluation are multi-faceted.  One interest of the Northern 
Plains Resource Council, for example, is to improving the functioning of the Stillwater 
GNA.  However, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation—the organization funding 
this work—while sharing this interest, is primarily interested in assessing the general 
utility of the GNA tool in environmental applications.  Both goals necessitate a variety of 
information gathering and analysis efforts.  Combined, these goals give this evaluation 
exercise an extremely broad focus. 
 
 
EVALUATION DESIGN DECISIONS 
 
As explained earlier, the design of a particular program evaluation should be based on 
several considerations, including most prominently the availability of information and the 
goals of the exercise.  In this case, we have a situation where information is generally 
lacking, and where the goals of the evaluation are multifaceted.42  This strongly suggests 
two overarching principles for the evaluation effort.  First, the effort should be qualitative 
and descriptive more so than quantitative (and/or statistical).  The universe of GNAs is 
much too small to consider any sort of statistically oriented evaluation, especially given 
the difficulty associated with establishing appropriate control groups.  Basic descriptions 
of existing GNAs are a real deficiency in the literature and are an impediment to virtually 
all types of analysis.43   These considerations strongly suggest a research strategy 
primarily reliant on qualitative analyses.  Secondly, the effort must feature several lens 
and/or foci.  This evaluation is intended to serve several purposes and several audiences.  
                                                 
42 Unfortunately, these conclusions all underscore our belief that the evaluation of environmental GNAs 
will be difficult.  On the other hand, the lack of data and understanding about GNAs suggests that even 
modest insights gained through our evaluation will have real value. 
43 As King et al. observe (1987:11), “description, in as much detail as possible, of the materials, activities, 
processes, and administrative arrangements that characterize a particular program is an important part of its 
evaluation.”   
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Users of this study are likely to have a variety of questions regarding GNAs: e.g., How 
are GNAs being used?  Are GNAs achieving their specified goals?  How effectively and 
efficiently are GNAs functioning?  Do some GNAs work better than others?  How can 
the use of GNAs be improved?   How well do GNAs work in comparison to other 
approaches?  Several types of evaluation studies are implicated by these questions.   
 
While an effort will be made to offer partial answers to all these questions, the evaluation 
strategy proposed below is primarily an “effectiveness evaluation” aimed at determining 
the extent to which the set of GNAs studied are achieving their intended goals.  This 
analysis will primarily be conducted from the perspective of the community 
organizations (rather than the companies involved).  A secondary goal is to determine 
why or why not the GNAs studied are successful.  Thus, the proposed analysis is 
summative more so than formative, in that the primary goal is to assess whether or not 
the selected GNAs are working, rather than emphasizing how they might be improved. 
 
Five perspectives or “metrics” are listed below to guide evaluation judgments.  Note that 
they offer a blend of objective and subjective analysis, and draw on insights from 
participants (i.e., insiders) as well as outside analysts.  This diversity of metrics and 
information sources is a product of the multiple objectives of this research, and reflects 
the challenge of finding adequate information. 
 
The following three metrics will primarily be used to evaluate whether or not the GNAs 
are working successfully.  They are listed in order of importance. 
 
1. Actual program activities versus promised activities.  To the extent that the GNA 
requires specific actions (or inactions) at predetermined times (or under specific 
circumstances), these standards provide a useful way to evaluate activities, outputs, 
and potentially, outcomes.  (This is a time series, or longitudinal, approach.) 
 
This type of evaluation is highly objective, and depends only on collecting 
data on activities and requirements.  This information should be obtainable 
through questionnaires and interviews, and the review of the GNA document and 
any other available records.  (Potentially, this may include technical information 
such as emissions data.) 
 
 
2. Participant satisfaction and self-assessment.  Presumably, participants have a good 
idea of the suite of problem-solving options available to them, and to the costs and 
benefits of pursuing the GNA strategy.  Thus, their degree of satisfaction with the 
GNA is a useful metric of the strategy.44   
 
     This information can be obtained through questionnaires and interviews.   Note 
that it will be useful to solicit opinions from both community leaders and 
company representatives. 
                                                 
44 Note that asking a participant to measure their satisfaction can be an easy an effective way for identifying 




3. GNA success versus other problem-solving opportunities.  Communities can use a 
variety of approaches to modify and/or control the activities of neighboring 
companies.  Ultimately, the efficacy of the GNA approach must be considered with 
respect to what is potentially achievable using other tools—including those of a 
regulatory, judicial, economic, and/or political nature. 
 
While this assessment will be informed by discussions with GNA participants, 
it is largely an analytical effort that can occur within the Natural Resources Law 
Center in consultation with researchers with expertise in other problem-solving 
strategies and their associated literatures.45   
 
 
Determining why or why not a given effort is successful will be approached from two 
perspectives.  One approach relies on the judgments of participants regarding the 
availability of key resources and variables, such as leadership, funding, and other 
categories defined by participants.  A second approach involves an analysis by the 
Natural Resources Law Center using principles of institutional analysis.   
 
4. Self-assessment of keys to success and failure.  Success or failure can often hinge on 
the availability of a key resource or circumstance that is best understood by 
participants active in the negotiation and implementation of the GNA.   
 
This type of information is readily available in written questionnaires and 
interviews.   
 
 
5. Internal logic of the problem-solving strategy used in the GNA.  One way to explain 
the success or failure of a problem-solving strategy in a given situation is through an 
institutional analysis case study that evaluates how the GNA effort has changed rules 
influencing relationships, behaviors, and activities of key participants, and whether or 
not this happened as intended. 
 
This is the type of analysis ideally suited to institutional analysis concepts, 
and can be conducted by researchers at the Natural Resources Law Center without 
significant outside input.  Before the analysis can be conducted, however, a 
working knowledge of each case study must be developed.  This can be done 
through written questionnaires, oral interviews, and through the review of relevant 
documents. 
 
                                                 
45 This is a metric where a statistical comparison would be highly desirable, but is impractical given the 
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APPENDIX G:  NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF THE GNA WORKSHOP IN 2002 
 
 
Billings Gazette, August 4, 2002 
 
Knowledge, trust key to agreements 
 
By Dan Burkhart 
Of the Gazette Staff 
 
RED LODGE  --  Dawn Caldarelli remembers how people in her low-income 
neighborhood in Buffalo, N.Y., spent generations watching freshly washed sheets sully 
on the line. Old timers talked about orange snow.  
“Everyone had just kind of put up with what they saw without thinking about what it 
really meant," the single mother of four said.  
But Caldarelli, with a degree in psychology and environmental science, knew there were 
dangers to the health and welfare of the community from the company recycling waste in 
her neighborhood.  
"For decades some nasty chemicals had been making people sick, but the company got 
away with it because they were doing a good thing - recycling - without anyone looking 
to see how that was done," she said.  
For Caldarelli, this was where she lived. She wasn't going to see her kids get sick.  
"We had a high incidence of cancer, but no studies to see if there was a connection. I 
couldn't get the regulatory agencies to even look at the issue. 'That's it,' I decided. I was 
going to have to do something myself," she said.  
It wasn't easy when she began a campaign to get the media involved. She was threatened. 
Plant employees demeaned her.  
"I was told I wasn't smart enough to understand," she said. "But I didn't need a degree to 
recognize a 30,000-pound spill of sulfur dioxide was dangerous."  
It took time, but Caldarelli eventually persuaded the Buffalo Common Council (the 
equivalent of a city council) to pressure the chemical company with the eco-friendly 
name, Environmental Natural Corp., to sit down to negotiate remedies to neighborhood 
concerns. Trucks carrying toxic chemicals were re-routed away from her community. 
Pollution prevention measures were beefed up. The company agreed to notify the 
community when there was a toxic spill or health threatening event.  
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It was Buffalo's version of a Good Neighbor Agreement, something similar to what 
citizen groups in Stillwater and Sweet Grass counties did with Stillwater Mining Co. 
Basically, Good Neighbor Agreements are a way for companies and communities to 
resolve environmental, health and safety issues without going to court. It allows both 
sides to sit down face to face to resolve problems. It involves people in corporate 
decisions and actions.  
In Caldarelli's case, it fixed what governmental regulatory agencies didn't.  
"The agencies looked the other way. They weren't interested," she said.  
Her story was one of many told this past weekend in Red Lodge at a Good Neighbor 
conference sponsored by the Northern Plains Resource Council.  
"In the course of trying to move forward with Good Neighbor Agreements, we were 
interested in the experience of others," NPRC staff director Teresa Erickson said.  
Erickson said the NPRC is interested in trying to use the same kind of agreement with 
coalbed methane issues.  
"We thought it would be useful to bring together others from across the country to 
collectively refine Good Neighbor Agreements as a tool to solve natural resource 
conflicts," she said.  
The representatives of citizen groups attending told different stories about different 
conflicts. For Dr. Henry Clark of Richmond, Calif., it was dealing with a petro-chemical 
company. For Tara Thomas, it was coal mining in Colorado. For Denny Larson it was 
working in what was called the "cancer crescent," an area saturated with toxic oil and gas 
residues and residents with an abnormally high rate of cancer.  
But despite the different stories, all had much in common. First, they were motivated by 
the failure of government.  
"Regulatory agencies don't do their job," Clark said. "It's partly inertia, partly politics."  
Publicity is one tool to persuade companies to discuss agreements that often go beyond 
the compliance companies have under local, state and federal laws.  
"Money talks," Richard Abraham of Texans United said. "Even if a company has good 
intentions, they answer to stockholders. There has to be an economic benefit to working 
out the problems."  
Sometimes not being tied up in court is enough. Sometimes getting good publicity helps.  
"Companies don't like bad press, and they hate delays. It costs them money if we appeal 
permit decisions," Abraham said.  
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Many times it's because the community groups find ways to resolve an issue and save the 
company money. Most citizens don't really want to know technical details about mining 
or refining, according to Larson. But his group discovered more unhealthy emissions 
came from leaking valves than out the stacks of refineries.  
"We researched leakless valves. They would reduce bad emissions and save the company 
a lot of money. They could recapture product. Of course, we had to demonstrate the 
expense of installing them would repay them," he said.  
Thomas had a similar experience dealing with Colorado coal companies when it came to 
noisy trains. With 100 crossings in communities along the route of the coal trains, it was 
a serious issue. Thomas found there were ball bearings that would reduce the noise.  
"I'd rather be gardening than learning about ball bearings," she said. "But you have to 
know the subject to negotiate."  
Patience is required to complete agreements. Clark said his group started addressing 
refinery issues in 1984. It was in the early 1990s before negotiations began, spurred 
somewhat by the media attention that came when the Rev. Jessie Jackson arrived to help.  
And once agreements are in place, the work isn't done. Anne Rolfes of the Louisiana 
Bucket Brigade said her organization's name was literal. They provide people with a 
relatively inexpensive bucket that can test for six different toxic emissions. It's a way of 
checking how accurate a company's reports are, she said.  
For NPRC, dealing with Stillwater Mining was a good deal less contentious than some of 
the experiences others had. The biggest obstacle was uncertainty, according to Stillwater 
Mining vice president Chris Allen in an NPRC report.  
"SMC entered the GNA with decidedly mixed emotions. This ambivalence was born of 
many things, but it all boiled down to one word - uncertainty. A year ago, the path 
forward looked murky. Today, the landscape is better illuminated, and it seems to us that 
the prospect of failure recedes the longer we work together," he stated.  
NPRC and its affiliates - the Stillwater Protective Association and the Cottonwood 
Resource Council - also had uncertainties. Could the company be held legally 
accountable? Would there be ongoing cooperation?  
In the end the agreement between Stillwater Mining and the citizen groups was a good 
model for others. It was binding. It went beyond what the company was required to do. It 
included citizen representatives on two key committees - one for oversight, one for 
technical developments. It was good publicity for the company.  
"The heart of the GNA rests upon the principles of mutual trust and respect. We are not 
always going to agree with each other, and some issues may be sufficiently important to 
drive us to arbitration. But, if our playing field is both level and clearly defined, and the 
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principles upon which this agreement was founded remain our touchstone, then I believe 
the GNA will prosper," according to Allen.  
Caldarelli was one who benefited from the report on the historic Montana agreement.  
"Ours is based on memorandums of understanding rather than a legally binding 
agreement," she said. "That's something we can do better thanks to what we learned at 
this conference." 
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APPENDIX H:   CONTRACTS:  DEFINITIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
  





When considering the negotiation of a Good Neighbor Agreement it may be beneficial to 
understand some of the fundamental terms and concepts that make up the law of 
contracts.  This memo briefly reviews some definitions and considerations regarding 
contracts.  In reviewing this material, keep in mind that for every rule or requirement in 
contract law, there is often an exception.  There are multiple aspects of contract law that 
are not included in this document—e.g., aspects such as the mirror image rule (how 
offers and counteroffers relate to each other), parol evidence (dealing with what can come 
in as evidence when terms of a contract are in dispute), the various defenses that a 
breaching party may have when not fulfilling the terms of a contract, and remedies or 
damages available if a party does breach.  These are complex issues that require the skill 





 Agreement – A manifestation of mutual assent between two or more people.   
 Bargain Requirement – Generally, when forming a contract, there must be some sort 
of a manifestation of mutual assent to the agreed upon exchange.   
 Consideration - A contract requires the presence of “consideration.”  Consideration is 
present in a bargained-for exchange, where a person making a promise requires 
something from the other person in return for the promise.  Consideration may be 
thought of as the price of this promise, or something bargained for and given in 
exchange for the promise.48 
 Contract – A contract is a promise where the law provides a remedy for the aggrieved 
party if that promise is broken.   
 Offer & Acceptance – Aspects of the “bargain requirement.”  The offer is typically a 
proposal presented by one party followed by an acceptance from the other party, 
manifesting mutual assent.     
                                                 
46 It must be noted that this document is intended only as an educational tool and is not to be construed as 
offering any legal advice.  When working with the intricacies involved in drafting a contract, it is advisable 
to seek legal guidance from a licensed attorney.   
47 Each of the definitions included has been summarized from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  See 
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (3rd ed. 1999) for a comprehensive treatment of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts.  The Restatement was a project instituted by several prominent scholars in 1933.  In 
1979, a second version was adopted by the American Law Institute.  The provisions of the Restatements are 
generally considered to be authoritative by courts and commentators.  However, the Restatements do not 
carry the force of law that is found in a statute or court decision.  See CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., RULES OF 
CONTRACT LAW (1999).   
48 See CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., RULES OF CONTRACT LAW 15 (1999).   
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 Promise – A manifestation of intent to act or not act in a certain way.  This promise is 
made in a way so as to justify another in understanding that the promise is intended to 
create a commitment.   
 Statute of Frauds – A requirement that certain contracts must be in writing, otherwise 
enforcement may be forbidden.  The following contracts are those that generally must 
be in writing to be enforceable:  a contract requiring one to answer for the duty of 
another; a contract regarding an interest in land; a contract that cannot be completed 
within one year from the date created; a contract for the sale of goods valued at $500 
or more.     





General Creation of Contracts
The primary approach in the creation of contracts is called a “bargained-for exchange.”49  
A bargained-for exchange means that there is a legally enforceable agreement where each 
party gets something.  For example, suppose one person has $1000 to spend on a used car 
and another person has a car that she is selling for $1000.  Transferring title to the car in 
exchange for the money is a bargained-for exchange.  This is different from simply 
giving the car to someone as a gift because gift promises are not enforceable.50  When 
there is a bargained-for exchange, “a promise is said to be ‘supported by consideration’ 
because the promisor gets something in exchange for (or as the price of) her promise.”51  
This exchange of bargains is also called “consideration.”  One important aspect of 
consideration is the concept that “past consideration is not consideration.”  If a person is 
willing to give Mr. Smith $1000 in June for helping her move into her apartment the 
previous January, there is no bargained-for exchange and the gift is not enforceable.  
Another example may be if a company wants a concession for something that it did in the 
past (“we closed that portion of the company four months ago, so in exchange we 
want…”) would not necessarily be consideration.  Courts often do not like having to 
determine how much is “enough” consideration and will often leave it up to the parties to 
determine.52
 
Once the basics of the bargain have been negotiated, there must be an actual offer and 
acceptance before a contract can be formed.  Contract law approaches this aspect by 
looking for “a particular communication that constitutes an offer and another 
communication that constitutes an acceptance.”53  An offer is “an expression by one party 
of assent to certain definite terms, provided that the other party involved in the bargaining 
transaction will likewise express assent to the same terms.”54  Contract law uses a 
                                                 
49 ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 15 (2004). 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 26. 
53 Id. at 40. 
54 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 28 (2d ed. 1993).   
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“reasonable person” approach in determining if someone’s actions or behavior is an offer 
to enter into a contract.   
 
Statute of Frauds 
The Statute of Frauds generally requires that certain contracts must be in writing, 
otherwise enforcement may be forbidden.  The idea behind this requirement is that the 
presence of an actual written contract deters people from fraudulently claiming that the 
parties have an enforceable oral agreement.  According to the Restatement (Second), 
“where any promise in a contract cannot be fully performed within a year from the time 
the contract is made, all promises in the contract are within the Statute of Frauds [must be 
in writing] until one party to the contract completes his performance.”55  Even after the 
one party completes his performance, the provisions regarding the other party are still 
enforceable.56   
 
Unless there is a law in place requiring otherwise, a contract that must be in writing 
because of the Statute of Frauds is enforceable if it is actually in writing, signed by or on 
behalf of the parties.  The writing must (a) reasonably identify the subject of the contract, 
(b) indicates that a contract has been made between the parties, and (c) describes in 
reasonably certain language the essential terms of the promises made when creating the 
contract.57   
 
Misrepresentation, Duress, Undue Influence & Unconscionability
There are several acts of conduct by one party that can influence whether the contract 
being negotiated is enforceable.  Three types of conduct discussed here are acts of 
misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence.  It is often difficult to determine when a 
specific act or term crosses the line into the realm of misrepresentation, undue influence, 
or overreaching.  This seems to be a constant challenge for lawmakers and courts.   
 
If a party to a contract makes a representation to the others, this representation may be 
considered to be a fraudulent misrepresentation, depending on the circumstances.  A 
misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker intends the statement to induce the other 
party to agree to the contract and the maker (a) know that the statement is not being made 
according to the facts available, or (b) does not have confidence that he is making the 
statement truthfully, or (c) knows that he does not have a proper basis for making the 
statement.58  This type of misrepresentation is considered “material” if it would likely 
induce a reasonable person to agree to the contract, or if the maker knows that this would 
be the likely result.59  If the misrepresentation relates to one of the essential terms of a 
proposed contract, and it induces the other person to assent to the agreement, the assent is 
not effective.  The “other” person must have been justified in relying on the 
misrepresentation.  This misrepresentation aspect of contract law may result in the 
                                                 
55 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §130 (3rd ed. 1999). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at §131. 
58 Id. at §162. 
59 Id.  
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contract being prevented from being formed in the first place, or may result in the 
contract being voidable.60   
 
Conduct involving duress often impacts the existence and/or enforceability of a 
contract.61  Duress may be present if a party’s assent to a contract is induced by the other 
party’s improper threat.  If the improper threat leaves the victim with no reasonable 
alternative, the victim may decide to take action to void the contract (the contract is 
voidable by the victim).62  So, when is a threat improper?  It is improper if “what is 
threatened is a crime or a tort, or the threat itself would be a crime or a tort if it resulted in 
obtaining property.”63  It is also improper if the other party is threatening a criminal 
prosecution, the threat of a civil suit made in bad faith, or the threat itself is a breach of 
the duty to deal in good faith.64  Additionally, a threat is improper if the threatened act 
would cause harm to the recipient and would not significantly create any benefit to the 
party making the threat.65    
 
Undue influence is another factor to consider when determining if a contract is 
enforceable.  Undue influence is “unfair persuasion of a party who is under the 
domination of the person exercising the persuasion or who by virtue of the relation 
between them is justified in assuming that that person will not act in a manner 
inconsistent with his welfare.”66  If a person agrees to a contract as a result of undue 
influence, the contract may be voidable by the victim.67  Undue influence typically relates 
to the entire contract.   
 
When questioning if a specific term is enforceable, courts also look to see if the contract 
or term is “unconscionable,” a term used to refer to a bargain that is so exceedingly one-
sided and detrimental to a party as to suggest a lack of meaningful choice or bargaining 
power.68  If a term is unconscionable at the time the contract is created, a court may 
refuse to enforce the entire contract, may remove the unconscionable term and enforce 
the rest of the contract, or limit the application of the unconscionable term to avoid any 
unconscionable result.69   
 
It should be noted that, in addition to policies against using undue influence and 
unconscionability, there is also a general duty of good faith and fair dealing that is 
imposed on each party to a contract.  This good faith and fair dealing duty applies during 
both the performance and enforcement of the contract.70
  
                                                 
60 Id. at §§163-64. 
61 Id. at §§174-77. 
62 Id. at §175. 
63 Id. at §176. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. 
66 Id. at §177. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at §208. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at §205. 
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Impossibility of Performance & Impracticability of Performance 
Even if the contract is created in good faith by both parties, there may be unforeseeable 
circumstances that make it difficult for one or both parties to comply with their promises 
included in the contract.  Community groups have come across this situation when the 
company in question is experiencing financial difficulty and claiming that they are not 
able to fulfill their end of the bargained-for exchange.  Contract law addresses this type of 
situation under the category “impossibility” of performance and “impracticability” of 
performance.71
 
“Impossibility” is when one making a promise is literally unable to perform his promise 
due to circumstances beyond his control.72  A common example is where a musician rents 
a music hall to perform for a fee of $3,000.  Prior to the concert, the hall burns down.  In 
that case, a supervening event (the fire) made performance impossible.  As such, contract 
law may turn to the concept of “impossibility of performance” to release the music hall 
management from liability.73  Not everything that makes performance impossible has this 
same result.  Generally, a court will first look at if the parties to the contract allocated the 
risk of a specific event (such as a flood or fire) to a party.  This may be done by directly 
expressing the risk through words or through implication as indicated via the parties’ 
negotiations, trade custom, course of dealing, etc.  If the parties did not anticipate this 
type of event at all, the courts must determine where the risk lies.74  The courts also look 
at other factors in determining if performance is truly impossible, and if so, who bears the 
risk.  However, a court will not generally excuse a promising party from performing 
where the party somehow causes the impossibility to occur.75   
 
What if an event occurs that does not make it impossible to fulfill a promise, but does 
make it extremely expensive to fulfill the promise?  This situation is termed 
“impracticability.”  It is difficult to determine when the results of an event reach the level 
of impracticability.  It is suggested that a “very serious disruption must occur.”76  Courts 
will look at factors such as if the event alters the essential nature of the contract or 
contract term, if the event causes a severe shortage, etc.77  Foreseeable, moderate changes 





In addition to issues regarding contract law, groups considering GNAs may want to seek 
professional advice about other related legal issues.  For example: 
 One community organization investigated the possibility of getting a Federal Consent 
Decree.  This is when the parties, after filing a federal lawsuit, come to an agreement 
and submit the agreement to a federal judge.  That judge has discretion as to if the 
                                                 
71 Id. at §§261-72. 
72 ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 305 (2004). 
73 Id.  
74 Id.   
75 Id. at 309. 
76 Id. at 311. 
77 Id. 
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judge will accept the agreement and approve it.  Once it is approved and the judge 
“signed off on it,” the court has essentially agreed to maintain jurisdiction to enforce 
the agreement.   
 When negotiating contract terms, some community organizations involved in this 
Good Neighbor Agreement study specifically sought out terms that are self-
executing, that is, terms that do not require a significant amount of oversight.  With a 
self-executing term in a contract, if the term is not met, it is considered a breach and 
general breach of contract remedies are available.   
 Several community organizations have achieved some success in enforcing contract 
provisions by including the terms in a permit, such as a water use permit.  Investigate 
all requirements relating to this option as they often require the approval or 
collaboration of a state agency. 
 There may also be remedies available through property law (covenants, easements, 
etc.).  This is a specialized area that may require consulting an attorney working 





The following is a list of possible resources.  The list includes legal treatises, 
practitioner’s guides, and websites that may assist you to further expand your 
understanding of contract law.  The sponsoring organization makes no representations as 
to the quality or comprehensiveness of the resources listed.   
 
GERALD E. BERENDT ET AL., CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE (1998).  A commonly 
used textbook with details on each contract concept and supporting case law.   
 
1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 28 (2d ed. 1993).  A widely used 
contracts treatise. 
 
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (3rd ed. 1999).  A widely used contracts 
treatise. 
 
ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 15 (2004).  Short, concise 
treatise with examples presented in an easy to understand format. 
 
CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., RULES OF CONTRACT LAW (1999).  A guide that includes 
the Uniform Commercial Code (guides contract law when the contract involves the 
sale of goods) and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (guides general contract 
law).   
 
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS (5th ed. 2003). 
 
FRED S. STEINGOLD, LEGAL GUIDE FOR STARTING & RUNNING A SMALL BUSINESS 
(7th ed. 2003).  Although this book is targeted to those starting a small business, it 
includes material discussing the core concepts of contract law.  
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http://www.findlaw.com.  Website that provides links to find a lawyer, search the 
website, search legal news, search for related cases, and search for statutes (laws) 
relating to contracts, and virtually every other aspect of the law.   
 
http://www.contract-law.com.  Website that provides additional definitions and a 
series of Frequently Asked Questions regarding contracts. 
 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contract.  Provides definitions and concepts. 
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